Gaub v. Milbank Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-442,85-442
• Citation: 220 Mont. 424,715 P.2d 443
• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Parties: Mark A. GAUB, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY, and Kimberly A. Tanner, Defendants, and Larry Tanner and Judy Tanner, Defendants and Respondents.

Page 443

715 P.2d 443

220 Mont. 424

Mark A. GAUB, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY, and Kimberly A. Tanner, Defendants, and Larry Tanner and Judy Tanner, Defendants and Respondents.

No. 85-442.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Nov. 14, 1985.

Decided March 20, 1986.

Hash, Jellison, O'Brien & Bartlett, James C. Bartlett, Kalispell, for plaintiff and appellant.

Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg, Gary R. Christiansen, Kalispell, for defendants and respondents.

GULBRANDSON, Justice.

The plaintiff appeals an order from the Lake County District Court granting summary judgment to defendants Larry Tanner and Judy Tanner. Plaintiff contends on appeal that Sec. 61-5-108, MCA, requires any negligence of a minor to be imputed to the minor's parents when (a) both parents signed the minor's application for a driver's license and (b) no proof of financial responsibility accompanied the minor's application for a driver's license. We affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment to the parents.

The following facts are taken from the District Court's order:

Defendant Kimberly A. Tanner drove a motor vehicle which was involved in a collision with plaintiff's vehicle in December 1983. She is the minor daughter of defendants Larry and Judy Tanner. Both parents signed Kimberly Tanner's application for a driver's license in December 1982. They maintained liability insurance on the motor vehicle which she drove at the time of the accident. The amount of insurance was twice the minimum amount required to satisfy Montana's financial responsibility laws. The parents provided proof of liability insurance to the Motor Vehicle Division of the State of Montana by complying with its directives to the Lake County Treasurer when they licensed and registered the motor vehicle. No proof of financial responsibility accompanied Kimberly Tanner's application for a driver's license.

Plaintiff's sole issue on appeal concerns the meaning of Sec. 61-5-108, MCA:

Can parents who signed a minor's application for a driver's license invoke a limit on damages in the amount of their liability insurance coverage when (a) both parents have signed the application for the minor to obtain a driver's license, and (b) no proof of financial responsibility accompanied the minor's application for a driver's license?

Section 61-5-108, MCA, states:

(1) The application of any person under the age of 18 years for an instruction permit or operator's license shall be signed and verified before a person authorized to administer oaths by both the father and mother of the applicant, if both are living and have custody of him, or by the surviving parent, or in the event neither parent is living or has custody, then by the person or guardian having such custody or by an employer of such minor, or in the event there is no guardian or employer then by some other responsible person who is willing to assume the obligation imposed under this chapter upon a person signing the application of a minor.

(2) Any negligence or willful misconduct of a minor under the age of 18 years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to a person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or license, which person shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by such negligence or willful misconduct, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section.

(3) In the event a minor deposits or there is deposited upon his behalf proof of financial responsibility in respect to the operation of a motor vehicle owned by him, or if not the owner of a motor vehicle, then with respect to the operation of any motor vehicle, in form and in amounts as required under the motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of this state, then the department may accept the application of such minor when signed by one parent or the guardian of such minor, and while such proof is maintained such parent or guardian shall not be subject to the liability imposed under subsection (2) of this section.

Appellant focuses on the last two phrases in subsection (3) to support his interpretation. He argues that subsection (3) is available only when "one parent or the guardian of such minor" signs the application and that it is not available when both parents or the minor's employee or some other responsible person signs the application. He also contends that the proof of financial responsibility must be submitted at the time of application. The District Court concluded, from reading Sec. 61-5-108, MCA, as a whole that in subsections (1) and (2), the legislature intended a minor should receive a driver's license only if the application is co-signed by a person who shall be responsible for any negligence of the minor while operating a motor vehicle. The court further concluded that, in subsection (3), the legislature eliminated this imputed liability for that responsible person so long as proof of financial responsibility is provided and maintained. Finally, the District Court concluded that the express language of subsection (3) contains no time limitation within which proof of financial responsibility must be deposited.

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the legislature controls ... The intention of the legislature must first be determined from the plain meaning of the words used ... [Citations omitted.]

Missoula County v. American Asphalt, Inc. (Mont.1985), 701 P.2d 990, 992, 42 St.Rep. 920, 922. In the search for plain meaning, "the language used must be reasonably and logically interpreted, giving words their usual and ordinary meaning." In re Matter of McCabe (1975), 168 Mont. 334, 339, 544 P.2d 825, 828. A court's function, when construing a statute, is to ascertain what it contains,

not to insert what has been omitted nor to omit what has been inserted ... A statute must be read and considered in its entirety and the legislative intent may not be determined from the wording of any particular section or sentence, but only from a consideration of the whole ... [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.]

State ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. 175, 184, 500 P.2d 921, 926-927, cert. den. (1973) 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L.Ed.2d 593.

We agree with the District Court's construction of the statute which considers the statute as a whole. Under appellant's construction, if one parent signs the application and provides proof of financial responsibility, that parent has no imputed liability; but if both parents sign and provide the required proof, both parents have imputed liability. Similarly, a guardian having custody who signs...