Gaudin v. Austin
| Decision Date | 26 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 07A04-0909-CV-534.,07A04-0909-CV-534. |
| Citation | 921 N.E.2d 895 |
| Parties | Susanne C. GAUDIN, Robyn Rosenberg, Christopher Answorth, Paul Colvin, Janet Kramer, and Leonard A. Murray, Appellants-Petitioners, v. J.W. AUSTIN, President, Darrell L. Kent, Vice President, Mary H. Fouch, as County Commissioners of Brown County, Indiana, Appellees-Respondents. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
E. Paige Freitag, Bauer & Densford, William C. Lloyd, Lloyd Law Office, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Stephen R. Buschmann, Thrasher Buschmann Griffith & Voelkel, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
In September of 2007, the Brown County Commissioners enacted an ordinance establishing a fire district. In January 2009, after two new Commissioners were elected, the Commissioners enacted an ordinance purporting to dissolve the district. No petition to dissolve the district or to repeal the ordinance establishing it had been filed. Soon thereafter, Gaudin and the other plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the dissolution ordinance was void because no petition had been filed.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commissioners: "there is nothing to compel a conclusion that a governing body with the authority to establish a Fire Protection District does not have a similar authority to dissolve a district by ordinance, particularly one established by ordinance." (App. at 11.)
We reverse.
When we review the grant or denial of summary judgment, we use the same standard as the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sanders v. Board of Comm'rs of Brown County, 892 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied 915 N.E.2d 978 (Ind.2009). Where, as here, the interpretation of a statute is at issue, such statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Id. at 1252. Where the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo. Id.
The goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the General Assembly. Id. We presume the legislature intended the language used in a statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result. Id. Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme. Id. To determine legislative intent, we read the sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. Id. If two statutes or two sets of statutes appear inconsistent in some respects, but can be rationalized to give effect to both, then we are obliged to do so. Id.
In Sanders, the Brown County Commissioners passed an ordinance creating a county-wide fire protection district.1 Ind. Code § 36-8-11-5(a) provides: "Freeholders who desire the establishment of a fire protection district must initiate proceedings by filing a petition in the office of the county auditor of the county where the freeholder's land is located." Some citizens sued the Commissioners seeking injunctive relief and requesting a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was void because no petition by county landowners had been filed.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commissioners: "It appears upon reading [chapter 36-8-11] in harmony and as part of a uniform system of jurisprudence, the Indiana Legislature intended to give freeholders the ability to create a fire protection district even if the county legislative body refuses to do so." Id. at 1251. We affirmed, agreeing a fire protection district could be created in either of two ways: the county commissioners may create a fire protection district pursuant to Ind.Code § 36-8-11-4 (), or freeholders may file a petition with their County Auditor pursuant to Ind.Code § 36-8-11-5. Id. at 1254.
While chapter 36-8-11 explicitly provides in two discrete sections for establishment of a district either by ordinance or by freeholder petition, it addresses dissolution of a fire protection district in only one section, which sets forth only one method of dissolution. Ind.Code § 36-8-11-24 provides in pertinent2 part:
(a) Proceedings to dissolve a fire protection district may be instituted by the filing of a petition with the county legislative body that formed the district.
* * * * * *
(b) The petition must be signed:
(1) by at least twenty percent (20%), with a minimum of five hundred (500), of the freeholders owning land within the district; or
(2) by a majority of those freeholders owning land within the district; whichever is less.
(c) ... the provisions of section 8 of this chapter concerning a petition to establish a district apply to a dissolution petition.
* * * * * *
(e) ... a petition against the dissolution of the fire protection district may be presented to the county legislative body at or after a hearing on the petition to dissolve a district and before the adoption of an ordinance or resolution dissolving the district. If the legislative body finds that it contains the signatures of fifty-one percent (51%) of the freeholders within the district or of the freeholders who own two-thirds (2/3) of the real property within the district, determined by assessed valuation, the legislative body shall dismiss the petition for the dissolution of the district.
* * * * * *
(g) If, after the public hearing, the legislative body determines that dissolution should occur, it shall adopt an ordinance dissolving the district.
* * * * * *
(i) A person aggrieved by a decision made by the county legislative body or county legislative bodies under this section may, within thirty (30) days, appeal the decision to the circuit court for any county in which the district is located.
(Emphasis supplied.) The statute has no other general provision for dissolution of a district, nor does it include a provision addressing dissolution by the Commissioners specifically.
The Commissioners argue they had authority to dissolve the district without a petition pursuant to the "Home Rule" statute, which provides:
(b) A unit has:
(1) all powers granted it by statute; and
(2) all other powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs, even though not granted by statute.
(c) The powers that units have under subsection (b)(1) are listed in various statutes. However, these statutes do not list the powers that units have under subsection (b)(2); therefore, the omission of a power from such a list does not imply that units lack that power.
But Ind.Code § 36-1-3-6 provides that "[i]f there is a constitutional or statutory provision requiring a specific manner for exercising a power, a unit wanting to exercise the power must do so in that manner." Ind.Code § 36-8-11-24, which explains how "[p]roceedings to dissolve a fire protection district may be instituted," is such a "statutory provision requiring a specific manner for exercising a power." Thus, the Commissioners did not have authority to dissolve the district by ordinance.
The Commissioners rely on Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369, 379 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied 804 N.E.2d 750 (Ind. 2003), where we noted the general rule that "[w]hen the word `shall' appears in a statute, it is construed as mandatory rather than directory unless it appears clear from the context or the purpose of the statute that the legislature intended a different meaning." "The term `may' in a statute ordinarily implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion." Id. at 380. The statute addressed in Romine said a person seeking the removal of a drainage obstruction "may file a petition under" the Drainage Obstruction Act, and Romine had not "offered any persuasive argument to justify a departure from that usual rule of construction." Id.
While we acknowledge that "ordinary" implication of the word "may," Romine does not control for three reasons. First, our holding in Romine that the legislature did not intend the Drainage Obstruction Act to "be the exclusive means of first resort for disputes of the sort involved here," id., was premised on our analysis of the pre-existing common law on the same topic:
Our research leads us to conclude that the Drainage Obstruction Act adds to the substantive common-law primarily in that it permits complaining parties to seek redress for a dispute, not only in state superior and circuit courts, but also before the appropriate county drainage board. Viewed against this historical backdrop, it appears that the Drainage Obstruction Act did not so much change the common-law as it created an alternative forum for deciding such disputes. As reviewed above, the common-law developed two alternate outcomes, one favoring the obstruction builder (where the common enemy doctrine applies), the other favoring the complaining neighbor (where the court found a natural watercourse or pond was involved).3 It appears that the Drainage Obstruction Act addresses and expands upon the law as it...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Town of Cedar Lake v. Alessia
...that document in light of the clear, binding, and current Home Rule statutes. Nor is this case similar to either Gaudin v. Austin, 921 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), aff'd by an equally divided court, 936 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind. 2010), in which we held that a municipality could not unilate......
-
Town of Cedar Lake v. Alessia
...that document in light of the clear, binding, and current Home Rule statutes. Nor is this case similar to either Gaudin v. Austin, 921 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), aff'd by an equally divided court,936 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind.2010), in which we held that a municipality could not unilaterally......
-
Frazier v. State
...§ 33–33–49–32. When, as here, the issue is the interpretation of a statute, we review the matter de novo. Gaudin v. Austin, 921 N.E.2d 895 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. granted, opinion reinstated936 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind.2010). On March 12, 2008, we authorized Frazier's successive petition for post......
-
Anderson v. Gaudin
......Gaudin v. Austin, 921 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (“Gaudin I ”). We initially granted transfer thereby automatically vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). We held oral argument, but because of our ensuing inconclusive 2–2 vote, the opinion of the Court of Appeals ......