Gaudina v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Decision Date28 March 2014
Docket NumberNo. 1–13–1264.,1–13–1264.
Citation8 N.E.3d 588,2014 IL App (1st) 131264,380 Ill.Dec. 418
PartiesRobert GAUDINA, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Law Office of Michael W. Rathsack, Chicago (Daniel J. Kaiser, Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellant.

Taylor Miller LLC, Chicago (Frank C. Stevens, of counsel), for appellee.

OPINION

Justice PALMER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Robert Gaudina, appeals from the circuit court's March 18, 2013, order denying his motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. On appeal, Gaudina contends that the circuit court erred in finding that he was not an insured entitled to coverage under his wife's policy. Gaudina asserts that the policy language is ambiguous and must be construed against State Farm. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Gaudina was injured in an automobile accident on December 8, 2009, while working as a limousine driver. After settling his bodily injury liability claim against the other driver for that driver's policy limit ($250,000), Gaudina filed an underinsured motorist claim with State Farm under the automobile insurance policy of his wife, Maureen Rife. State Farm denied coverage of the claim on grounds that Gaudina was not an insured because, at the time of the accident, he was not residing primarily with her, and he therefore did not fit the definition of Rife's “spouse,” as set forth the policy. Rife's automobile insurance policy defined “spouse” as:

DEFINED WORDS WHICH ARE USED IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE POLICY

We define some words to shorten the policy. This makes it easier to read and understand. Defined words are printed in boldface italics. You can pick them out easily.

* * *

Spouse—means your husband or wife who resides primarily with you.

¶ 4 Further, the policy set forth who was considered an “insured” for purposes of the underinsured motor vehicle coverage:

UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE—COVERAGE W

You have this coverage if ‘W’ appears in the ‘Coverages' space on the declarations page.

We will pay for damages for bodily injury and insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be sustained by an insured and caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle.

* * *

Who is an Insured—Coverages U, U1 and W

Insured—means the person or persons covered by uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle coverages.

With respect to bodily injury, this is:

1. the first person named in the declarations;

2. his or her spouse;

3. their relatives * * *[.]

¶ 5 On December 7, 2011, Gaudina filed a declaratory judgment action against State Farm seeking a declaration that he was in fact an insured entitled to coverage of his claim under Rife's policy. Gaudina's complaint also sought damages and attorney fees pursuant to section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2008)) for State Farm's allegedly unreasonable and vexatious denial of coverage.

¶ 6 Both State Farm and Gaudina moved for summary judgment pursuant section 2–1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1005 (West 2008)). State Farm asserted that Gaudina was not entitled to coverage because he did not fit the definition of “spouse” as he did not reside primarily with Rife at the time of the accident. State Farm also argued that Gaudina's claim for section 155 damages should be dismissed because the loss was not covered under the policy and, at the very least, there was a bona fide coverage dispute.

¶ 7 Gaudina moved for summary judgment only as to his claim that he should be covered under the policy. Gaudina argued that the evidence showed that he never intended to permanently leave the house which he and Rife shared and that the policy language was ambiguous. Gaudina asserted that the phrase “resides primarily” was not defined in the policy and could have more than one meaning. That is, “primarily” could mean the residence that was “of most significance” or the residence where an individual spent most nights, and the policy also failed to specify the relevant time frame for determining where a person resides.

¶ 8 The parties cited several pieces of evidence in support of their respective arguments, including Gaudina's deposition and Rife's recorded statement to State Farm. In his deposition, Gaudina testified that he and Rife married in 2006 and had one child in 2007. Gaudina moved from Kansas to Rife's house in Crystal Lake, Illinois, when they got married. In approximately February 2007, they moved into a house at 774 Chisholm Trail in Roselle, Illinois. The title to the Chisholm Trail house was in Rife's name only and Gaudina did not contribute money to the purchase of the house, although he helped renovate it. Gaudina testified that in September 2008, Rife told Gaudina to leave the household; he had quit his job and had been unemployed for a long period of time, which Rife was unhappy about. Gaudina testified that Rife told him to leave until he found a job because Rife felt that she was holding him back. Gaudina testified that Rife “finally had enough” and told him [g]o out and find something. Get your life together. And come back.” Gaudina testified that he intended to return at some point and resume permanently living there with Rife, and the couple had attended marital counseling.

¶ 9 When he left, Gaudina took some clothes and toiletries. He testified that he left most of his clothes, pictures, other toiletries, and a few pieces of furniture at the Chisholm Trail house. He also testified that he would spend one or two nights a week at the house, or stop by to visit his daughter in the afternoon if he was in the area. He had a garage door opener for the house. Initially, he and Rife opened a joint checking account, but they got separate accounts when they separated in September 2008. He did not pay child support and he and his wife never filed for divorce. His name was taken off the utility bills when he left, and he did not pay any household expenses during the time he was not living there, except for the cable bill.

¶ 10 Gaudina testified that he lived in his car at first, and then rented a room in a townhouse in Lake Barrington, Illinois, in October 2008, and retrieved more of his clothes from the Chisholm Trail address. Gaudina testified that he eventually found employment as a driver for the limousine company in early 2009, but Rife did not ask him to return to the house because she wanted to see if it was going to work.” He believed that the W–2 statements from his job were sent to a post office box that he kept or to the Chisholm Trail address. He lived at the Lake Barrington townhouse until the accident in December 2009. At the time of the accident, Gaudina had a Kansas driver's license, but he later changed to an Illinois license, and the Illinois license listed the address in Lake Barrington. He affirmed that a January 2010 explanation of benefits from his health insurance provider listed the Lake Barrington address and that he had provided the address. He also used the Lake Barrington address for his workers' compensation claim relating to the December 8, 2009 accident. He testified that he had an insurance policy through State Farm for the car he owned, but he did not know whether it was in effect at the time of the accident.

¶ 11 Immediately following the accident, Gaudina was hospitalized. He testified that he then went to the live at the Chisholm Trail address because Rife offered to provide care for him as he recuperated. He was hospitalized two times thereafter because of complications. He and Rife moved his belongings out of the Lake Barrington address at some point after the accident. Ultimately, Rife again asked Gaudina to leave the Chisholm Trail house on December 15, 2010, because his failure to find employment was causing her stress. He lived in his car and in homeless shelters, and he later lived in a rented office in Elgin.

¶ 12 At the time of the deposition, Gaudina was living with his daughter, for whom he was the primary caregiver, in a house on Flamingo Drive in Roselle. He had lived there since August 2011 and shared the house with a few other men. In answer to an interrogatory requesting all residences that Gaudina had maintained since 2007, Gaudina listed the address on Chisholm Trail in Roselle, the townhouse in Lake Barrington, and the house in Flamingo Drive in Roselle.

¶ 13 In Rife's recorded statement to State Farm, she stated Gaudina was not “officially” living at the Chisholm Trail address at the time of the accident, but he “periodically would stay there from time to time ‘cause you know we have a child together and he would need to be with her while I'm working or whatever.” She stated that the last time Gaudina had full time residency at the Chisholm Trail house was September of 2008, and he did not leave voluntarily. She stated that he sometimes received mail there, although he also had a post office box. She stated that he rented somewhere else to live and some of his belongings were with him and some were at the Chisholm Trail house. He returned to live with her after the accident as he recovered, but she stated that she again “told him he had to leave * * * ‘cause it caused too much stress for [her] uh for him to be here.”

¶ 14 At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment on March 18, 2013, the circuit court held that the definition of “spouse” in the policy was not ambiguous and it should assess whether a person was a “spouse” for purposes of coverage at the time of the accident. Considering the undisputed facts, the circuit court concluded that Rife's residence was not Gaudina's primary residence at the time...

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