Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass.
Decision Date | 19 November 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 90-1501,90-1501 |
Citation | 923 F.2d 203 |
Parties | Robert A. GAUDREAULT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF SALEM, MASSACHUSETTS, et al. Defendants, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Robert A. Gaudreault, on brief, pro se.
John J. Kuzinevich, Issac H. Peres and Riemer & Braustein, on brief, for defendants-appellees, Mayor, Neil Harrington, Robert St. Pierre, Francis Wrigley, Andrew Ouelette, Garrett Lynch, Rubin Felix, Paul Tucker, and Milton Raymond.
Edward D. McCarthy, Joan Eldridge, McCarthy, Foster & Eldrdidge, on brief, for defendants-appellees, The Salem Hosp., Knight Alexander, M.D., James Durso, M.D., Salem Hosp. Bd. of Trustees, and Maximiliaan G. Kaulbach, President of Medical Staff.
Before CAMPBELL, TORRUELLA and CYR, Circuit Judges.
This appeal concerns an action brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. In April 1985 Gaudreault was arrested by the police in Salem, Massachusetts after an altercation at a bar. Gaudreault alleged that the four Salem police officers who arrested him (appellees Lynch, Raymond, Tucker and Felix) violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force in making the arrest. He claimed that he later suffered an assault in the Salem police station at the hands of a fifth, unidentified officer. The alleged attacker has never been made a party to this suit. Gaudreault also charged that the arresting officers and two watch commanders at the police station (appellees Ouelette and Wrigley) denied him medical treatment for a period of some ten hours after his arrest. Finally, he contended that the City of Salem, its mayor, city solicitor and chief of police are liable to him as well, apparently on a "failure to train" theory. 1 The magistrate to whom the district court referred the case granted summary judgment to the Salem Defendants on all claims against them, and this appeal followed. We affirm.
A claim that the police used excessive force in making an arrest must be analyzed in light of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870-71, 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 454 (1989). The pertinent question is whether the force used was "objectively reasonable" under all the circumstances; that is, whether it was consistent with the amount of force that a reasonable police officer would think necessary to bring the arrestee into custody. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir.1988). Proper application of the test of "objective reasonableness" requires the courts to pay careful attention to the facts and circumstances of the particular case at hand, including the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 455. We must keep in mind that not every push or shove rises to the level of a constitutional violation, and that police officers making arrests are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force needed to effect an arrest while operating under tense, dangerous and rapidly-changing circumstances. Id., at 393-94, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-72, 104 L.Ed.2d at 455-56.
We find that summary judgment was granted appropriately on this claim. The appellees submitted in support of their motion the entire transcript of the appellant's criminal trial on charges arising out of the fracas at the bar. The transcript contains both Officer Lynch's and Gaudreault's versions of the arrest. We have examined this testimony and conclude that no genuine dispute exists as to the "objective reasonableness" of the force employed by the police.
Officer Lynch told the following story. When the police approached Gaudreault at the bar, he was visibly intoxicated, yelling at bar employees and disturbing the patrons. Lynch asked Gaudreault several times to leave the premises. When Gaudreault refused, Lynch tried to lead him out of the bar by placing a hand on his shoulder. Gaudreault flailed his arm away from Lynch, striking Lynch in the face and forcing him to fall backwards. The officers then attempted to restrain Gaudreault with handcuffs. They never used their guns or clubs, although Gaudreault continued to strike at them. At some point during the fray, Officer Lynch severely injured the ligaments in his thumb. The appellant, on the other hand, did not display any physical injuries when arrested.
While Gaudreault disputed Officer Lynch's testimony on many of its particulars, he corroborated the dispositive facts and even expanded upon Lynch's testimony that he vigorously resisted arrest. According to Gaudreault, Lynch asked him to leave the bar, but he refused. Lynch then placed his hand or hands on Gaudreault, but not in an assaultive manner. Gaudreault resisted this effort, struck Lynch, and continued to resist when at least one other officer (and perhaps a civilian employee of the bar) moved to Lynch's aid. The struggle ended up on the floor, at which point Gaudreault slammed Lynch's head into the bar. 2 The officers then gained control of the situation and handcuffed Gaudreault.
Gaudreault also corroborated Officer Lynch's observation that he was not visibly injured when arrested. Although Gaudreault claims that he suffered bruises and abrasions on the night of his arrest, and offered records from Salem Hospital to document this charge, the complaint (Count Four, Paragraph 4) says that all the injuries reflected in those hospital records were caused by the attack at the police station later that night. It requires only simple deduction from that allegation to conclude that Gaudreault was not significantly injured during the arrest.
This much, then, is undisputed: Gaudreault offered active resistance to his arrest, causing Officer Lynch to suffer a painful injury. The police, on the other hand, never drew their weapons and did not cause any notable injury. They can only be said to have tailored their expense of force closely to the violent circumstances facing them. Their behavior was "objectively reasonable" as a matter of law. See Gassner v. City of Garland, Texas, 864 F.2d 394, 400 (5th Cir.1989) ( ); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1299 (E.D.N.C.1989) (same).
Count Five of the complaint alleges that when Gaudreault arrived at the police station in the company of Officers Lynch, Raymond, Tucker and Felix, six to eight "unknown police officers" were "playing volleyball" with Michael Messier, Gaudreault's friend who had been sitting with him at the bar and who, apparently, was arrested along with him. The police complied with Gaudreault's request that they cease harassing his friend, and put Messier in a cell in the station's detention area, out of Gaudreault's sight but within his hearing.
Another "unknown police officer" then entered the detention area and goaded Messier to fight. Gaudreault, from the booking room, challenged this unknown officer to take on him instead of his friend. Gaudreault was handcuffed at the time, with Officers Lynch and Raymond standing behind him, and Officers Tucker and Felix standing in front of him.
According to Gaudreault, the officer who had been badgering Messier then entered the booking room from behind Gaudreault. The officer assaulted Gaudreault with a night stick, hitting him in the "right flank," and then with his shoe, kicking Gaudreault about the head and eyes.
Gaudreault's allegations are corroborated to some extent by Messier's affidavit. Messier says that, while locked in his detention cell, two (Messier Affidavit, p 5). Gaudreault, from the booking room, challenged this officer, who then left the detention area and went to the booking room, which was out of Messier's sight. Messier then heard a "thump" and the scuffling of feet (Messier Affidavit, pp 6, 7).
Gaudreault also submitted medical evidence to support his story about a beating in the booking room. Records from Salem Hospital show that when Gaudreault was examined the next day, he displayed multiple bruises, to the forehead, left and right orbits of his eyes, nasal area, left ribs, right flank and left shoulder, and was suffering from a corneal abrasion and an abrasion on the upper back. These injuries are consistent with the nature of the assault described in the complaint.
Gaudreault's submissions clearly raise a genuine issue as to the fact of the assault. A reasonable jury could conclude that the still-unidentified officer attacked Gaudreault after receiving nothing more than verbal provocation, while Gaudreault stood in handcuffs with his back to his assailant. Such an attack would appear to have no justification, and no motive but punishment, and thus would constitute the use of "excessive force."
As the magistrate pointed out, however, Gaudreault never identified his assailant. In fact, by placing the blame for the assault on a specific (though unidentified) officer, Gaudreault has in effect admitted that the four officers named in the lawsuit did not participate actively in the assault. Consequently, there is no dispute that defendants Lynch, Raymond, Tucker and Felix cannot be held liable for committing the assault. The police officer who allegedly did commit the assault, meanwhile, is not a defendant in this case. 3
In support of their motion for summary judgment on this claim, the Salem Defendants made the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Redmond v. San Jose Police Dep't
...the constitutional violation. See Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 207 n. 3 (1st Cir.1990) (granting arresting officers' motion for summary judgment because the officers had no "realistic opportunity" to......
-
Villalobos v. W. Reg'l Jail
...or permanent disability, or a condition for which lack of treatment causes continuous severe pain. Id.; also see Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 *1st Cir. 1990)("A medical need is 'serious' if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatm......
-
Kosilek v. Spencer
...for a doctor's attention.’ ” Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir.1990)). Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that courts should look to the following factors in determining whether a......
-
Gray v. United States
...person would readily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.’ " Blackmore , 390 F.3d at 897 (quoting Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem , 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) ); see also Johnson v. Karnes , 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005). And so, "[n]ot ‘every ache and pain or medically ......
-
29-b-2 What to Do if Treatment Is Denied or Delayed
...prisoner consents to the extraction of another tooth which he wishes to keep). 90. See, e.g., Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 91. See, e.g., Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 423-25 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the prisoner's suicide attempts rai......
-
Managed health care in prisons as cruel and unusual punishment.
...Id. at 673 (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)); see also Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). See generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (addressing rights of pretrial (93) McNally, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 673. (......