Gauger v. Mills

• Citation: 340 Ill.App. 1,90 N.E.2d 790
• Decision Date: 24 February 1950
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 10394
• Parties: GAUGER v. MILLS.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 790

90 N.E.2d 790

340 Ill.App. 1

GAUGER v. MILLS.

Gen. No. 10394.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Feb. 24, 1950.

Hadley & Leren, Wheaton, for appellant.

Burton Y. Weitzenfeld, Chicago, Gordon Moffett, Wheaton, for appellee.

WOLFE, Presiding Justice.

Lucille Gauger, as administratrix of the estate of Walter J. Gauger, deceased, brought a suit in the Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois, to recover damages alleged to have arisen because of the death of the plaintiff's intestate, Walter J. Gauger, as a result of a collision of a truck driven by the plaintiff's intestate with an automobile driven by the defendant, Vida J. Mills, at the intersection of Fair and Ridge Avenues in the City of Elmhurst, DuPage County, Illinois, on the 30th day of April, 1948.

The plaintiff filed her complaint and alleged that on the 30th day of April, 1948, her intestate, Walter J. Gauger, was driving and propelling a certain motor truck in a northerly direction along Fair Avenue in the City of Elmhurst, at and near its intersection with Ridge Avenue, a certain other public street, which extended in an easterly and westerly direction; that the plaintiff's intestate and his heirs were in the exercise of ordinary care for his safety; that the defendant, Vida J. Mills, was driving an automobile in a westerly direction upon Ridge Avenue at and near its intersection with Fair Avenue, and that the defendant was guilty of one or more acts or omissions in the driving of her said automobile, to-wit: Did then and there operate said automobile at an excessive rate of speed; at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable and proper; without having good and sufficient brakes; without having the automobile equipped with adequate brakes; in failing to apply the brakes in the proper manner; without sounding any warning of the approach of her automobile; failed to yield the right of way; failed to keep a proper lookout; and failed to stop her automobile in time to avoid the collision with the truck driven by the plaintiff's intestate; and that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence, the automobile driven by the defendant struck the truck driven by the plaintiff's intestate, and the plaintiff's intestate was injured, from which he died on the 30th day of April, 1948. Damages in the amount of $15,000 was claimed.

There was a second count which charged practically the same facts except that instead of negligence, it is charged that the defendant willfully and wantonly committed the acts in question. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case this count was dismissed, so we are not concerned with the second count in this appeal.

The defendant filed an answer admitting that she was driving and operating the automobile in a westerly direction, as charged in the complaint. She denied that the plaintiff's intestate was driving the motor truck in a careful manner, and alleged that it was being driven carelessly and negligently. She denied all acts of negligence on her part, or that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment against her.

The case was submitted to a jury, and at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant entered a motion for a directed verdict. This motion was denied by the Court. The defendant then introduced evidence, and the case was submitted to a jury. The jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and assessed her damages as $15,000. The Court entered judgment upon the verdict, and the defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a motion for a new trial. The Court overruled and denied each of said motions. This appeal followed.

The evidence shows that Fair Avenue runs in a general northerly and southerly direction, and intersects Ridge Avenue, which runs in an easterly and westerly direction. The streets intersect nearly at right angles. There are no stop signs on either of the streets. Both streets are paved with concrete to a width of about twenty-four feet with curbs and gutters on both sides of the streets.

The plaintiff's intestate was employed by Marshall Field and Company and was driving one of its trucks at the time of the collison. With Gauger was another employee of Marshall Field and Company by the name of Robert Johnson. Johnson was employed to help Gauger deliver merchandise from Marshall Field and Company to customers in Elmhurst. Gauger was driving the truck seated on the left-hand side and Johnson at the right side. The truck of the plaintiff and the automobile of the defendant collided, and the right rear of the truck was struck by the left front part of defendant's automobile. As a result of the collision, the Marshall Field truck overturned, and Gauger was killed. Neither Johnson not Mrs. Vida J. Mills were injured.

The appellant insists that under the Statute she had the right of way, and that the plaintiff's intestate was guilty of negligence in not yielding the right of way to her. The appellee insists that her husband had the right of way, and the defendant was guilty of negligence in not yielding the right of way to him. This is the main controversy in this suit. The evidence is in conflict of just how far away the automobiles were from the intersection at the time the Marshall Field truck approached it. The testimony of Johnson, who was riding with Gauger at the time, is entirely different from that of Mrs. Vida J. Mills. Under the evidence in this case, it became a question of fact for the jury to decide which side's evidence was more worthy of belief. They have found the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and if the jury was properly instructed in regard to this matter, the jury's verdict should stand, as there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict.

At the request of the plaintiff, the Court gave the following instruction relative to the right of way: 'The right of way given to vehicles approaching an intersection is not an absolute right. The law that gives the right of way to a vehicle approaching an intersection from the right of another vehicle does not contemplate that this right of way may be invoked when the car from the right is so far from the intersection at the time the car from the left enters upon it, that, with both running within recognized limits of speed, the car to the left will reach the line of crossing before the car to the right will reach the intersection.'

The Statute provides: 'Except as hereinafter provided motor vehicles traveling upon public highways shall give the right-of-way to vehicles approaching along intersecting highways from the right and shall have the right-of-way over those approaching from the left.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, c. 95 1/2, § 165.

Both our Supreme and Appellate Courts have repeatedly held that this Statute does not give the car approaching an intersection from the right the absolute right of way, over the one approaching from the left, but there has been considerable confusion in deciding just when a car approaching the intersection from the left has the right of way over that from the right. Appellant relies on the case of Greene v. Noonan, 372 Ill. 286, 23 N.E.2d 720. There the Court was considering an instruction relative to the statutory right of way, but the main criticism of the instruction was that it was not applicable to the facts, as disclosed by the record in that case. It does not aid us materially in deciding this case.

A similar instruction to the one we are now considering was given in the case of Salmon v. Wilson, 227 Ill.App. 286....