Gaul v. Baker

• Decision Date: 30 July 1926
• Citation: 105 Conn. 80,134 A. 250
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GAUL v. BAKER.

134 A. 250

105 Conn. 80

GAUL v. BAKER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 30, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; John R. Booth and Isaac Wolfe, Judges.

Joseph A. Gray, of Norwalk, for appellant.

Raymond E. Hackett, of Stamford, for appellee.

HAINES, J.

The present action is the sequel to a former action considered by this court(Newman v. Gaul,102 Conn. 425, 129 A 221), and the premises involved are the same in both actions.The printed record in that action is made a part of the finding on this appeal.The former owner of the premises, one Newman, verbally leased them to Baker, who went into possession and still remains, to the exclusion of all others.By the terms of the lease, Baker was given two successive rights of renewal of his lease, an option to purchase at any time during the tenancy, and upon failure to purchase was to be reimbursed by the lessor for such improvements as he made upon the property during the tenancy.The present plaintiff Gaul, obtained title through foreclosure of a mortgage, but the defendant, Baker, was not a party to that action, and his lease was prior to the mortgage foreclosed.Thus the title obtained by Gaul was subject, not only to any prior mortgage, but to such interests as Baker had as tenant in possession, under the terms of his unrecorded lease for one year, for Gaul obtained such title and such only as Newman had the power to mortgage at the time of giving the mortgage.Dawson v. Orange,78 Conn. 107, 61 A. 101.

We held in Newman v. Gaul that Gaul's right to the possession of the property, so far as Baker was concerned, was not complete till the superiority of his claim over that of Baker was established, either by an action of ejectment against Baker or, if this was not appropriate to try the issues which might lie between them, then by some other action appropriate to those issues.

Contending that ejectment was not thus the appropriate action, Gaul now brings one under the provisions of General Statutes, § 5113, being an action to quiet title.No claim for possession is made, so that, in the event the plaintiff succeeds in this action, a further suit will be necessary to obtain the possession which Gaul is seeking.So far as the record in this case discloses, the sole defense of Baker to Gaul's claim of absolute title is that he has an interest in the property, by virtue of an equitable lien for improvements made under the terms of his lease, for $14,000.

The defendant demurred to the complaint on substantially three grounds: (1) That it was not alleged that the plaintiff was in possession and this action could not be maintained by one out of possession; (2) that the complaint did not state any right of possession in the plaintiff and the allegation of a fee is purely a legal conclusion; (3) that it was not alleged that the plaintiff was without an adequate legal remedy and so this equitable action does not lie.The defendant appeals from the action of the trial court in overruling this demurrer.

Prior to 1893, if claims upon lands in possession of the owner were made adverse to the latter, there appears to have been no means open to him to dispose of them, for this was a legal question affecting title to land, and, courts of equity being closed to him, he could not compel the adverse claimant to submit his claim to adjudication in a court of law, but must wait until the claimant attempted to assert his rights against him.Obviously for the purpose of affording a remedy to an owner in possession under such circumstances, the Legislature in that year, passed an act (Pub. Acts 1893, c. 66) which as amended, has now become General Statutes, § 5113.Foote v. Brown,78 Conn. 369, 62 A. 667.Whether the statute was available to an owner who was out of possession was at least an open question before 1915.Layton v. Bailey,77 Conn. 30, 58 A. 355;Cahill v. Cahill,76 Conn. 542, 57 A. 284.

In 1913the statute was amended to include within its provisions personal as well as real property.Public Acts of 1913, c. 54.In 1915 it was further amended to allow action to be maintained, not only against any one who claimed to own the property or any part thereof or to have any estate in the same or any lien or incumbrance thereon adverse to the plaintiff, but one " in whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim, or title conflicting with the plaintiff's claim, title, or interest, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of such property."Public Acts of 1915, c. 174.

From a statute for the benefit of an owner of real estate in possession, its scope has thus been enlarged by legislation, first, to cover personal property, as well as real, then to meet adverse claims of record affecting the title of the owner.We think the reasonable intendment of the statute as it now stands cannot be restricted to furnishing relief only to such as have possession of the property.Its beneficial operation is not thus restricted by any language which it contains and we see no warrant in law or reason for now narrowing the terms " any person" to mean only a person in possession.We hold, therefore, that the statute was open to the present plaintiff, though out of possession.Nor can we concur in the defendant's contention that the complaint fails to properly state the plaintiff's claim to the property.

" The essentials of a complaint [under this statute] are a statement of the plaintiff's ownership in the land described and of his title thereto."Foote v. Brown,78 Conn. 369, 377, 62 A. 667, 670.

The third ground of demurrer is that the complaint does not allege that the plaintiff has no remedy at law.The defendant does not cite any authority showing the need of such allegation and we know of none.Whatever may have been the rule when actions in equity were separately heard and determined, it does not conform to our present practice where both legal and equitable issues may be joined, heard and determined in one action, and where both legal and equitable relief may be had in the superior court.General Statutes § 5554;Practice Book, ...