Gauthier v. City of Cranston
| Decision Date | 07 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. PM-2012-5402 |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
| Parties | SCOTT GAUTHIER and CITY OF CRANSTON POLICE OFFICERS, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS, LOCAL 301 v. CITY OF CRANSTON |
DECISION
The matter before this Court is Plaintiffs' application, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 28-9-18, to vacate an arbitration decision issued on August 14, 2012.1 Plaintiffs are Scott Gauthier, a retired Cranston police officer, City of Cranston Police Officers, and the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301 (Union). Defendant is the City of Cranston (City). The Arbitrator found that Plaintiffs had not complied with the grievance procedure delineated in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Union and the City, and thus dismissed Plaintiffs' grievance on procedural grounds. For the reasons set forth herein, this Court vacates the Arbitration Decision but dismisses the grievance because Plaintiffs lack the substantive right to utilize the arbitration procedures set forth in the CBA. Jurisdiction is pursuant to § 28-9-14.
The Union and the City are parties to a CBA entered into pursuant to the Municipal Police Arbitration Act (MPAA), §§ 28-9.2-1 et seq. See CBA. The CBA became effective July 1, 2009 and expired on June 30, 2012. The CBA contains the terms and conditions of employment of police officers employed by the City, including the pension benefits to be provided to them upon their retirement.
In § 1 of the CBA, the City "recognize[d] and acknowledge[d] the I.B.P.O. as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for all full time police officers, up to and including police officers holding the rank of Captain for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . ." (CBA § 1.) Furthermore, § 1 of the CBA defines "member," "member of the bargaining unit," "employee," "officer," "patrol officer," "personnel," and/or "police officer" to mean all full-time police officers, up to and including the rank of Captain.
The CBA defines a grievance as "a dispute between the member (or the Union) and the City," which involves "the application, meaning or interpretation of the express provisions of this Agreement . . . ." (CBA § 22(a).) Section 22 of the CBA provides the procedure for resolving all grievances of members of the Cranston Police Department. (CBA § 22(a).) The CBA requires that a written grievance be filed with the Chief of Police and the Director of Personnel "[n]ot later than twenty (20) days, excluding weekends and holidays, after the event giving rise to the grievance . . . ." (CBA § 22(b).) If a grievance is not resolved through the procedure specified in § 22, either party has the right to refer the grievance to final and binding arbitration. (CBA § 22(e)-(h).)
Mr. Gauthier had been employed by the Cranston Police Department since July 6, 1993, and retired after attaining twenty years of service on July 6, 2009.2 (Arb. Tr. at 10.) On September 22, 2011, over two years after Mr. Gauthier's retirement, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of Mr. Gauthier. The grievance alleged that Mr. Gauthier was not receiving the retirement benefits afforded to him by the City through the Employee Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI). The grievance alleged that the benefits provided to him violated the parties' CBA, the City Ordinance, and State law. (Joint Ex. 2). Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that after receiving his retirement check, Mr. Gauthier found that his pension benefit calculation failed to include longevity and holiday earnings, which were part of his original compensation. (Arb. Tr. at 18-19). The grievance was denied, and the Plaintiffs filed a demand for arbitration through the American Arbitration Association in accordance with the CBA. (Joint Ex. 3).
An arbitration hearing was conducted before Arbitrator Paul Lemont (Arbitrator) on March 14, 2012.3 The parties stipulated that the issue to be decided by the Arbitrator was, (Arbitration Decision at 2.) The City did not raise procedural arbitrability as a bar to arbitration at the hearing or in its post-hearing memorandum to the Arbitrator. However, the Arbitrator interpreted the stipulated issue to be inextricably intertwined with procedural arbitrability. Namely, the Arbitrator found that Plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the arbitration clause of the CBA unless they complied with the time restraints for filing grievances as set forth therein. See CBA § 22(b). Accordingly, the Arbitrator construed the issue to include the procedural requirement that grievances be filed within twenty days of the event giving rise to the grievance.
On August 14, 2012, the Arbitrator issued a decision which dismissed Plaintiffs' grievance based on procedural arbitrability grounds. (Arbitration Decision at 8.) The Arbitrator based his decision on Plaintiffs' failure to timely file the grievance in accordance with § 22(b) of the CBA. Id. Specifically, the Arbitration Decision notes that Mr. Gauthier's grievance was dated September 20, 2011, well in excess of the twenty day requirement of the CBA. (Arbitration Decision at 2.) As a result, the Arbitrator found that Mr. Gauthier had waived his grievance.5 Id. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a complaint pursuant to § 28-9-18 to vacate the Arbitration Decision.
In support of its position, the City asserts that the Arbitration Decision dismissing the grievance was correct. However, the City assigns error to the Arbitrator's reliance on the theory of procedural arbitrability. The City argues that a grievance of a retired police officer is not substantively arbitrable under the CBA. The issue of substantive arbitrability was first raised by the City in their post-hearing memorandum submitted to the Arbitrator before the Arbitration Decision was reached. Additionally, the City asserts that even if the grievance was substantively arbitrable, the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority by dismissing the case on procedural arbitrability grounds.
Plaintiffs contend that they have standing under the CBA to pursue arbitration and that this matter is substantively arbitrable. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the arbitrator exceeded his powers pursuant to § 28-19-18(a)(2) by deciding issues beyond those framed and stipulated to by the parties. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the Arbitration Decision, based on procedural grounds and the timeliness of the grievance, constituted error. They argue that the Arbitrator's authority was limited to the issue framed by the parties. Moreover, Plaintiffs aver that the Arbitrator denied them a meaningful opportunity to argue and present evidence regarding the timeliness of the grievance because it was never addressed by the parties. Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that the Arbitrator reached an irrational result in his Arbitration Decision. Specifically,Plaintiffs state that the Arbitrator agreed with Plaintiffs' position on the stipulated issue, yet decided to dismiss the grievance on an issue not before the Arbitrator.
Our Supreme Court has looked to the extensive body of federal case law involving labor law, as there are many parallels between Rhode Island's labor regulations and the federal system of labor regulation. See Burrillville v. R.I. Labor Relations Bd., 921 A.2d 113 (R.I. 2007); see also DiGuilio v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 819 A.2d 1271, 1273 (R.I. 2003). The United States Supreme Court discussed arbitration's place in private sector labor law in the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The value of labor arbitration to alleviate occupational discord and employment litigation in the courts is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 579 (); see also School Committee of City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance AFT Local 930, 120 R.I. 810, 814-16, 390 A.2d 386, 390 (1978) ().6 When deciding whether a particular dispute falls within the purview of an arbitration clause, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that a court should not entangle itself in a review of the merits of the underlying grievance. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
Accordingly, pursuant to our precedent, "'[i]t is well settled that, in the typical case, the judiciary's role in the arbitration process is limited.'" Providence Sch. Bd. v. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958, 68 A.3d 505, 508 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Drago Custom Interiors, LLC v. Carlisle Bldg. Sys., Inc., 57 A.3d 668, 670 (R.I. 2012)). "Due to the public policy favoring the finality of arbitration awards, such awards enjoy a presumption of validity." N. Providence Sch. Comm. v. N. Providence Fed'n of Teachers, Local 920, 945 A.2d 339, 344 (R.I. 2008) (citing Pierce v. R.I. Hosp., 875 A.2d 424, 426 (R.I. 2005)).
Despite the presumption of validity, there are circumstances where vacating an arbitration award is justified. Grounds for vacating an award are provided in § 28-9-18:
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