Gauthier v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.

Citation644 F.Supp.2d 824
Decision Date25 March 2009
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 1:07CV12.
PartiesJudy GAUTHIER, as an individual and on behalf of Larry Gauthier and his estate, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

Jason Aron Itkin, Kurt B. Arnold, Arnold & Itkin, LLP, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Douglas W. Poole, William Robert Floyd, McLeod Alexander Powel & Apffel, Galveston, TX, J. E. McElligott, Jr., Kyle L. Gideon, Davidson Meaux Sonnier & McElligott, Lafayette, LA, Hubert Oxford, III, Benckenstein & Oxford, Beaumont, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

THAD HEARTFIELD, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas, the Court referred this matter to the Honorable Keith F. Giblin, United States Magistrate Judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for entry of findings of fact and recommended disposition on the Defendants' pending case-dispositive motions. On March 10, 2009, Judge Giblin issued his Report and Recommendation [Clerk's doc. # 112] on those motions. The magistrate judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that the Court grant four of the motions [Clerk's doc. # s 46, 47, 50, 51], deny three of the motions [Clerk's doc. #45, 48, 80], and grant in part and deny in part one of the dispositive motions [Clerk's doc. # 49].

The Defendants objected to the magistrate judge's report and re-urged the arguments and evidence contained in their motions for summary judgment regarding federal preemption and application of Louisiana law to Plaintiffs' claims. The Defendants specifically argue that Judge Giblin erred in his application of the law on federal preemption regarding federal funding of the warning devices at the crossing in question. They also contend that the magistrate judge misapplied Louisiana law on the "dangerous trap" doctrine in this case and that their motion for summary judgment regarding their statutory duties to maintain the crossing under Louisiana law should be granted. They finally object to Judge Giblin's recommendation that the Plaintiffs be allowed to introduce evidence relating to excessive speed or inadequacy of warning devices on the locomotive as part of their general negligence claims even though the magistrate recommended that summary judgment be granted on those issues.

It is only incumbent upon this Court to make a de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which the Defendants specifically raised objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). With respect to those portions of the report and recommendation to which no objections were raised, the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no plain error on the face of the record. See Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc).

The Court has conducted a de novo review of Judge Giblin's analysis on the issues presented in the motions and considered Defendants' objections regarding the same. Pursuant to the Defendants' objections and in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1), the Court conducted a de novo review of the magistrate judge's findings, the record, the relevant evidence, the specific objections, and the applicable law in this proceeding. After review, the Court finds that Judge Giblin's findings and recommendations should be accepted. The Defendants' objections [Clerk's doc. # 113] are overruled.

Accordingly, the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation on Dispositive Motions [Clerk's doc. # 112] is ADOPTED by this Court. The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:

Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment regarding the railroad's duty to maintain the crossing [Clerk's doc. # 45] is DENIED;

Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs' survival action [Clerk's doc. # 46] is GRANTED;

Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment regarding the federal preemption under the Boiler Inspection Act of claims related to the adequacy of warning devices [Clerk's doc. # 47] is GRANTED; subject to the Plaintiffs' introduction of certain related evidence on other negligence claims;

Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' inadequate warning devices claim (the "dangerous trap" motion) [Clerk's doc. #48] is DENIED; Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' inadequate warning devices and excessive train speed claims (federal preemption based on use of federal funds and train speed) [Clerk's doc. # 49] is GRANTED IN PART (as to the excessive speed claim) and DENIED IN PART (as to the inadequate warning device/federal funds preemption issue); and the accompanying supplemental motion for partial summary judgment on the inadequate warning device claims/federal funds issue [Clerk's doc. # 80] is DENIED;

Defendants motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [Clerk's doc. #50] is GRANTED; and

Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding allegations of inadequate training of the locomotive engineer [Clerk's doc. # 51] is GRANTED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

KEITH F. GIBLIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and the Local Rules for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas, Appendix B, the District Court referred this matter to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration of and recommended disposition on pretrial matters and proceedings. Pending before the Court for purposes of this report are several case-dispositive motions filed by the Defendants.

Those motions are:

-Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment regarding the railroad's duty to maintain the crossing [Clerk's doc. # 45];

-Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs' survival action [Clerk's doc. # 46];

-Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment regarding federal preemption under the Boiler Inspection Act of claims related to the adequacy of warning devices [Clerk's doc. # 47];

-Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' inadequate warning devices claim (the "dangerous trap" motion) [Clerk's doc. # 48];

-Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' inadequate warning devices and excessive train speed claims (federal preemption based on use of federal funds and train speed) [Clerk's doc. # 49] and the accompanying supplemental motion for partial summary judgment on the same issues [Clerk's doc. # 80];

-Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [Clerk's dpc. # 50]; and

-Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding allegations of inadequate training of the locomotive engineer [Clerk's doc. # 51].1

BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs' Claims

The Plaintiffs filed this civil action based upon events occurring on or about the morning of December 29, 2006, when an Amtrak train traveling on a Union Pacific track struck Larry Gauthier's vehicle at the "Eddy Street crossing" in Vinton, Louisiana. The impact of the train killed Larry Gauthier. The Plaintiffs are all family members of Mr. Gauthier and filed their claims sounding in allegations of wrongful death, negligence and gross negligence either individually or on behalf of Mr. Gauthier's estate. The Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant Union Pacific and the other Defendants, Andrew Granger, Brent Waguespack, Ken Rouse, Jack Mann, all alleged to be employees of Union Pacific in the First Amended Complaint, and National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak.

The Plaintiffs allege that the crossing had previously been closed and reopened and that, upon reopening, the crossing had no or very little warning to vehicle traffic. The Plaintiffs further contend that the Defendants had a duty to make the crossing safe or close it, but they failed to close it or provide adequate warning at the crossing. Throughout the case, Plaintiffs have argued that there has been a history of accidents and problems at the Eddy Street crossing.

Based upon these factual allegations, the Plaintiffs have asserted causes of action for wrongful death, negligence, and gross negligence. They state that they assert these claims under the common law of Texas, and that they are specifically "not pleading any claims preempted under the holdings set forth in Norfolk v. Shanklin, CSX Transportaion v. Easterwood, or those cases' progeny." See First Amended Complaint, at p. 2. The Plaintiffs' tort claims are based on the allegations that Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent for:

a. failing to keep a proper lookout;

b. failing to properly sound the train's whistle, siren, or horn;

c. failing to proper maintain an adequate, unobstructed sight distance at its crossings;

d. failing to slow and/or stop the train in order to avoid a specific individual hazard;

e. failing to install a crossing guard;

f. failing to use any means of active warning for approaching traffic;

g. failing to perform inspections and testing of warning systems;

h. failing to properly train employees;

i. failing to properly inspect the track and take reasonable precautions to prevent individuals from placing themselves in harm's way;

j. exceeding the speed limit; and

k. failing to perform any studies, inspection, or analysis into the problems at the crossing.

B. Motions for Summary Judgment and Corresponding Briefs

At the outset, the Court notes that in the Plaintiffs' briefs, they represent that they do not oppose the Court granting a handful of the Defendants' motions. See Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply in Further Support of Their Response to Defendants' Various Summary Judgment...

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