Gautier v. Tams Mgmt.

Decision Date02 March 2023
Docket NumberCivil Action 5:20-cv-00165
PartiesJULES GAUTIER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TAMS MANAGEMENT, INC., PAY CAR MINING, INC., BLUESTONE INDUSTRIES, INC., BLUESTONE RESOURCES, INC., and BLUESTONE COAL CORP., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FRANK W. VOLK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending is Plaintiff Jules Gautier's Motion for Class Monetary Relief filed on August 29, 2022. [Docs. 136, 137]. Defendants Tams Management, Inc., Pay Car Mining, Inc., Bluestone Industries, Inc., Bluestone Resources, Inc., and Bluestone Coal Corp. responded on September 2, 2022 [Doc. 138], and Mr Gautier filed a reply in support of his motion on September 12, 2022 [Doc. 139]. The matter is ready for adjudication.

I.

On March 4, 2020, Mr. Gautier, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, commenced this action against the Defendants, alleging violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act, 29 U.S.C § 2101 et seq. [Doc. 1].

Specifically, Mr. Gautier alleged that the Defendants had failed to provide the required notice to their fulltime employees prior to laying off more than 50 of them beginning in October 2019 at the Burke Mountain Mine Complex in McDowell County, West Virginia. Id.

The case ultimately proceeded to trial, where the jury answered four special interrogatories in favor of Mr. Gautier. [Doc 129]. The jury first determined that Defendants Tams Management, Inc., Pay Car Mining, Inc., Bluestone Industries, Inc., Bluestone Resources, Inc., and Bluestone Coal Corp. were a “single employer” under the WARN Act. Id. Next, the jury found that under the WARN Act, the Burke Mountain Mine Complex was a “single site of employment.” Id. The jury then concluded that 50 or more of the Defendants' fulltime employees at the Burke Mountain Mine Complex were terminated and that 50 or more of the Defendants' fulltime employees had their hours reduced by more than 50% for every month in any six-month period beginning on October 14, 2019. Id. These answers in effect rendered the Defendants liable under the WARN Act.

Following this finding on liability, Mr. Gautier moved for class monetary relief on August 29, 2022. [Docs. 136, 137]. Pursuant to the WARN Act, he seeks back pay for the entire class of 164 aggrieved employees, plus prejudgment interest. [Doc. 137 at 2-6]. He also seeks civil penalties for the affected local government, id. at 6-8, and requests attorney's fees, expenses, and a class representative service fee, id. at 8-10. The Defendants responded on September 2, 2022, arguing first that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict on liability. [Doc. 138 at 1-2]. But even assuming liability, the Defendants also point to several issues with Mr. Gautier's damage calculations, id. at 2-6, and dispute that prejudgment interest is appropriate under the WARN Act, id. at 6-7. Mr. Gautier filed a reply in support of his motion on September 12, 2022, in which he concedes that damages were partially miscalculated. [Doc. 139 at 7].

In light of Mr. Gautier's concession, the Court granted him leave to supplement his damage calculations [Doc. 149], which he did on January 20, 2023 [Doc. 150]. The Defendants responded on January 27, 2023, again raising several of the same issues. [Doc. 151].

II.

The WARN Act, enacted in 1988, requires an employer to provide 60-days' notice before ordering a “plant closing” or “mass layoff.” 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). “An employer who fails to provide this notice is liable to each affected employee for backpay, benefits, and attorney's fees.” Meson v. GATX Tech. Servs. Corp., 507 F.3d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)). In addition, the WARN Act imposes a civil penalty on employers to be paid to the unit of local government entitled to notification under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3).

III.

Following a careful review of the parties' briefs, the Court concludes that Mr. Gautier and the class that he represents are entitled to monetary relief. However, as outlined below, the Court directs Mr. Gautier to make several changes to his damage calculations.

A. Preliminary Issues

Prior to addressing the merits of Mr. Gautier's motion for class monetary relief, the Court turns to two preliminary issues raised by the Defendants.

1. Insufficient Evidence

First, the Defendants contend that the jury had insufficient evidence to find that 50 or more fulltime employees at the Burke Mountain Mine Complex were terminated or that 50 or more fulltime employees had their hours reduced by more than 50% for every month in any sixmonth period beginning on October 14, 2019. [Doc. 138 at 1-2]. Specifically, the Defendants assert that the jury only heard evidence about employees of Defendant Tams Management, Inc., which had a total of 45 employees. Id. at 2. Moreover, the Defendants also contend that only 41 fulltime employees experienced termination or the requisite reduction in hours. [Docs. 138 at 5, 151 at 46].

In addition to these evidentiary arguments, the Defendants also assert, as they did in their motion for summary judgment, that a given employment event cannot qualify as an employment loss under more than one of the three categories in 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6). [Doc. 138 at 1-2]. As a result, because Mr. Gautier's purported class only contained 90 fulltime employees, the Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the jury could not find that 50 employees were terminated and that 50 employees experienced a reduction in hours. Id. In other words, the Defendants conclude that the jury's answers to the special interrogatories are logically inconsistent. Id.

The Court previously addressed the third argument at summary judgment, and the Defendants have not formally renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law after trial. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), such a motion must be made [n]o later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.” Here, the jury returned its verdict on August 11, 2022, and, since that time, the Defendants have only raised these issues in responses to Mr. Gautier's filings, in effect insulating them from any meaningful answer. Accordingly, because the Defendants have failed to timely and formally renew their motion, the Defendants have waived their right to such relief.

2. Expert Methodology

The Defendants next contend that Mr. Gautier's supplemental expert report is unreliable and inaccurate.[1] [Doc. 151 at 6-7]. They note mathematical errors in the report and assert that Mr. Gautier's expert has failed to provide his reasoning or methodology. Id.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, an expert may testify if the following four requirements are met:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. In other words, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ‘imposes a special gatekeeping obligation on the trial judge' to ‘ensur[e] that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.' Sardis v. Overhead Door Corp., 10 F.4th 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2021)); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).

“Reliability is a ‘flexible' inquiry that focuses on ‘the principles and methodology' employed by the expert.” Sardis, 10 F.4th at 281 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95). “Specifically, district courts must ensure that an expert's opinion is ‘based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and not on belief or speculation.' Id. (quoting Oglesby v. Gen. Motors Corp., 190 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)).

Similarly, district courts may exclude inaccurate expert reports, such as those that contain “a ‘mind-boggling' number of errors and unexplained discrepancies.” EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 466-68 (4th Cir. 2015).

While the Defendants have raised several issues with Mr. Gautier's expert report, on balance, these issues do not render the report unreliable or inaccurate. To begin, Mr. Gautier explains that his expert calculated a “levelized average daily wage” for each worker. [Doc. 139 at 4]. The expert subsequently multiplied that average by the statutory maximum number of days in order to obtain the total amount of back pay for each worker. Id. Contrary to the Defendants' assertion, such a calculation does not rest on “belief or speculation.” Sardis, 10 F.4th at 281. In using a simple mathematical formula, Mr. Gautier's expert instead employed sound “principles and methodology.” Id.

The Defendant's identification of mathematical errors does nothing to alter this conclusion. While trial courts are permitted to exclude expert reports containing a “mindboggling” number of errors, Freeman, 778 F.3d at 466-68, that is simply not the case here. The Defendants have identified two[2] calculations out of a total of 164 that contain mathematical errors. While these mistakes must be remedied, such a relatively small number of errors hardly warrants the exclusion of an entire report. Rather, the Court ORDERS Mr. Gautier's expert to correct the mistakes in his spreadsheet.[3]

B. Back Pay
1. Workdays Versus Calendar Days

The Court now turns to the merits of the motion for monetary relief. Mr. Gautier first requests class wide back pay as provided for under the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. §...

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