Gavarette v. State
Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
Docket Number | Claim No. 134376 |
Citation | 75 Misc.3d 1207 (A),167 N.Y.S.3d 345 (Table) |
Parties | J. GAVARETTE, Claimant v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. |
Court | New York Court of Claims |
Claimant's attorney: J. GAVARETTE, Pro Se
Defendant's attorney: HON. LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General for the State of New York, By: Christina Calabrese, Assistant Attorney General
Motion to dismiss denied as claim was timely under continuous treatment doctrine.
The following papers numbered 1-2 were read and considered by the Court on the State's pre-answer motion to dismiss Claim No. 134376:
Notice of Motion, Attorney's Supporting Affirmation and Exhibit 1
A Notice of Intention to File a Claim and a claim were served upon the State on January 24, 2020 and the claim was filed with the Court on January 28, 2020 (State's Ex. A). The claim alleges that, during claimant's incarceration at Eastern NY Correctional Facility, claimant was deprived of adequate and timely medical care in the necessary treatment of claimant's medical condition pertaining to his right knee and that this caused claimant pain and suffering and a worsening of his medical condition (State's Ex. A, Claim ¶¶ 2-5). The State moves to dismiss the claim as untimely commenced more than 90 days after April 10, 2018, which the State argues is the date of accrual based upon paragraph 14 of the claim which the State interprets as the date that claimant was last seen by a specialist1 (State's Affirmation ¶¶ 7, 11). Claimant opposes the motion and argues that the claim was timely commenced based upon the accrual date of claimant's medical appointment with a doctor "[o]n or about December of 2019" as alleged in paragraph 5 of the claim (State's Ex. A, Claim ¶ 5). Claimant also argues that the allegations of the claim dating more that 90 days prior to the commencement of the claim are timely pursuant to the continuous treatment doctrine which tolls the accrual date to the date of the last medical treatment in December of 2019. The State did not submit any reply papers and thus did not challenge the accrual date of December of 2019 or the applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine.
The service and pleading requirements set forth in Court of Claims Act §§ 10 and 11 are jurisdictional in nature and require strict compliance as a precondition of suit against the State (see Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth. , 81NY2d 721, 724 [1992]). A failure to comply with any provisions of Court of Claims Act §§ 10 and 11 is a jurisdictional defect compelling the dismissal of the claim (see Kolnacki v State of New York , 8 NY3d 277, 281[2007] []; Criscuola v State of New York , 188 AD3d 645 [2d Dept 2020] ). In an action for medical malpractice, a Notice of Intention to File a Claim must be served or a claim must be served and filed within 90 days after the accrual of the claim ( Court of Claims Act 10 [3] ). Under the continuous treatment doctrine, where there is a "continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure," the accrual of a medical malpractice claim is tolled until the last date of treatment ( CPLR 214-a ).
In the case at bar, the claim asserts that "[o]n or about December of 2019" claimant went to a doctor's appointment in reference to his medical condition (State's Ex. A, Claim ¶ 5). The claim further states, (id. ). The claim also alleges that, "my requests...
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