Gavica v. Hanson, 12921

• Decision Date: 06 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 12921,12921
• Citation: 101 Idaho 58,608 P.2d 861
• Parties: Richard Fermin GAVICA, personally and as heir, and as administrator of the estates of Fermin Gavica and Jean Gavica, deceased; Delphine Rae Schubert, personally and as heir; and Geraldine Jo Krueger, personally and as heir, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Harold Edmund HANSON; Stephen F. Frost d/b/a Stephen F. Frost Trucking Company, J. R. Simplot Company, a Nevada Corporation; FMC Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; The State of Idaho; and Tiger Transportation, Inc., a Foreign Corporation, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 861

608 P.2d 861

101 Idaho 58

Richard Fermin GAVICA, personally and as heir, and as administrator of the estates of Fermin Gavica and Jean Gavica, deceased; Delphine Rae Schubert, personally and as heir; and Geraldine Jo Krueger, personally and as heir, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Harold Edmund HANSON; Stephen F. Frost d/b/a Stephen F. Frost Trucking Company, J. R. Simplot Company, a Nevada Corporation; FMC Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; The State of Idaho; and Tiger Transportation, Inc., a Foreign Corporation, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 12921.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 6, 1980.

Rehearing Denied April 21, 1980.

[101 Idaho

59] Herman J. McDevitt, M. Jay Meyers and Boyd B. White, II, of McDevitt, McDevitt, Meyers & White, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Wesley F. Merrill, of Merrill & Merrill, Gary L. Cooper, of Racine, Huntley & Olson, Martin R. Ward, of Maguire, Kisling & Ward, Pocatello, Richard C. Fields and Donald J. Farley, of Moffott, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton and Craig Meadows, of Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Howley, Boise, for defendants-respondents.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from two summary judgments granted in favor of defendants-respondents. Plaintiffs-appellants brought this action for the wrongful death of their parents, who were killed in an automobile accident. In that action plaintiffs-appellants sought punitive damages against certain of the defendants-respondents, and prior to trial summary judgment issued against plaintiffs-appellants prohibiting any consideration of punitive damages. Summary judgment was also granted in favor of the defendant-respondent State of Idaho on the basis that as a matter of law there had been no breach of duty by the State and in any event the asserted negligence of the State was not the proximate cause of the accident. We reverse both summary judgments.

On December 20, 1974, Fermin and Jean Gavica were traveling in their automobile easterly on Highway I-15W. Defendant-respondent Hanson, driving a truck, was also traveling eastward on the same highway some distance behind the Gavicas. On that particular stretch of the highway lay a thick haze which appears to have been caused by certain atmospheric conditions in combination with emissions from the nearby industrial plants of defendants-respondents J. R. Simplot Company and FMC Corporation. Drivers proceeding along the highway should observe the haze approximately two miles prior to entering it.

The Gavicas entered the haze and the driver of another car indicated that thereafter the Gavicas were "going slow or stopped." Hanson indicated that upon entering the haze he reduced his speed from 55 miles per hour to 35 miles per hour. That assertion, however, is questioned since an examination of the truck immediately after the accident revealed that the gear lever was in fourth auxiliary. Hanson denied such, stating that to be in that gear "you'd have to hit at least 70 (MPH)." Hanson testified that the haze cleared slightly and he suddenly came upon the Gavica vehicle which he estimated to be moving at about 5 MPH. The truck struck the Gavica vehicle from the rear and both Gavicas were killed instantly.

Reduced visibility and haze in this particular area has been a continuing but infrequent problem since at least 1965. Prior to the construction of Highway I-15W, FMC, Simplot and the State of Idaho worked together to set up signs along U.S. Highway 30 warning of the haze condition. Those signs still exist today.

Highway I-15W, completed in the late 1960's, is located approximately 150 yards to the north of U.S. Highway 30 and runs roughly parallel to it. In 1971 the State, after receiving complaints about poor visibility, experimented with temporary warning signs along Highway I-15W. That experiment, however, lasted only three months and was declared impractical. It was not until after the Gavicas' death that the State erected permanent warning signs along Highway I-15W to warn motorists of the danger of haze.

Plaintiffs-appellants brought this wrongful death action seeking compensatory and punitive damages from J. R. Simplot Company, FMC Corporation, Harold Hanson, and Hanson's employer, Stephen F. Frost Trucking Company. Plaintiffs-appellants sought compensatory damages from the State of Idaho. Defendants moved for summary judgment forbidding proof and allowance of punitive damages on the basis that such damages were not permissible in a wrongful death action. That summary judgment was granted. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Idaho on the basis that the State's failure to place warning signs on Highway I-15W was neither the proximate cause of the collision nor the breach of a duty of the State. Plaintiffs-appellants sought and obtained a certification that the issues decided by summary judgment presented controlling matters of law necessary of decision prior to trial and this Court permitted this appeal by certification. I.A.R. 12.

I

Whether punitive damages should be allowed in wrongful death actions is a case of first impression in Idaho. Our statute, I.C. § 5-311, provides:

"Action for wrongful death. When the death of a person, not being a person provided for in section 5-310, Idaho Code, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death; or if such person be employed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other person. In every action under this and the preceding section, such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just."

The precise issue then to be decided is whether the statutory language "such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just" permits proof and allowance of punitive damages. Principles of statutory interpretation require this Court to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d 318 (1971); Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P.2d 766 (1969). "The intent of the legislature may be implied from the language used, or inferred on grounds of policy or reasonableness." Summers v. Dooley, supra at 89, 481 P.2d at 320. In effectuating the legislative intent behind an ambiguous statute, the Court should, if possible, avoid indulging in a statutory construction which would cause absurd or unduly harsh results. Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P.2d 497 (1977); Hartman v. Meier, 39 Idaho 261, 227 P. 25 (1924). By providing for wrongful death actions, I.C. § 5-311 is in derogation of the common law rule forbidding such actions. Hughes v. Hudelson, 67 Idaho 10, 169 P.2d 712 (1946). I.C. § 73-102 requires that statutes in derogation of the common law "be liberally construed, with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice."

We therefore examine the provisions of I.C. § 5-311 having regard to policies underlying punitive damage awards. The language of I.C. § 5-311 is broad. As stated in Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942),

"Our statute . . . providing for recovery of damages for death, caused by wrongful act or negligence, is as liberal as any we have examined. It places but one restriction on the amount which may be recovered. That restriction is to be found in the language: 'such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just.' " Id. at 245, 130 P.2d at 862. (Emphasis in original.)

This Court has permitted awards for loss of companionship and guidance and funeral expenses, but has held that the grief suffered by surviving heirs is not a compensable element of damage under the statute. See Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950); Hepp v. Ader, supra; Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789, 285 P. 676 (1930). However, the precise boundaries of damages allowable under the statute have never been completely delineated.

Respondents assert and the trial court held that damages allowable under the statute are limited to compensatory damages. However, neither this Court nor the legislature has ever so expressly stated and indeed in Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Company, supra that question was left open.

Punitive damages are generally not favored under the law and should be awarded only within narrow limits. Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972); Lewiston Pistol Club v. Imthurn, 94 Idaho 264, 486 P.2d 275 (1971). It has been stated that exemplary damages will be awarded only when there is clear evidence that the wrongdoer acted maliciously, fraudulently or with gross negligence. Bradford v. Simpson, 98 Idaho 830, 573 P.2d 149 (1978); Jolley v. Puregro Company, supra. While an award of exemplary damages is a form of punishment, the primary purpose behind such an award is one of deterrence: "the assessment of exemplary damages should be prompted by the court's or jury's desire to assure, to the extent possible via the imposition of a monetary penalty, that similar conduct does not occur in the future." Jolley v. Puregro Company, supra at 709, 496 P.2d at 946. See Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972).

As noted in Cox v. Stolworthy, supra :

"Where actual physical harm is threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the situation rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the plaintiff's physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive damages award finds justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of the injury sustained." Id. at 691, 496 P.2d at 690.

See also Harrington v. Hadden, 69 Idaho 22, 202 P.2d 236 (1949). Thus, while a wrongdoer may be liable for punitive damages if he injures another, it is argued that punitive damages should nevertheless be withheld if a wrongdoer so injures another as to cause death. We find no logic in such a conclusion. If wrongful conduct is to be deterred...