Gavin v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 13 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-2506,85-2506
• Citation: 811 F.2d 1195
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,160 Lawrence Mark GAVIN, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1195

811 F.2d 1195

16 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 299, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,160

Lawrence Mark GAVIN, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services

of the United States, Appellee.

No. 85-2506.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 16, 1986.

Decided Feb. 13, 1987.

Robert W. Pratt, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.

Robert C. Dopf, Asst. U.S. Atty., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, FAGG, Circuit Judge, and TIMBERS, ^* Senior Circuit Judge.

LAY, Chief Judge.

Lawrence Gavin appeals from the judgment of the district court ¹ entered in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying him disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423 (1982).

Background

Lawrence Gavin is a thirty-five year old man with a history of mental disorders as well as alcohol and drug related problems. Gavin's employment history shows odd factory related work with no sustained period of employment. In 1972, he was admitted to the Mount Pleasant Mental Health Institute where he was diagnosed as suffering from inadequate personality disorder and episodic excessive drinking. The staff psychiatrist gave Gavin a poor prognosis. In 1975, Gavin was again admitted to Mount Pleasant for "bad nerves" and impotency problems. He was diagnosed as suffering from inadequate personality disorder, alcoholism, and neurosis anxiety. In 1976, he was again evaluated at Mount Pleasant. On this admission he was examined as to his mental competency to stand trial following his arrest for passing a number of bad checks. The records showed that Gavin was rebellious, moody, and hostile, but the staff found no organic brain syndrome or thought disorder. He was given a diagnosis of antisocial personality, inadequate personality, and alcoholism, but was found competent to stand trial.

In 1978, Gavin was admitted to the Clarinda Mental Health Institute where he spent thirty days in lieu of a forty-four day jail sentence for again writing bad checks. The Clarinda institute's final diagnosis was inadequate personality disorder and dis-social behavior. A report dated July 24, 1979, from the Menard Psychiatric Center following a beating and homosexual attack in the county jail diagnosed an inadequate personality disorder, an adjustment reaction to adult life, and mild depression. Gavin was later transferred to the Alton Mental Health Center in Illinois where he was diagnosed as suffering from schizo-affective schizophrenia.

Shortly after leaving Alton, Gavin applied for disability insurance benefits with the Department of Health and Human Services. At the Department's request, a Menard psychiatrist, Dr. N. Vallabhenani, provided a history of Gavin and opined that Gavin has very poor self-esteem but does not suffer from an intellectual impairment. He felt, however, that under stress, Gavin became more bizarre and disorganized. A consultative examination was also performed by Dr. David G. Windsor who found that Gavin has a chronic, severe disturbance resembling paranoid schizophrenia which, under stress, can develop into a full-blown psychosis. He found Gavin's awareness of his problem to be quite limited. Apparently on the basis of Dr. Windsor's November, 1979, diagnosis, the Secretary awarded Gavin disability benefits.

In April of 1981, the disability benefits were terminated. Gavin had been reevaluated by Dr. Steve Paden, who found no active signs of schizophrenia nor any other signs of formal thought disorder. He found anxiety symptoms but no indication of clinical depression. His diagnosis was: (1) borderline personality disorder; and (2) adult antisocial behavior. It was apparently this evaluation that formed the basis for the Secretary's termination of benefits. However, Dr. Paden's report provides a rather dubious basis for denial of benefits. He wrote:

Regarding his ability to follow instructions, this would seem to be intact. However, his ability to work with supervisors and co-workers and carrying out instructions would be significantly impaired because of his very anxious restless hyperactive state. It is well documented that very low level of stress can precipitate significant decompensation for this gentleman.

In February, 1982, Gavin attempted suicide, his third such attempt, by drug overdose. Two months later, he was again arrested for writing bad checks. He was convicted of this offense in February, 1983, immediately after which he was evaluated by Dr. Richard Lee at the Iowa State Men's Reformatory. Lee found no psychosis, but did note alcohol and multiple drug abuse, as well as anti-social personality.

In September, 1983, Gavin again filed an application for disability benefits with the Department of Health and Human Services. This application is the subject of the present appeal. Both the original application and his application for reconsideration were denied by the Secretary, who found that Gavin's mental impairment would place significant restrictions only on his ability to deal with work pressure in a work setting. The ALJ found contradictory evidence in the record as to whether Gavin could pursue any gainful employment and that Gavin was able to carry out his past relevant work functions of simple, routine, repetitive, unskilled work. Gavin's request to the Appeals Counsel for review was denied. On appeal, the district court found, based upon Magistrate R.E. Longstaff's Report and Recommendation, that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Gavin now appeals to this court.

Discussion

Based upon our review of the record, we hold that the Secretary's finding that Gavin is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. We find the district court failed to properly analyze the overall record and that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports a finding of disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

The ALJ specifically found that Gavin has the residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work as a general factory laborer. The only limitations the ALJ found with respect to Gavin's work capabilities were that he is unable to handle work-related stress and pressure. The record speaks to the contrary. Over a time span of more than a decade, the record shows Gavin has been diagnosed by different psychiatrists at different mental health facilities as suffering from, among other things, inadequate personality disorder. ² These diagnoses also included postulations of schizophrenia, anti-social personality, alcohol and drug abuse, and passive-aggressive personality disorder. He has a poor work record and has consistently shown an inability to keep his temper under control on the job. Numerous psychiatrists and vocational rehabilitation personnel verify that Gavin is mentally and emotionally incapable of handling job-related stress. ³ Dr. Karl Northwall's opinion that Gavin may be employable in a sheltered setting is of little value to our determination. We have stated that "the possibility of 'work in a sheltered workshop is not substantial evidence supporting a denial of disability benefits.' " Rush v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 738 F.2d 909, 916 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting Van Horn v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir.1983)).

A functional non-psychotic disorder qualifies as an impairment if it is manifested by recurrent and persistent periods of anxiety with tension and apprehension, which result in a restriction of daily activities and constriction of interests and deterioration in personal habits and seriously impaired ability to relate to other people. Bailey v. Califano, 614 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir.1980). While we do not pass on the weight of the evidence presented in this case, there is substantial evidence to implicate the above definition. The appropriate test in cases involving mental impairments "is whether the mental impairment is of such severity that plaintiff cannot, or could not on his last eligibility date, engage in any substantial gainful employment." Dunlap v. Harris, 649 F.2d 637, 638-39 (8th Cir.1981).

Since the district court adopted the magistrate's findings and analysis, we will refer to those findings throughout our discussion. The magistrate agrees with the ALJ that the evidence is contradictory and bases his recommendation to affirm the ALJ's decision on this finding. The Secretary argues that where there is conflicting evidence, the ALJ's finding is conclusive on review by judicial officers. Beasley v. Califano, 608 F.2d 1162, 1166 (8th Cir.1979). The magistrate adopted this reasoning and concluded that there exists "substantial evidence " from physicians and vocational counselors "to support the ALJ's findings that he is capable of returning to his former employment." ⁴ (Emphasis added). Based on this determination, the magistrate recommended that the Secretary's decision be affirmed as it was supported by "substantial evidence in the record as a whole."

We believe, however, that the magistrate failed to review the record in the manner dictated by precedent of both this court and the United States Supreme Court. It is not sufficient for the district court to simply say there exists substantial evidence supporting the Secretary and therefore the Secretary must be sustained. The substantial evidence test employed in reviewing administrative findings is more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the Secretary's findings. Parsons v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir.1984). While such a broad-based search is appropriate where a reviewing court considers the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury's verdict, see, e.g., DeWitt v. Brown, 669 F.2d 516, 523 (8th Cir.1982) ("a jury verdict will be sustained so long as there is 'substantial evidence' or 'a reasonable basis in fact' for the jury's conclusion") (quoting Gisriel v. Uniroyal, Inc., 517 F.2d 699, 701 n. 6 (8th Cir.1975)), it is not to be employed on...