Gay v. Pfister, Case No. 12-cv-1444
| Decision Date | 17 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-cv-1444 |
| Parties | ANTHONY GAY, Petitioner, v. GARY PFISTER, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Anthony Gay's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondent has filed a Response (Doc. 16). Petitioner was given the opportunity to file a reply to Respondent's Response but he failed to file one. (Doc. 4 at 4). For the following reasons, Petitioner's § 2254 Petition is DENIED.
Petitioner committed aggravated battery on July 19, 2000, by spraying a liquid substance onto a correctional officer at the Pontiac Correctional Center where Petitioner was incarcerated. People v. Gay, Livingston County Case No. 03-CF-62. (2004). Petitioner was indicted for the July 19, 2000 incident on February 25, 2003, approximately thirty-one months after the incident occurred. (Doc.17, Exh. A at 2). Petitioner was found guilty following an April 2004 jury trial and was sentenced to six years in prison to be served consecutively with Petitioner's other sentences. (Id. at 3). On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in letting himrepresent himself. (Id.). The state appellate court affirmed the conviction in March 2008, and Petitioner did not seek further review in the Illinois Supreme Court. (Id.).
In November 2008, Petitioner filed an amended post-conviction petition in which he alleged, as relevant here, the following claims: (1) the citations that the Department of Corrections issued for his conduct did not provide him with sufficient notice that his behavior would expose him to criminal prosecution, and (2) the State subverted his constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy trial by tactically delaying certain indictments. (Doc. 17, Exh. B at 3). In May 2009, Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for post-conviction relief, adding a third claim that his ninety-seven-year aggregate sentence resulting from this case and several other convictions violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 3-4). The state trial court dismissed Petitioner's post-conviction petition on December 10, 2009. (Doc. 9-1 at 13).
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's decision, relying in part on an earlier opinion resolving Petitioner's identical claims for similar convictions and sentences. (Doc. 17, Exh. B at 2). The court found that due process was not violated because petitioner did not show that he was substantially and unfairly prejudiced. (Id. at 7). Moreover, the court rejected Petitioner's characterization that his aggregate sentence of ninety-seven years was a de facto life sentence which amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 6). In addition, the court found that Petitioner's habeas corpus relief should be limited only to alleged constitutional violations occurring in the instant case. (Id.).Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal the appellate court judgment, which the Illinois Supreme Court denied in September 2012. (Doc. 17, Exhs. H & I).
In October 2012, Petitioner filed the instant § 2254 Petition in this Court raising the following arguments: (1) his due process rights were violated by the State's failure to give him notice that "his conduct was a violation of state statute" and would "lead to criminal charges;" (2) the State intentionally delayed indictments, violating his speedy trial rights; (3) his aggregate sentences violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1 at 5-8). The Court dismissed Petitioner's first claim, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. (Doc. 4 at 3).
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2254 empowers federal district courts to hear petitions for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody on the grounds that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. A federal court may not grant relief on claims that have been adjudicated on the merits by state courts unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or rested on an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, a petitioner must show that the state court's ruling on his or her claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond anypossibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law when it is "substantially different from the relevant precedent" of the Supreme Court, or it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" the Supreme Court precedent and nevertheless reaches a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). In reviewing reasonableness, "it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by the Supreme Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009). Thus, federal habeas review is limited to a deferential inquiry of the reasonableness, rather than the absolute correctness of a state court decision. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1426 (2011); Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2012). As such, the issue before this court is whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in dismissing Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief.
Petitioner first alleges that the State subverted his speedy trial rights by staggering the indictments in his aggravated battery cases. (Doc. 1 at 7). This claim is mistakenly brought, as the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment is ordinarily not implicated until formal indictment. Unites States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977).
A pre-indictment delay may violate due process, however, if the delay (1) causes a defendant substantial prejudice, and (2) was an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The prejudice alleged, though, must be specific and concrete. United States v. Hagler, 700 F.3d 1091, 1099 (7th Cir. 2012) (). Even if a defendant demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice, the Court must still balance the potential prejudice against government interests. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 450-52 (7th Cir. 1994) ().
Here, the Illinois Appellate Court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's pre-indictment delay claim did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law. First, the statute of limitations for a particular crime generally serves as a safeguard for the defendant against unreasonable prosecutorial delay. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 322-33. Thus, so long as the defendant is indicted within the applicable statute of limitations period, the defendant will typically be able to defend himself adequately. United States v. Baker, 40 F.3d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1994). Here, the applicable statute of limitations to indict a defendant for aggravated battery was three years. 702 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-5(b) (2011). Petitioner was indicted foraggravated battery on February 25, 2003 for the July 19, 2000 incident, which was within the three-year statute of limitations. Applying clearly established federal law, the Illinois Appellate Court soundly rejected Petitioner's pre-indictment delay claim.
Second, Petitioner's challenge to the prosecutorial practice of staggering indictments rather than filing them all at once bears no relation to the pre-indictment delay. Rather, Petitioner's argument is based on an erroneous presumption that he would not have been responsible for some crimes he committed had the State prosecuted all cases at once because the State would not be able to comply with the speedy trial requirement. Moreover, prosecutors are not constitutionally required to file charges promptly once it has assembled sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 792. "The Due Process Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek indictment." Id. at 790. Since Lovasco expressly reserves the issue whether prosecutors may delay indictment in order to manage multiple potential charges against a single defendant to the lower court, the state court's approval of that practice cannot be said to unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. Third, Petitioner failed to show any specific and concrete prejudice resulting from the delay that would impair his ability to secure an effective defense and "a fair trial." Sowa, 34 F.3d at 450. Nor could Petitioner show how the State gained a tactical advantage by way of its delay in bringing charges against him. Thus, as the Illinois Appellate Court found, the staggering of indictments here does not "offend those fundamentalconceptions of...
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