Gaylor v. Mnuchin

• Decision Date: 06 October 2017
• Docket Number: 16–cv–215–bbc
• Citation: 278 F.Supp.3d 1081
• Parties: Annie Laurie GAYLOR; Dan Barker; Ian Gaylor, personal representative of the estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor; and Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Steve MNUCHIN, Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury; John Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; and the United States of America, Defendants, and Edward Peecher ; Chicago Embassy Church ; Patrick Malone; Holy Cross Anglican Church; and the Diocese of Chicago and Mid–America of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, Intervenor–Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

278 F.Supp.3d 1081

Annie Laurie GAYLOR; Dan Barker; Ian Gaylor, personal representative of the estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor; and Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.Steve MNUCHIN, Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury; John Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; and the United States of America, Defendants,¹ andEdward Peecher ; Chicago Embassy Church ; Patrick Malone; Holy Cross Anglican Church; and the Diocese of Chicago and Mid–America of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, Intervenor–Defendants.

16–cv–215–bbc

United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin.

Signed October 6, 2017

Richard L. Bolton, Boardman & Clark LLP, Madison, WI, for Plaintiffs.

Richard Gerald Rose, Erin Healy Gallagher, Gregory Van Hoey, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, Richard Davis Humphrey, Leslie K. Herje, U.S. Attorney's Office, Madison, WI, for Defendants.

Hannah Clayson Smith, Daniel Dunkley Benson, Luke William Goodrich, The Becket Fund, Washington, DC, for Intervenor–Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BARBARA B. CRABB, District Judge

The question in this case is whether Congress may give a subset of religious employees an income tax exemption for which no one else qualifies. At issue is the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 107(2), which excludes from the gross income of a "minister of the gospel" a "rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation." (Although the phrase "minister of the gospel" appears on its face to be limited to Christian ministers, the Internal Revenue Service has interpreted the phrase liberally to encompass certain religious leaders of other faiths as well. E.g., Silverman v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 727, 731 (1972) (applying "minister of the gospel" to persons holding equivalent status in other religions); Rev. Rul. 78–301, 178–2 C.B. 103 (applying "minister of the gospel" to those who perform "substantially all of the religious functions" of ordained minister). The correctness of the IRS's interpretation of § 107 is not at issue.)

Plaintiff Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and some of its officers brought this lawsuit to challenge § 107(2) on the ground that it discriminates against secular employees and violates both the establishment clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs initially challenged § 107(1), which excludes from a minister's gross income "the rental value of a home furnished to [the minister] as part of his compensation," but I dismissed that part of the lawsuit for lack of standing. Dkt. # 15.

This is the second time that the foundation and its officers have challenged § 107(2). In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Lew, 983 F.Supp.2d 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2013), I concluded that the provision violates the establishment clause because it provides a benefit to religious persons and no one else, even though doing so is not necessary to alleviate a special burden on religious exercise. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims but instead vacated the judgment on the ground that plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014).

Now plaintiffs say that they followed the directions of the court of appeals to obtain standing and are challenging § 107(2) again. In a previous opinion in this case, the court allowed three ministers who receive housing allowances, along with the churches the ministers serve, to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to present their own view regarding why they believe § 107(2) is valid. Dkt. # 35.

The case is now before the court on three motions: (1) Christopher Butler's unopposed motion to intervene as a defendant, dkt. # 81; (2) a motion for summary judgment filed by the United States of America, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service and the Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury, dkt. # 43; and (3) a motion for summary judgment filed by the intervenor defendants, dkt. # 48. Plaintiffs have not filed their own summary judgment motion, but instead ask the court in their opposition brief to enter judgment in their favor on the court's own motion. Dkt. # 65 at 41. See also Ellis v. DHL Exp. Inc. (USA), 633 F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2011) ("District courts have the authority to enter summary judgment sua sponte as long as the losing party was on notice that it had to come forward with all its evidence."). None of the defendants object to this request on procedural grounds.

The motion to intervene will be granted. Butler is the new pastor of intervenor defendant Chicago Embassy Church, replacing intervenor defendant Edward Peecher, who no longer works for that church. Like Peecher, Butler receives a housing allowance. Butler's interests are identical to Peecher's, Butler is adopting the summary judgment materials filed by intervenor defendants and he is not asking to make any changes to the case. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to allow him to intervene. Intervenor defendants have not moved to dismiss Peecher, presumably because he now works for a different church and will continue to receive a housing allowance and claim an exemption under § 107(2). Dkt. # 83, ¶ 5.

As to the merits, I will deny defendants' motions for summary judgment and grant summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor. I adhere to my earlier conclusion in Lew that § 107(2) violates the establishment clause because it does not have a secular purpose or effect and because a reasonable observer would view the statute as an endorsement of religion.

Although defendants try to characterize § 107(2) as an effort by Congress to treat ministers fairly and avoid religious entanglement, the plain language of the statute, its legislative history and its operation in practice all demonstrate a preference for ministers over secular employees. Ministers receive a unique benefit under § 107(2) ; it is not, as defendants suggest, part of a larger effort by Congress to provide assistance to employees with special housing needs. A desire to alleviate financial hardship on taxpayers is a legitimate purpose, but it is not a secular purpose when Congress eliminates the burden for a group made up of solely religious employees but maintains it for nearly everyone else.

Under my view of the current law, that type of discriminatory treatment violates the establishment clause. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' alternative argument that § 107(2) violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.

From the parties' proposed findings of fact and the record, I find that the following facts are undisputed.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

A. Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Annie Laurie Gaylor and Dan Barker are co-presidents of the Freedom from Religion Foundation, a nonprofit membership organization that advocates for the separation of church and state. Before her death in 2015, Anne Nicol Gayor was a lifetime member and president emerita of the foundation. (I will refer to Annie Laurie Gaylor simply as "Gaylor" and to Anne Nicol Gaylor by her full name.)

Gaylor and Barker each receive a salary from the foundation. Since 2011, the foundation has designated part of those salaries as a housing allowance. Anne Nicol Gaylor also received housing allowances before she died. The allowance for Gaylor and Barker was $4500 in 2011; $13,200 in 2012; and $15,000 in 2013. (Plaintiffs do not say what the allowance was in subsequent years, except that it is "intended to approximate their actual housing expenses for each year." Plts.' PFOF ¶ 8, dkt. # 63.)

Gaylor and Barker pay federal income taxes, as did Anne Nicol Gaylor until her death. In January 2015, Gaylor and Barker filed an amended income tax return for the year 2013. (Plaintiffs do not say so expressly, but presumably Gaylor and Barker filed a joint return because they are married.) In their amended return, Gaylor and Barker claimed the designated housing allowance as an exclusion of income and they sought a partial refund of the taxes they paid. Anne Nicol Gaylor also filed an amended return for the tax year 2013 in which she sought the same refund.

On March 2, 2015, the Internal Revenue Service allowed Gaylor's and Barker's requested refund, but did not explain why. Dkt. # 60–2. On April 13, 2015, the IRS informed Anne Nicol Gaylor that it was processing her amended return, but it never issued a decision on her request for a refund.

In March 2015, Gaylor and Barker filed an amended return for the year 2012. They stated that they are "not clergy" and that their "employer is not a church," but they believed "it is unfair that ministers can exclude housing while we cannot." In July 2015, the IRS disallowed the claim. The letter stated that "individual taxpayer[s] are allowed to claim deductions for Housing on Sch A if they have mortgage interest and property taxes, otherwise there is no deduction." Dkt. # 60–4. In a response to the IRS, Gaylor and Barker cited 26 U.S.C. § 107(2). In letters dated August 20, 2015, November 25, 2015 and January 12, 2016, the IRS informed Gaylor and Barker that the agency was "working on" their amended return. Dkt. # 60–5; Plts.' PFOF ¶ 19, dkt. # 63.

In April 2016, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. On June 27, 2016, plaintiff received the following response from the IRS:

My review of the information previously submitted by you indicates your claim should be denied. Your claim appears to be based on a portion of your wages being deemed to be a housing allowance. Your letter dated 07/14/2015 states that you are aware that a housing allowance is excludable from income if you are a minister of the gospel and also avows that neither of you are ministers of the gospel. It goes on to state that this is unfair and discriminatory. It appears that your concerns are misdirected. Congress writes tax laws and it is the job of the Internal Revenue Service to implement them. In

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