Gaymon v. Esposito
| Decision Date | 16 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-4170 (JLL) |
| Parties | MELLANIE GAYMON, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF'S OFFICER EDWARD ESPOSITO, et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court by way of three (3) motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by the following Defendants: (1) Essex County Sheriff's Office (and/or County of Essex), Officer Esposito,1 Sheriff Armando Fontoura, Undersheriff Kevin Ryan [Docket Entry No. 68], (2) Lieutenant Peter Corbo [Docket Entry No. 89], and (3) Captain Kevin Pascoal [Docket Entry No. 90]. The Court has considered the submissions made in support of and in opposition to the instant motions. No oral argument was heard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. Based on the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs may file a Third Amended Complaint on or before September 30, 2013, solely for the purpose of: (a) omitting those claims (and facts corresponding thereto) which have now been dismissed with prejudice bythe Court, (b) repleading those claims which the Court has allowed to proceed at this time, and (c) curing the pleading deficiencies in Counts One and Three.
On July 16, 2010, Plaintiffs' decedent Defarra I. Gaymon ("Decedent" or "Mr. Gaymon"), the chief executive officer of a credit union in Atlanta, Georgia, was in Branch Brook Park in Newark, New Jersey at approximately 6:15 p.m. (Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 14-16). The Essex County Sheriff's Office ("ECSO"), which is a law enforcement agency and department within the County of Essex, patrols several Essex County parks, including Branch Brook Park. (Id., ¶ 8). Sheriff Armando Fontoura and Undersheriff Kevin Ryan are responsible for training Sheriff's Officers and for ensuring compliance with ECSO standard operating procedures. (Id., ¶¶ 9-10). At all relevant times, the ECSO had a standard operating procedure ("SOP") requiring a minimum of four officers to be utilized for undercover quality of life details in the Essex County parks. (Id., ¶ 27).
On the night in question, Defendant Sheriff's Officer Edward Esposito ("Officer Esposito") and Sheriff's Officer David Cohen ("Officer Cohen") were conducting an undercover quality of life detail, in plain clothes, at Branch Brook Park. (Id., ¶ 28). They were the only two officers assigned to the plain clothes/undercover detail in Branch Brook Park that night. (Id., ¶ 28).
Mr. Gaymon was allegedly unarmed at said Park when an encounter occurred between himself and Defendant Officer Esposito. (Id., ¶¶ 17-18). The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Officer Esposito chased Mr. Gaymon to a pond located within the park. (Id., ¶ 19).Because the pond was in front of Mr. Gaymon, he apparently had no avenue of escape. (Id., ¶ 21). It is further alleged that Mr. Gaymon then got down on his knees, and Defendant Officer Esposito approached him from behind without backup. (Id., ¶¶ 20, 22). Defendant Officer Esposito then allegedly kicked Mr. Gaymon several times and unholstered and drew his gun. (Id., ¶¶ 23-24). Officer Esposito then purportedly took aim with his revolver and fired it once at Mr. Gaymon, hitting him with a bullet in the stomach and causing his death. (Id., ¶ 25).
In light of the foregoing facts, Plaintiffs initiated this matter on June 17, 2011, by filing a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey. Shortly thereafter, Defendants removed this matter to this Court on July 20, 2011. This Court's jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. On January 27, 2012, Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court granted said motion without prejudice on March 29, 2012. Since then, Plaintiffs have filed two amended complaints. The Second Amended Complaint, filed on February 15, 2013, is now the operative complaint in this matter. See Docket Entry No. 67.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges three violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count One alleges a claim of excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as against Officer Esposito. Count Two contains a claim of failure to train and/or supervise, in violation of § 1983, as against the ECSO, County of Essex and the Supervisory Defendants.3 Count Three alleges a Monell claim of failure to follow standard operating procedure, in violation of § 1983, as against Defendant County of Essex.4 Count Four alleges a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act,N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, as against Defendant Officer Esposito. Counts Five and Six allege state law tort claims act violations as against the ECSO, County of Essex and the Supervisory Defendants, based upon excessive force and failure to train/supervise. Count Seven contains a wrongful death claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, et seq, as against Defendant Officer Esposito and the Supervisory Defendants. Finally, Count Eight purports to assert a "survival action" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3 as against all Defendants.5
Defendants have now filed motions to dismiss all Counts of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
For a complaint to survive dismissal, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234. But, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, legal conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations may not benefit from the presumption of truthfulness. Id.
Additionally, in evaluating a plaintiff's claims, generally "a court looks only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the record." Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).6 With this framework in mind, the Court turns now to Defendants' motions.
Defendant Officer Esposito moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 excessive force claim on the basis that: (1) it fails to state a claim, and (2) in any event, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil action for the deprivation of rights against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that "the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). Here, the parties do not dispute that Defendant Officer Esposito was acting under the color of state law as an officer of the ECSO. At issue is whether Defendant Officer Esposito used excessive force against Mr. Gaymon when he shot him and, thereby, deprived Mr. Gaymon of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) ().
To allege a § 1983 claim for the use of excessive force, deadly or not, a plaintiff must show that a "seizure" occurred, and that said seizure was unreasonable. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has held that the use of deadly force, "[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others," is not justified. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Still, "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of physical harm, either to the officer or to others," deadly force may be justified. Id.
Further, when the excessive force alleged occurred in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen, the test of "reasonableness" used by the Court requires an assessment, under the totality of the circumstances, of whether an "officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivations." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-97. The"reasonableness" test thus involves "careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government interests at stake." Id. at 396-97 (internal quotations omitted). Evaluating the objective reasonableness of the police conduct "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396. Further, a court may consider "the possibility that the persons subject to the police action are violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the...
To continue reading
Request your trial