Geary v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

• Decision Date: 07 October 1937
• Docket Number: No. 24044.,24044.
• Citation: Geary v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 366 Ill. 625, 10 N.E.2d 350 (Ill. 1937)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: GEARY v. GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO.

366 Ill. 625

10 N.E.2d 350

GEARY

v.GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO.

No. 24044.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 11, 1937.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1937.

Appeal from Third Division Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Municipal Coury of Chicago; Le Roy Hackett, Judge.

Action by Jean S. Geary, assignee, against the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Court (287 Ill.App. 626, 5 N.E. (2d) 266), reversing a judgment of the municipal court in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment of the Appellate Court reversed; judgment of municipal court affirmd.Milton Hart, of Chicago, for appellant.

Ashcraft & Ashcraft, of Chicago (Russell F. Locke and Rufus D. Beach, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

STONE, Justice.

Appellant, as assignee of a claim for rent, secured judgment thereon in the municipal court of Chicago against the appellee in the sum of $1,750. The cause was tried on a stipulation of facts from which it appears that on February 25, 1931, appellee, then in possession of the premises, wrote to the Foreman Trust & Savings Bank, herein called the Foreman Bank, then receiver of the premises, as follows:

‘Re: 3309 W. Madison Street.

‘Herewith original and duplicate copies of renewal lease for one year commencing May 1, 1931, at a monthly rental rate of $125.00 with one one-year renewal privilege at $135.00 per month.

‘Kindly have both copies properly signed, and return to this office at your earliest convenience.’

On March 2, following, the Foreman Bank forwarded the lease to its attorney and requested him to procure authorization, by the court in which the receivership was pending, to execute the lease. This authorization was made on March 6, and on March 7, at 10:30 a. m., the Foreman Bank, as receiver, having executed the leases sent by appellee with its letter of February 25, mailed them to appellee with the following letter:

‘We are pleased to advise you that the court has authorized us to execute a lease with your Company from May 1, 1931, for a period of one year at a monthly rental of $125.00.

‘We are returning herewith two leases for signature. Kindly return the original, retaining a copy for your files.’

On that day, at 1:30 p. m., the appellee mailed the following letter to the receiver:

‘Re: 3309 W. Madison Street.

‘Our Mr. MacKenzie has been negotiating with you for the renewal of our lease on the above store. An offer of $125.00 per month for the term of one year commencingwith May 1, 1931, and ending with April 30, 1932, was submitted on our lease form with our letter of February 25, 1931. To date this offer has not been accepted.

‘Please accept notice that we withdraw this offer and that we do not intend to renew our lease after the expiration of its present term.

‘Thank you for your efforts and consideration.’

It is stipulated that appellee did not, when it mailed this letter, know of the mailing of the executed leases by the receiver, and that the receiver, when mailing them to appellee, had no notice of an intention on the latter's part to withdraw its offer to lease. On April 30, just prior to the termination of the current year, appellee addressed a letter to the receiver inclosing keys to the premises and advising him that the premises had been vacated. The premises remained vacant from April 30, 1931, to April 1, 1932, when they were rented for $60 per month. Evidence was also admitted tending to prove an effort on the part of the receiver to rent the premises during the year. On appeal to the Appellate Court the judgment of the municipal court was reversed. The cause is here on leave to appeal granted.

Appellant's theory is that an agreement between the parties for rental of the premises at $125 per month having been reached by correspondence, the lease became effective though it had been signed only by the receiver. Appellee, on the other hand, argues that the most that can be made of the correspondence is an offer to make a lease and an acceptance of such offer, and that as the appellant declared upon the lease which had not been signed, and not upon a broken promise to make a lease, he is not entitled to recover.

The rule of law, accepted by counsel on both sides of this lawsuit, is that a contract is ordinarily effected by offer and acceptance, (Restatement of Law of Contracts, p. 27, par. 22), and that when an offer is made by letter and the offeree posts his acceptance, the contract is complete,...