Gebhardt v. Warren
| Decision Date | 22 January 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 30366.,30366. |
| Citation | 77 N.E.2d 187,399 Ill. 196 |
| Parties | GEBHARDT v. WARREN et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Kankakee County; C. D. Henry, judge.
Suit by Howard Gebhardt against Minnie Gebhardt Warren and others for partition of real estate owned in his lifetime by Charles Gebhardt, now deceased. From decree for plaintiff, the defendants appeal.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Eva L. Minor, of Kankakee, for appellants.
Arthur Poorman, of Chicago Heights, Armen R. Blanke, of Kankakee, and Schradzke & Gould, of Chicago, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Kankakee County, which partitioned real estate owned in his lifetime by Charles Gebhardt, now deceased. Appellee, Howard Gebhardt, the plaintiff below, was awarded a seven twenty-fourths interest as the adopted son of Frank Gebhardt, who was a true son of the intestate, Charles Gebhardt. Appellants, who are the other heirs of Charles Gebhardt, seek to review that finding of the court on the ground that appellee was not the legally adopted son of Frank Gebhardt. The trial court has reserved jurisdiction of so much of the cause as pertains to an accounting of other property not involved here. Since the necessary result of our judgment must be that one party will gain and the other lose a freehold estate, a freehold is involved so as to give this court jurisdiction on direct appeal. Hachadourian v. Bogosian, 393 Ill. 135, 65 N.E.2d 687;Wood v. Dillon, 391 Ill. 186, 62 N.E.2d 668.
Motions filed in this court and taken with the case have created an issue as to what portions of the transcript of the adoption proceedings are correctly included in the record before us. Appellee introduced the petition and order into evidence, marking them as exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B.’ Physically attached to these documents when they were introduced into evidence were copies of an appearance, of a consent to adoption, answer of guardian ad litem, a summons, and the certificate of the clerk, none of which were specifically introduced into evidence, but which, nevertheless, came before the court. All these documents were made a part of the record by the court reporter who prepared the report of proceedings, and such report was certified by the trial judge. Because appellants here rely, in part, on many alleged errors appearing in documents other than the petition and order, appellee has filed a motion seeking to strike from the report of proceedings, from the abstract of record, and from the brief and argument of appellants, all references to any portion of the adoption proceedings other than the petition and order. In response to this motion appellants have presented an affidavit of the trial judge in which he states that he considered all portions of the transcript, in addition to arguments resisting the motion.
We are of the opinion that the entire transcript of the adoption proceedings is properly in the record before us. The report of proceedings shows that when the transcript of record, which contained the petition and the decree, was offered in evidence, the court asked: ‘Is that an authenticated copy?’ and when assured it was, stated: ‘It may be admitted into evidence,’ referring apparently to the entire transcript and not the petition and decree separately.
In Re Estate of Bohn, 308 Ill. 214, 139 N.E. 64, this court stated that the mother's consent in writing to the adoption, filed with and referred to in the petition, may properly be considered a part of it. The same may be true of an entry of appearance in such cases. The certificate of the trial judge in the report of proceedings, as to what took place before him, is conclusive in this court. People v. Bouderioyni, 299 Ill. 96, 132 N.E. 501. Here the certificate of the trial judge indicates that the entire adoption transcript was admitted into evidence and considered by him. Appellee's motion to strike parts of the record is denied.
It is conceded that the main issue presented for review is the validity of the adoption proceedings. The attack directed against those proceedings is collateral and the sole inquiry therefore is whether the county court had jurisdiction to render the order. Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 Ill. 115, 195 N.E. 657;McConnell v. McConnell, 345 Ill. 70, 177 N.E. 692. Since parties thereto are not objecting, that inquiry is further limited to the jurisdiction of the subject matter. McConnell v. McConnell, 345 Ill. 70, 177 N.E. 692;In re Estate of Bohn, 308 Ill. 214, 139 N.E. 64. If it appears from the record that the court did not acquire jurisdiction of the subject matter, the order of adoption is open to collateral attack. Hopkins v. Gifford, 309 Ill. 363, 141 N.E. 178;Kennedy v. Borah, 226 Ill. 243, 80 N.E. 767.
The record shows that on May 27, 1922, Frank and Elizabeth Gebhardt filed a petition in the county court of Cook County to adopt Edwin Keller, the illegitimate son of one Katherine Keller, and to change his name to Howard Gebhardt. The petitioners alleged that they were residents of ‘the City of Chicago Heights, County of Will, State of Illinois,’ that Edwin Keller was a male child of the age of one year and six months; that they wished to adopt him to provide him with the necessities of life, an education, and for the purpose of inheritance; that the mother of the child had consented to the adoption of the child by the petitioners; that they had custody of the child at 1128 Emerald Ave., Chicago Heights, Illinois, and that said child was found in the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois.
Attached to the petition was an appearance signed by Katherine Keller, ‘the mother of the child to be adopted’ and defendant in the cause, in which she entered her appearance, waived process and consented to a decree in accordance with the prayer of the petition. This document, which has no date, was captioned as follows:
'State of Illinois,
'In the County Court of Cook County.
'In the Matter of the Application of
Martin A. Krueger and Marguerite
Krueger to Adopt Edwin Keller.'
Also attached to the petition was a document entitled ‘Consent to Adoption,’ dated December 31, 1921. This document recited that Katherine Keller, of the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, mother of Edwin Keller, ‘do hereby consent to the adoption of said child by _____,’ then followed the words ‘Martin A. Krueger and Marguerite Krueger’ which had been deleted by a line, and the words ‘Frank Gebhardt and Elizabeth Gebhardt’ inserted above the lineated words. The caption of this document likewise stated that it was ‘In the Matter of the Application of Martin A. Krueger and Marguerite Krueger to Adopt Edwin Keller.’
Appellants' first contention is that these documents fail to show substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute conferring jurisdiction of the subjectmatter, and that the county court of Cook County was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of adoption. It is evident that the form used had first been made out for the Kruegers and a later attempt was made to change it. The rule in this State, as discussed and set forth in McConnell v. McConnell, 345 Ill. 70, 177 N.E. 692, is one of substantial compliance with the adoption statute.
Section 1 of the Adoption Act in effect on May 27, 1922 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1921, chap. 4, sec. 1), provided in part as follows: ‘That any reputable person may petition the circuit or county court of the county in which he resides, or where the child may be found for leave to adopt a child not his own,’ etc. Appellants contend the petition on its face shows substantial want of compliance with the statute for the reason that it was filed in the county court of Cook County, whereas it recites that the petitioners were...
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