Gee v. Moss, 43.

Decision Date19 October 1931
Docket NumberNo. 43.,43.
Citation156 A. 458
PartiesGEE et al. v. MOSS et al.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Essex County.

Action by Ethel Gee and another against Sarah Moss and husband. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Hudspeth & Harris, of Jersey City (Edward A. Markley, of Jersey City, of counsel), for appellants.

Meyer M. Semel, of Newark, for respondents.

KAYS, J.

This is an appeal from the Essex county circuit court tried before his honor, Newton H. Porter, circuit court judge, and a jury. The suit was brought to recover compensation for injuries received by the plaintiff Ethel Gee, who was run down by an automobile owned by Sarah Moss and operated by her husband, Sigmund Moss, in the performance of the business of his said wife.

The first trial of the case resulted in a verdict in favor of the said plaintiffs below for the sum of $2,200. A rule to show cause was thereupon allowed by the trial judge and a new trial was directed which limited the same to damages only. The second trial was had which resulted in a larger verdict than the verdict rendered at the first trial and was for the sum of $5,300. Prior to the second trial the pleadings were amended so as to admit evidence which was not presented at the first trial. As a result of these amendments there was some evidence as to the injuries of the said plaintiff, Ethel Gee, introduced at the second trial which was not presented to the jury at the first trial. This evidence was to the effect that the said plaintiff had sustained a curvature of the spine and some other injuries. The trial judge refused to allow another rule to show cause and judgment accordingly was entered upon the second verdict. This appeal is from that judgment.

The only ground for reversal before us is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial on the second verdict. The trial judge said that he had considered the matter very carefully from every standpoint and concluded it was not a case under the decisions that justified the setting aside of the verdict and the granting of a new trial. He further said that he was not convinced that the jury decided the case because of mistake, passion, or prejudice. He further said there was testimony in the case that fully justified the verdict. The appellants refer to the case of Gaffney v. Illing sworth, 90 N. J. Law, 492, 101 A. 243, and claim that this case holds "that the refusal of a new...

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14 cases
  • Hager v. Weber
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • May 21, 1951
    ...v. Illingsworth, 90 N.J.L. 490, 101 A. 243 (E. & A.1917); Robinson v. Payne, 99 N.J.L. 135, 122 A. 882 (E. & A.1923); Gee v. Moss, 108 N.J.L. 160, 156 A. 458 (E. & A.1931); Gormley v. Gasiorowski, 110 N.J.L. 287, 164 A. 440 (E. & A.1937); Nelson v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra; Salvato v.......
  • Nelson v. E. Air Lines, Inc.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • January 29, 1942
    ...because the granting of a new trial is in general not subject to appeal or other review." Then came such decisions as Gee v. Moss, 108 N.J.L. 160, 156 A. 458; Gormlcy v. Gasiorowski, 110 N.J.L. 287, 164 A. 440, 441; Rossman v. Newbon, 112 N.J.L. 261, 170 A. 230, 231, and Diamond Rubber Co.,......
  • Bowem v. Healy's Inc.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • January 22, 1938
    ...that the verdict was the product of sympathy, passion, or prejudice. Gray v. Elmo, 9 N.J.Misc. 1093, 1097, 156 A. 825; Gee v. Moss, 108 N.J.L. 160, 156 A. 458. It is, of course, a circumstance to be The following quotation taken from the opinion of Nevius, J., in the early case of Doughty v......
  • Salvato v. N.J. Asphalt & Paving Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • January 17, 1947
    ...the jury, when there is sufficient evidence before the jury, which the jury might believe, to justify the verdict rendered. Gee v. Moss, 108 N.J.L. 160, 156 A. 458. If the rule were otherwise the court could in the exercise of its personal judgment, substitute it for the unanimous judgment ......
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