Geer v. Gates Chili Cent. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 25 July 2018
• Docket Number: 17-CV-6161L
• Citation: 321 F.Supp.3d 417
• Parties: Wesley GEER, Plaintiff, v. GATES CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

321 F.Supp.3d 417

Wesley GEER, Plaintiff,

v.GATES CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

17-CV-6161L

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed July 25, 2018

Earl Thomas Hall, Fairport, NY, for Plaintiff.

Joshua D. Steele, Mohammad Ibrahim Tariq, Harris Beach LLP, Pittsford, NY, Jillian Kay Farrar, Paul F. Keneally, Underberg & Kessler LLP, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID G. LARIMER, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Wesley Geer filed this action in March 2017, alleging that he was terminated from his employment as a high school teacher with the Gates-Chili Central School District ("District") in 2017, in violation of his federal civil rights and tortiously under New York law.

Three motions are now pending before the Court: a motion by defendants Joseph DiMaria and Employee Health Referral Systems, Inc., d/b/a Employee Health Systems ("EHS") to dismiss the complaint (Dkt. # 24); a motion by plaintiff for leave to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. # 37); and a motion by plaintiff to compel production of certain discovery-related documents (Dkt. # 45).

BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken from the amended complaint (Dkt. # 8), the allegations of which are assumed to be true, for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC , 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012). The Court has also considered certain documents that are referred to or incorporated by reference in the complaint. See Whipple v. Reed Eye Associates , 213 F.Supp.3d 492, 495 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).

Plaintiff, who was born in 1959, was a tenured middle-school social studies teacher with the Gates-Chili Central School District ("District") from 1999 until his termination on April 7, 2016. He was terminated as a result of certain charges brought against him, which resulted in a arbitrator's finding that plaintiff was guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher, immoral character, insubordination and neglect of duty." Amended Complaint ¶ 23 (referencing arbitrator's decision); Arbitrator's Decision (Dkt. # 32-4) at 3. This mostly related to plaintiff's interactions with students, particularly on several occasions when he lost his temper and shouted at students.¹

Around 2009, plaintiff, who alleges that he has suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder

for many years, sought psychological treatment for problems stemming from several causes, including his wife's illness and other traumatic events. Complaint ¶¶ 52-54. During the 2011-12 academic year, plaintiff also participated in therapy, pursuant to the District's employee assistance program ("EAP"). He alleges that he did so at the direction of the District. Complaint ¶ 106. Plaintiff does not appear to take issue with that directive, as he alleges that his participation in the EAP was a reasonable accommodation for his emotional or psychological difficulties. Complaint ¶ 104.

The EAP was administered by defendant EHS, pursuant to a contract between EHS and the District. Under the terms of the contract, which is expressly referenced in the complaint, any information provided by an employee using the EAP was to remain confidential. See Dkt. # 32-3 at 3-4.

According to plaintiff, then-principal Gerard Iuppa, who himself was a licensed psychologist, understood the problems that plaintiff was dealing with, but was generally satisfied with plaintiff's work performance. Iuppa retired in January 2013.

Following Iuppa's retirement, defendant Lisa Buckshaw became the principal. Plaintiff alleges that with the knowledge and support of defendant Superintendent Kimberle Ward, Buckshaw sought to get rid of plaintiff. The reasons for her alleged animus toward plaintiff are not entirely clear, but at least part of it appears to stem from Buckshaw's alleged awareness that plaintiff had opposed Buckshaw's hiring because of her role in prior instances of illegal employment discrimination, against other employees. Complaint ¶¶ 91-93. (Aside from plaintiff's opposition to Buckshaw's appointment, those alleged acts of discrimination are unrelated to the events giving rise to this lawsuit.)

Over the course of the 2013-14 school year, Buckshaw allegedly took several disciplinary actions against plaintiff, relating to various incidents involving plaintiff's interactions with students and other teachers. Plaintiff alleges that these were essentially trumped-up charges and that Buckshaw, with Ward's support, was trying to manufacture a pretext for plaintiff's termination.

During the 2015-16 academic year, Buckshaw recommended plaintiff's termination. Pursuant to N.Y. Educ. L. § 3020-a, which generally provides that a tenured employee is entitled to a hearing when charges have been brought against him, a hearing was held before an arbitrator/hearing officer. At that hearing, EHS's president/owner, Joseph DiMaria, testified pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District.

DiMaria testified at the hearing that he met plaintiff in 2014, based on a referral from the District pursuant to the EAP, requesting him to talk to plaintiff about "some concerns and issues the District had expressed." Plaintiff's Ex. 6 (Dkt. # 26-7) at 110. DiMaria stated that those matters generally related to "[c]oncerns expressed by teachers who worked with Mr. Geer or about either some of his classroom activities [and] their relationships with him ...." Id. at 112.

DiMaria further testified that he met with plaintiff on four occasions, as well as with some other District staff members, roughly between February and April 2014. He stated that in general, those other employees "felt intimidated, threatened in a sense [by plaintiff]. I don't think physical threat but feeling that Mr. Geer was aggressive and they felt intimidated by him, and they were afraid to express it because they felt some level of intimidation and retaliation." Id. at 113.

In his testimony, DiMaria said virtually nothing about any communications between plaintiff and him. DiMaria did indicate that he had relayed some of the other teachers' concerns to plaintiff. But following these meetings, DiMaria ultimately recommended that plaintiff be allowed to resume teaching, with "some more structure and supervision," at least initially, so that if further problems arose, they could be dealt with in an orderly way. Id. at 114. He testified that pursuant to his usual procedures, he also conducted a mental health screen of plaintiff, to see if any other issues needed to be addressed, but that "[n]one of the results indicated further treatment or test." Id. at 116.

In the end, however, plaintiff was discharged, mostly due to events that occurred after—consistent with DiMaria's recommendation—plaintiff was allowed to return to work. According to Buckshaw (who also testified at the hearing), the decision to terminate plaintiff was prompted in large part by an incident that occurred on September 24, 2015—some fifteen months after plaintiff's EAP sessions with DiMaria had come to an end, see Dkt. # 26-7 at 118. On that date, Buckshaw was told by a staff member, shortly after the end of a fire drill, that there was shouting coming from plaintiff's classroom. Buckshaw stated that she immediately went to the room, where she found plaintiff yelling at his students, apparently because he believed that some of them had misbehaved in some manner during the drill.

Buckshaw told plaintiff more than once that she would "take if from here," whereupon plaintiff stopped talking and gestured with his arm as if to say, "They're all yours," and Buckshaw addressed the students, reminding them of the importance of behaving properly during fire drills. Buckshaw then left the room and plaintiff resumed teaching. Id. at 121-25. Based on the timing of the events, including her review of video from a security camera, Buckshaw estimated that plaintiff had been yelling at his students for some six minutes by the time she arrived.

Buckshaw also testified about several other causes for concern about plaintiff. These included complaints or reports from students and at least one parent about certain statements that plaintiff had made to his students. These need not be recited in detail here, but they included comments about plaintiff's belief that women should not be allowed to serve in the military (because their proper role is to stay home and raise children), making joking references to pornography and to menstrual periods, embarrassing a student in front of the entire class because the student had failed a test, and so on.

Buckshaw, Ward and Assistant Superintendent John Brandon consulted with each other, and the decision was made to terminate plaintiff. Buckshaw testified that "Kim [Ward] really made a decision that that's it. We're done," but Buckshaw concurred with that decision. She testified that while she found plaintiff to have a "huge heart and a lot of passion," both staff members and students were afraid of him. She stated that he was simply "too unpredictable," and that she was "concerned that he will snap at a child and hurt them physically although we already know that he has harmed them emotionally." Dkt. # 26-7 at 170-71.

After that decision was made, plaintiff presumably exercised his right to a hearing pursuant to § 3020-a. See Educ. L. § 3020-a(2)(f) (stating that "[t]he unexcused failure of the employee to notify the clerk or secretary of his or her desire for a hearing within ten days of the receipt of charges shall be deemed a waiver of the right to a hearing").

Following the § 3020-a hearing, the arbitrator issued a forty-two-page decision concluding that plaintiff was guilty of conduct unbecoming a teacher, and insubordination. He also ruled that the appropriate penalty was termination of plaintiff's employment. Dkt. # 32-4.

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 15, 2017. The amended complaint asserts eight causes of action: (1) a claim against the District under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ; (2) an...