Geffken v. Strickler
Decision Date | 01 February 2001 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-13.,SC00-13. |
Citation | 778 So.2d 975 |
Parties | Richard Henry GEFFKEN, Petitioner, v. R.R. STRICKLER, etc., Robert K. Mathis, Judge, etc., and the State of Florida, Respondents. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard Henry Geffken, Sanderson, FL, Petitioner, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
Petitioner Richard Henry Geffken petitions this Court for writ of quo warranto challenging his conviction and sentence.1 We have jurisdiction to consider such petitions pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution.
Before we proceed to the merits of the petition, we must determine whether petitioner is subject to the partial payment provisions of section 57.085, Florida Statutes (1999) (hereinafter the Prisoner Indigency Statute). Petitioner has filed an affidavit of indigency asserting that he has insufficient funds with which to pre-pay the entire filing fee in this case. The Prisoner Indigency Statute provides, inter alia, that if a prisoner lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee upon filing, partial payments of the fee will be deducted from the prisoner's inmate account if or when funds become available.2 However, the Prisoner Indigency Statute specifically exempts "collateral criminal proceedings" from this requirement. We conclude that writ petitions which contest a criminal conviction or sentence are "collateral criminal proceedings," and are exempt from the partial payment provisions of the Prisoner Indigency Statute.
The Prisoner Indigency Statute provides, inter alia, that inmates who do not have sufficient funds to pay for certain types of lawsuits in full upon filing must pay for their lawsuits in installments if and when any funds are deposited into their inmate accounts. See § 57.085, Fla. Stat. (1999).3 The statute, however, specifically exempts "collateral criminal proceedings" from its provisions. See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). That means that if an inmate files an action which is considered a "collateral criminal proceeding," and the court finds that the inmate is without funds to pay for the action, i.e., that the inmate is indigent, the inmate may, in some circumstances, be considered completely exempt from the partial payment provisions of the statute.
We recently determined in Hall v. State, 752 So.2d 575 (Fla.2000), that a postconviction motion and an appeal therefrom are "collateral criminal proceedings" for purposes of determining whether sanctions may be imposed under a different statutory scheme, which provides for discipline when an inmate files a frivolous or other improper lawsuit. See §§ 944.279, 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999).
Similarly, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded in Ferenc v. State, 697 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), that the Prisoner Indigency Statute does not apply to postconviction motions because they are collateral criminal proceedings. Like the sanction statutes, the Prisoner Indigency Statute provides that it does not apply to a "criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding." See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (1999). Both the sanction statutes and the Prisoner Indigency Statute were enacted as part of one act that created or amended several statutory provisions for the purpose of reducing unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings. See ch. 96-106, Laws of Fla.4 Not only did the act provide statutory authority for the sanctioning of inmates who file frivolous, untruthful, or malicious lawsuits, see § 944.279, Fla. Stat. (1999); ch. 96-106, § 5, Laws of Fla. ( ); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999); ch. 96-106, § 6, Laws of Fla. ( ), it amended the statute that regulates pleadings filed by indigents to exclude prisoners, and created a new indigency statute for prisoner filings. See §§ 57.081, 57.085, Fla. Stat. (1999); ch. 96-106, § 1, 2, at 93-95. The legislative history of these amendments makes clear that the intent of all the amendments was to reduce the filing of frivolous lawsuits and reduce the amount of funds unnecessarily expended on such lawsuits in the courts.
All of these statutes specifically include the same exclusionary provision that "collateral criminal proceedings" should not be included in these attempts to reduce litigation.5 We agree that statutes enacted in the same act and using the same language should ordinarily be interpreted similarly. Accord Winthrop & Joseph, Inc. v. Marriott Resort Hospitality Corp., 695 So.2d 789, 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ( ); see also WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So.2d 674, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ( ). Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth District's holding in Ferenc, and consistent with our decision in Hall, we hold that a writ petition which contests a criminal conviction or sentence is a "collateral criminal proceeding" for purposes of the Prisoner Indigency Statute. That being so, we conclude that petitioner need not comply with the payment provisions of the statute and we hereby grant him in forma pauperis status.6
It is so ordered.7
1. At this time we express no opinion as to the propriety of the use of a quo warranto petition to challenge a criminal conviction or sentence.
2. Prior to the enactment of the statute, prisoners asserting indigency fell under the general indigency statute which provides, among other things, that persons meeting the indigency requirements are permitted to have their cases...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Schmidt v. Crusoe
...responses thereto. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction At the time Schmidt filed his petition here, this Court was about to issue Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975 (Fla.2001), which held that a writ petition that contests a conviction or sentence is a collateral criminal proceeding and is therefore ......
-
Fla. Parole Com'n v. Spaziano
...as part of a Legislative effort intended to reduce unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings. Id. at 363; see also Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla.2001) ("The legislative history of these amendments makes clear that the intent of all the amendments was to reduce the filing of ......
-
Johnson v. Office of State Attorney, No. 5D08-710.
...139 n. 3 (Fla.2008) (quoting Austin v. State ex rel. Christian, 310 So.2d 289, 290 (Fla.1975)). The supreme court in Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 976 n. 1 (Fla.2001), passed upon a quo warranto petition challenging a conviction and sentence, but specifically declined to express an o......
-
Ruggirello v. Jones
...have qualified as a lien-exempt collateral criminal proceeding under Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003), and Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975 (Fla.2001). We cannot agree, and therefore reject the concession of error. II. When an indigent prisoner initiates a judicial proceeding,......
-
Original proceedings, writ large.
...a proper method to obtain postconviction relief." Although the Supreme Court had declined to address that issue in Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So. 2d 975, 976 n.1 (Fla. 2001), the Fifth District confronted it directly and dismissed the petition for a writ of quo warranto. The court held that ......