Geib v. Geib's Estate, 3-277A38

Docket NºNo. 3-277A38
Citation182 Ind.App. 377, 395 N.E.2d 336
Case DateOctober 11, 1979
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Steven P. Kennedy, Eugene M. Feingold, Munster, for appellant.

G. Edward McHie, Charles A. Myers, Hammond, for appellee; McHie, Enslen & Moran, Hammond, of counsel.


This appeal arises from probate proceedings in Lake Superior Court. Appellant Lora Geib challenges that court's denial of her petition to revoke letters improvidently issued and motion to strike and set aside a protective order.

Hugh Geib, Pennsylvania resident and son of the decedent, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration in the estate of Stanley R. Geib and was appointed co-administrator with Charles A. Myers, Hammond attorney. Myers filed a petition for an order to deliver assets, requesting that Eugene M. Feingold, Hammond attorney for the appellant, a Delaware resident, be ordered to deliver to Myers certain assets of the estate alleged to be in Feingold's possession. Appellant filed her petition to revoke letters improvidently issued and served a notice of deposition, stating her intention to depose Hugh Geib at the Munster law office of Feingold.

Myers filed a motion to strike notice of deposition and motion for a protective order on June 8, 1976, both motions being granted that same day. On September 30, a hearing was held on all pending motions; the court denied appellant's motion to reconsider and set aside striking of notice of deposition and protective order and her petition to revoke letters, and granted Myers' petition to deliver assets.

Appellant states the issues she raises for review as follows:

1. "Were the Orders entered by the trial court on September 30, 1976, denying the Petition of Lora Geib to Revoke Letters Improvidently Issued, denying the Motion to Strike and Set Aside a Protective Order for Hugh Geib, and granting the Petition of Co-Administrator to Deliver Assets, a final order or judgment from which Lora Geib has the right to appeal?"

2. "Did the trial court err and deny a fair hearing to Lora Geib, Appellant, by refusing to allow her the right to take the discovery deposition of Hugh Geib, a Co-Administrator, in the manner provided by the Indiana Rules of Court?"

The actions of the trial court are affirmed.

This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal because the denial of a petition to revoke letters improvidently issued under IC 1971, 29-1-10-1 (1978 Burns Supp.) is a final order or judgment as defined in Krick v. Farmers and Merchants Bk., Adm. (1972), 151 Ind.App. 7, at 15, 279 N.E.2d 254, at 259:

". . . To be appealable as a final judgment, an order or judgment must be one which finally determines the rights of the parties involved; or, if it does not dispose of all the issues, it will still be appealable if it disposes of some distinct and definite branch of the proceedings leaving no further question for future determination by the court as to that particular issue. Seaney v. Ayres (1958), 238 Ind. 493, 151 N.E.2d 295; Greathouse v. McKinney ((1942), 220 Ind. 462, 44 N.E.2d 344); Kruzick v Pelkey, (1962) 134 Ind.App. 569, 190 N.E.2d 201."

Appellant contends that her rights in the administration of Stanley Geib's estate were finally determined and that she had no further remedy for the assertion of those rights in the trial court. See analogizes her position to that of the appellant in Meyer v. Anderson Banking Co. (1961), 243 Ind. 145, 177 N.E.2d 662. Meyer was appointed co-administrator of an estate and later removed by the court on its own motion. Meyer filed a motion to set aside the order and appealed its denial. The Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction, classifying the entry of judgment removing an administrator as a final, appealable judgment. In Helm v. Odle, Admrx. etc. (1959), 129 Ind.App. 478, 157 N.E.2d 584, this Court heard the appeal of a trial court's refusal to remove an administrator.

What is at stake in a petition to revoke letters improvidently issued is closely analogous to what is at stake in a petition to remove an administrator and, consequently, the former is also a final, appealable judgment. This comports with Russell, Administrator etc. v. Moore (1960), 130 Ind.App. 351, 164 N.E.2d 670, where this Court considered an appeal taken from the revocation of letters of administration pursuant to a petition to revoke letters improvidently issued. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction not because the order of revocation was not a final judgment, but because the appellants failed to name the representative of the estate as a party appellant or appellee in their assignment of error. If this Court can hear an appeal from a revocation of letters, it is axiomatic that it can hear an appeal from a...

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8 cases
  • Campbell v. Eli Lilly and Co., 2-580A151
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 30 Diciembre 1980
    ...exercises its judicial discretion; this court will interfere only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Geib v. Estate of Geib, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 336. In the case at bar, Lilly successfully sought to limit discovery, temporarily, to matters relevant to the issues raised by......
  • Estate of Wilson, Matter of, 48A05-9209-CV-329
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 10 Marzo 1993 order, and this court will interfere with the trial court's order only if an abuse of discretion is shown. Geib v. Estate of Geib (1979), 182 Ind.App. 377, 395 N.E.2d 336, 338. Phipps cites Templin v. Erkekedis (1949), 119 Ind.App. 171, 84 N.E.2d 728, a malpractice action, in support of ......
  • Estate of Lee v. Lee & Urbahns Co., 49A02-0610-CV-933.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 14 Noviembre 2007 bears the burden of showing that the trial court's use of the protective order was an abuse of discretion."); Geib v. Geib's Estate, 182 Ind.App. 377, 380-81, 395 N.E.2d 336, 338 (1979) ("Appellant's burden was to show that the trial court's use of TR. 26(C)(3) was an abuse of discretion......
  • Sauzer-Johnsen v. Sauzer, SAUZER-JOHNSE
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 12 Octubre 1989 further question for future determination by the Court as to that particular issue. [citation omitted]. Geib v. Estate of Geib (1979), 182 Ind.App. 377, 378-79, 395 N.E.2d 336, 337. The trial court's order would ordinarily not be final because it did not redistribute the property. See Ma......
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