Geiler v. Commission On Judicial Qualifications

• Decision Date: 25 October 1973
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 515 P.2d 1 Leland W. GEILER, a Judge of the Municipal Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS, Respondent. L.A. 30058

Page 201

110 Cal.Rptr. 201

10 Cal.3d 270, 515 P.2d 1

Leland W. GEILER, a Judge of the Municipal Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS, Respondent.

L.A. 30058.

Oct. 25, 1973.

Hutchinson & Irwin Paul R. Hutchinson and James A. Irwin, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., James H. Kline and Douglas B. Noble, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

BY THE COURT.

Petitioner was appointed a judge of the Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County on December 30, 1966. On March 26, 1971, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications ¹ (hereafter the Commission) resolved on its own motion pursuant to rule 904 of the California Rules of Court ² to conduct a preliminary investigation of the judicial conduct of petitioner. Pursuant to rule 905 the Commission filed a notice of formal proceeding herein on January 21, 1972. The Commission requested this court by resolution of February 11, 1972, to appoint three special masters for the taking of evidence, as authorized by rule 907. By order filed March 7, 1972, this court appointed three special masters to hear and take evidence in this matter and to report thereon to the Commission. ³

After a hearing which consumed 21 court days the masters rendered their report on July 5, 1972. The Commission had set forth in the six counts of its notice of formal proceedings 23 specifications of wilful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The masters found that petitioner had, as charged in five of these specifications, been guilty of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute. As to the remaining specifications the masters concluded that petitioner was not guilty of wilful misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The masters unanimously recommended that petitioner 'be censured for the following reasons: ( ) 1. Indiscreet use of vulgar, unjudicial and inappropriate language directed toward court attaches and lawyers. ( ) 2. His crude and offensive conduct in public places.'

Both petitioner and the examiners filed objections to the report of the masters pursuant to rule 913. ⁴ After the Commission had itself heard oral argument in accordance with rule 914, and following each member's consideration of the evidence adduced before the masters and the objections filed to the masters' findings thereon, the Commission issued its own unanimous findings of fact and conclusions of law. In addition to the five specifications upon which the masters had found petitioner guilty of misconduct, the Commission also found petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice as charged in four other specifications. In relation to the remaining fourteen specifications the Commission concluded that the charges were either unproved or did not warrant discipline. The Commission thereupon recommended to this court, pursuant to rule 917 and article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution (see fn. 1, supra), that petitioner be removed from office. The recommendation of removal was approved by seven members of the Commission. The two remaining members of the Commission voted to recommend censure rather than removal of petitioner.

We granted a writ of review to examine the Commission's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of removal. ⁵ (See rule 920). After reviewing the entire record, we adopt the recommendation of the Commission.

1] In reviewing the Commission's recommendation, we must address ourselves to the issue of the quantum of proof applicable to an inquiry concerning a judge. We believe the burden of proof imposed upon the examiners in such an inquiry should be analogous to that employed in State Bar disciplinary proceedings, wherein we require that charges of misconduct 'be sustained by convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty and any reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.' (Moore v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 79, 41 Cal.Rptr. 161, 164, 396 P.2d 577, 580.) We accordingly declare the standard of proof in such an inquiry before the Commission to be proof by clear and convincing evidence sufficient to sustain a charge to a reasonable certainty. (Cf. Medoff v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 535, 550, 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800.)

The Commission, not the masters, is vested by the Constitution with the ultimate power to recommend to this court the censure, removal or retirement of a judge. Thus the Commission if free to disregard the report of the masters and may prepare its own findings of fact and consequent conclusions of law. The Commission must, however, apply the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard of proof in its independent evaluation of the evidence adduced before the masters. Moreover, '(s)ince it is difficult to pass upon the weight to be given the testimony of a wriness when only the written record is before a reviewing body,' the Commission may properly 'give great weight to the action of the (special masters),' who, having heard the presentation of evidence were 'in a better position than the (Commission) to pass upon the truthfulness of the testimony.' (McKinney v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 194, 196, 41 Cal.Rptr. 665, 666, 397 P.2d 425, 426.)

2] We must also decide the appropriate standard for this court to employ in reviewing a recommendation by the Commission. Were this recommendation of independent force and effect absent further action by this court, our review of the evidentiary basis for that recommendation might properly be limited to a determination whether the Commission's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Under such a standard of review, we would not be free to disregard the Commission's findings merely because the circumstances involved might also be reasonably reconciled with contrary findings of fact. (Cf. People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 395, 82 Cal.Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659.) Procedures in State Bar matters offer an alternative standard--an independent review of the record by this court. However, the power to retire a judge for disability or to censure or remove a judge for misconduct is, of course, contingent on the Commission having so recommended (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 18), and is therefore more limited than our power to commence proceedings on our own motion to disbar or suspend an attorney. (See Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6107; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 253--254, 272 P.2d 768.) Nevertheless, since the ultimate, dispositive decision to censure or remove a judge has been entrusted to this court, we conclude that in exercising that authority and in meeting our responsibility we must make our own, independent evaluation of the record evidence adduced below. After conducting such a review we may then decide as a question of law whether certain conduct, which we may have found as a fact to have occurred, was 'wilful misconduct in office' or 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.' (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 18.) Finally, it is to be our findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon which we are to make our determination of the ultimate action to be taken, to wit, whether we should dismiss the proceedings or order the judge concerned censured or removed from office.

Having clarified what we consider to be the proper institutional role of this court vis-a-vis the Commission and the special masters in an inquiry, we turn to the instant proceeding. It should be noted initially that the masters did apply the proper standard of proof in preparing their findings of fact. The masters' formal findings contain four separate references to a 'clear and convincing evidence' standard of proof in holding certain allegation not to have been proven.

Although its conclusions of law differed, the Commission's findings of fact paralleled the master's findings. The Commission adopted as its own all but a few words of the masters' findings relative to the first five counts of the notice of formal proceedings, containing 22 of the 23 specifications of misconduct by petitioner. Where the Commission's findings in regard to these specifications did differ from the masters', they reflected the Commission's quite proper determination to focus on an Objective appraisal of petitioner's conduct in terms of the effect of such conduct on the administration of justice. The masters were more concerned with the Subjective motivations of petitioner in engaging in specified conduct, and with the Subjective appraisal of his motivations by the persons directly affected by the specified conduct. It should be emphasized that there were no significant differences in the Commission's and the masters' determinations of whether or not the conduct alleged to have occurred in the 23 specifications did in fact occur. In no instance did the Commission find to have occurred conduct alleged in a particular specification, which allegation the masters had previously found not proven.

The specifications found by the Commission to have been proven other than that of count six generally concerned crude behavior and vulgar language which petitioner used in dealing with various professional associates, employees and officers of the court. Petitioner was found to have prodded a deputy public defender with a 'dildo' during a conference in chambers one morning, and later that day to have referred to this incident twice in open court so as to curtail the victim's cross-examination of two witnesses. Petitioner was found to have approached a court commissioner from behind in a public corridor of the hall of justice and to have grabbed this victim's testicles. Petitioner was found on two occasions to have made lustful references to his female clerk, once while in...