Geis v. Board of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, Morris County
| Decision Date | 30 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-5482,PARSIPPANY-TROY,84-5482 |
| Citation | 774 F.2d 575 |
| Parties | , 27 Ed. Law Rep. 1093 GEIS, Robert and Loretta Geis v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OFHILLS, MORRIS COUNTY, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Myles C. Morrison, III (Argued), Maryann L. Nergaard, Dillon, Bitar & Luther, Morristown, N.J., for appellant.
Theodore A. Sussan (Argued), Spotswood, N.J., for appellees.
Before SEITZ and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges and WEBER, District Judge. *
In this appeal we review the appropriateness of the educational placement of a mentally and neurologically impaired child, pursuant to the Education of the Handicapped Act ("Act"), 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1400-1461 (1982). The Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills, Morris County, New Jersey ("Board") appeals from the district court's final order requiring that the child, S.G., continue in a residential program at the Woods School in Langhorne, Pennsylvania. The Board was also ordered to pay S.G.'s educational costs. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.
Because this case involves interpretation of a complex web of federal and state statutes and regulations, it will be helpful to first summarize the legal framework. The Act provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped children, conditioned on compliance with certain mandatory goals and procedures. The Act thus represents a federal effort to foster the education of handicapped children through cooperative federalism. It was passed in response to Congress' perception that a majority of handicapped children in the United States "were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to 'drop out.' " H.Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
An important goal of the Act is to reduce costs to government and taxpayers by helping handicapped people to become self-sufficient. As we have previously noted:
A cost-benefit philosophy supported these interlocking goals. Instead of saddling public agencies and taxpayers with the enormous expenditures necessary to maintain the handicapped as lifelong dependents in a minimally acceptable institutionalized existence, Congress reasoned that the early injection of federal money and provision of educational services would remove this burden by creating productive citizens.
Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir.1981) (footnote omitted).
To qualify for federal financial assistance under the Act, a state must demonstrate that it "has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1). That policy must be defined in a state plan submitted to, and approved by, the Secretary of Education, which must describe in detail the goals, programs, and timetables under which the state intends to educate handicapped children within its borders. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1413.
The "free appropriate public education" required by the Act is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an "individualized education program" ("IEP"). 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1414(a)(5). The IEP, which is the product of a meeting between qualified representatives of the local education agency, the pupil's teachers, and parents or guardians, is a written document containing:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of the child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
The Act also imposes extensive procedural safeguards upon the states, including provisions for notice to the parents of any proposed change in a child's placement, the right to a "due process" hearing before an impartial officer regarding any changes in the child's placement, the right of appeal to the designated state educational agency when due process hearings are conducted by local agencies, and further appeal to any state court of competent jurisdiction or federal district court. No changes in placement may be made during the pendency of those proceedings. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415.
In New Jersey, the Act's mandates are implemented by an array of statutes, N.J.Stat.Ann. Secs. 18A:46-1--18A:46-46 (West 1968 & Supp.1985), and regulations promulgated by the State Board of Education under its "broad legislative rule-making powers." D.S. v. Board of Education, 188 N.J.Super. 592, 598, 458 A.2d 129, 133, certification denied, 94 N.J. 529, 468 A.2d 184 (1983). The initial evaluation and classification of a child is conducted by a multi-disciplinary "child study team", which then develops an IEP in consultation with parents and teachers. N.J.Admin.Code tit. 6, Secs. 6:28-3.1--6.28-3.6 (1984). Upon receiving written notice of a proposed or denied action, parents have 30 days to request a due process hearing. Id. at Sec. 6.28-2.7. Until recently, due process hearings were conducted by Classification Officers who were employees of the State Board of Education. N.J.Admin.Code tit. 6, Sec. 6:28-1.9(j)(1) (1978). In East Brunswick Board of Education v. New Jersey State Board of Education, No. 81-3600 (D.N.J. July 7, 1982), however, this procedure was struck down as violative of the Act's requirement that due process hearing officers be independent of the State educational agency. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(2). On March 21, 1983 new regulations transferring responsibility for due process hearings to the independent New Jersey Office of Administrative Law went into effect. See 15 N.J.Admin.Reg. 437 (1983); N.J.Admin.Code tit. 1, chap. 6A (1984); N.J.Admin.Code tit. 6, Sec. 6:28-2.7(a)(6) (1984).
S.G., who is now sixteen years old, has been a resident pupil at the Woods School since 1974. At that time, the appellees lived in Randolph Township, New Jersey, where S.G. had previously attended pre-school classes for the handicapped. Upon evaluation of S.G. for enrollment in the school system, the child study team for the Randolph School district recommended residential educational placement and described S.G. as suffering from neurological dysfunction, mental retardation, communication disorders, and chronic illness with emotional overtones. During his early years, S.G. also suffered from motor and psychomotor seizures for which he took medication until 1977.
In 1977, the appellees moved to Parsippany, New Jersey. The Parsippany-Troy Hills Regional School District and the Board thus took responsibility for S.G.'s educational placement. The Board evaluated S.G.'s condition in 1977 and 1979 and recommended that he remain in his residential placement at the Woods School. In 1981, however, the appellees learned that the Board's child study team intended to recommend that S.G. enter public school in Parsippany. They contested the change in placement and, on June 24, 1981, they requested a due process hearing.
Pursuant to an order of the Classification Officer, entered September 28, 1981, the child study team reevaluated S.G. and recommended that he attend the Brooklawn Junior High School. The appellees again objected and additional hearings were held on April 28, May 27, and June 23, 1982. In his September 13, 1982 decision, the hearing officer found that, until the current dispute, the Board regarded S.G.'s placement at the Wood's School as "officially and educationally necessary." App. at 43. Nonetheless, the officer decided that the child study team's evaluation was correct and ordered S.G. to be placed at the Brooklawn Junior High School's class for students with trainable mental retardation beginning with the 1982-83 school year.
Though the East Brunswick decision, supra, that invalidated the New Jersey due process hearing procedure was issued prior to the Classification Officer's decision in this case, the parties agreed to treat his forthcoming opinion as the impartial final decision in the administrative proceedings, and the appellees appealed this decision to the district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2). 1
The district court held a trial in this case on May 15 and 22, 1984. The court reviewed the evidence in the administrative record and heard new testimony about S.G.'s evaluation in 1981 and his progress since the administrative decision. The district judge also visited both schools to see their educational programs.
In its opinion filed May 30, 1984, the district court held that the New Jersey regulations which implemented the Act created a higher standard for the education of handicapped children than the basic opportunity required in order to receive federal funding. Specifically, the court held that under N.J.Admin.Code Secs. 6:28-2.1 and 2.2 (1978) "a local public school district must provide each handicapped pupil a special education program and services according to how the pupil can best achieve educational success." Geis v. Board of Education, 589 F.Supp. 269, 272 (D.N.J.1984) (emphasis added). The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the Woods School would allow S.G. to "best achieve success in learning and that placing S.G. in his home and in local schools would have an adverse effect on his ability to learn and develop to the maximum possible extent." 589 F.Supp. at 273. On June 1, 1984, the district court entered its final order permitting S.G. to continue his education at the Woods School....
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