Geise v. Greene
| Decision Date | 11 May 1880 |
| Parties | GEISE v. GREENE and another. Runkel v. The Same. Haberman v. The Same.] |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Argued April 22, 1880
APPEAL from the County Court of Dodge County.
Action under the general mill-dam law. The complaint alleges the overflow and injury of plaintiff's land in Dodge county contiguous to the Crawfish river--which is described as a non-navigable stream,--by means of defendant's mill dam across said river, located in Jefferson county. It also avers that the dam is maintained at an unreasonable height; and the prayer is for damages, past and prospective, and that the verdict and judgment determine how much the dam shall be lowered.
The defendants demurred to the complaint for insufficiency of facts, and upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter; and they appealed from an order overruling their demurrer.
Order affirmed.
For the appellants, a brief was filed by Hastings & Greene, with Geo W. Bird and Wm. F. Vilas of counsel, and the case was argued orally by Mr. Vilas:
1. The state constitution (art. VII, sec. 2) provides for only two kinds of courts besides those specifically named, viz "municipal courts" and "inferior courts in the several counties;" and as the jurisdiction of the county courts named in section 2465, R. S., is made by statute concurrent with and equal to that of the circuit court, the difficulty of regarding them as "inferior" courts is insuperable. Const. of Wis., art. VII, sec. 8; Platto v. Deuster, 22 Wis., 482. To sustain their constitutionality, therefore, they must be deemed "municipal courts." State v. McArthur, 13 Wis., 383; Atkins v. Fraker, 32 Wis., 510; McNab v. Noonan, 28 Wis., 434. As such, the court below only had jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of Dodge county and the demurrer was well taken. Connors v. Gory, 32 Wis., 518; Zitske v. Goldberg, 38 id., 216; Mathie v. McIntosh, 40 id., 120. 2. But even as an "inferior court" its jurisdiction would be equally limited. The constitution provides that such courts may be established "in the several counties," and requires that their judges be chosen "by the electors of the respective jurisdictions," showing clearly an intention to confine the jurisdiction within the county lines. Const., art. VII, sec. 2; 32 Wis., 510. The statute also limits the grant of concurrent jurisdiction made to these county courts, to such as is exercised by the circuit courts "in said counties," and does not confer upon them the powers possessed by the latter courts, outside the county. R. S. 1878, sec. 2465. For judicial construction of similar constitutional or statutory provisions, see People v. Evans, 18 Ill., 361; Supervisors v. Young, 31 id., 194; Meyer v. Kalkmann, 6 Cal., 582; Landers v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y., 450. It is no answer to this to say that the court may administer the remedy so far as it is confined within the limits of its jurisdiction, as by adjudging compensation only. The subject matter of the action cannot be thus separated. If the action as an entirety is not embraced in the grant of jurisdiction, there is no jurisdiction whatever. 3. The mill-dam law itself confines the jurisdiction in actions under it to the circuit courts, and declares that compensation shall be obtained "in no other manner." R. S. 1878, sec. 3377. This cannot be construed as merely restricting the remedy to "a civil action," because that was unnecessary. There was reason, however, in limiting it to an action in the circuit court, because, in cases like the one at bar, only the circuit court is competent to grant the full relief contemplated by the law; and because the jurisdiction is important, affecting vast manufacturing and agricultural interests, and should be lodged in none but courts of general jurisdiction. 4. This dam was erected under a special charter, which provides that the mill-dam law of 1840 shall apply "to any dam constructed by virtue of this act." The provisions of the act of 1840 thereby became a part of the charter, and as such remained in force notwithstanding the repeal of the general law. Wood v. Hustis, 17 Wis., 417; Crosby v. Smith, 19 id., 449. If this be true, then the reenactment of a new general law, without special reference to the charter, could certainly not affect the provisions thus incorporated into it, and plaintiff's remedy must still be governed by the act of 1840. Besides, the river is navigable, as shown by the charter, while the general law of 1878, under which this action is brought, applies in terms only to rivers not navigable. The remedy being under the act of 1840, that statute must be strictly pursued. Sedgw. Stat. and Con. Law, 341; 22 Wis., 516, 521; 37 id., 186; 30 id., 379; 15 id., 69; 14 id., 443, 609; 12 id., 16; 23 Pick., 36; 3 Met., 380; 1 id., 130, 138, 553; 1 Manning (Mich.), 193; 13 Barb., 209; 5 Hill, 575; 8 Ind., 281; 9 id., 283. That remedy and the one provided by the present general law are wholly different, both as to process, mode of trial, judgment, right of appeal, and manner of computing damages; and they cannot be deemed substantially the same, so that in a given case either can be pursued at will. Nor, upon demurrer, can the action, though manifestly brought under the general law, be deemed one under the charter, provided there is enough in the complaint to sustain such a proceeding. Supervisors v. Decker, 30 Wis., 624. To determine what the action is, the summons and prayer for relief are controlling. 13 Wis., 472.
For the respondent there were briefs by Hall & Skinner, and by Jenkins, Elliott & Winkler, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Jenkins:
1. No territorial restriction upon the jurisdiction of the county courts has ever been enacted, and none has been supposed to exist. During a long series of years, and in a great multitude of cases, justice has been administered by these courts upon this theory, and their power in this respect has never been questioned. A power thus exercised and acquiesced in for so long should be deemed a rule of property, which is not to be disturbed. Scanlan v. Childs, 33 Wis., 666. If an interpretation can be given sub silentio, this court has settled the rule in favor of the jurisdiction by repeated decisions. Page v. Harrison, 20 Wis., 323; State v. Smith, 19 id., 531; Meshke v. Van Doren, 16 id., 319; Second Ward Bank v. Upmann, 12 id., 499; State v. Smith, 14 id., 564; State ex rel. Mann v. Brophy, 38 id., 413. Particular attention is called to the case last cited. 2. The jurisdiction is sustained by a correct interpretation of the constitution. Under sec. 14 of art. VII, which provides that the office of judge of probate may be abolished, and probate powers conferred "upon such inferior courts as may be established" in the several counties, the legislature have transferred the probate jurisdiction to the county courts. It necessarily follows that these county courts are properly "inferior courts," and not "municipal courts." Moreover, this court has twice declared them to be "inferior courts." Harrison v. Doyle, 11 Wis., 283; McNab v. Noonan, 28 id., 434. The position that "inferior courts" are territorially restricted as to jurisdiction by the constitution, is untenable. As there used, the term includes the circuit courts, whose jurisdiction extends throughout the state. See sec. 3, art. VII. It will be observed that there is no territorial limit to courts of justices of the peace (sec. 14, art. VII); and accordingly justices' warrants and subpoenas have been made to run beyond the county limits. R. S., secs. 4056, 4777. It would be absurd to claim that the power of the county court is more restricted, when it is clothed with appellate jurisdiction over justices' courts. Certainly, there is no territorial limit to the probate powers of the county courts; and it cannot be held that sec. 2 of art. VII restricts the jurisdiction of these courts to the county lines; and it is by virtue of the same article (sec. 14) that these broader powers have been conferred upon them. 3. Section 3377, R. S., merely defines the mode of procedure. It does not prohibit jurisdiction in other than the circuit courts. The action of divorce is purely statutory, and given in terms to the circuit court alone; yet in State v. Smith, 19 Wis., 531, the jurisdiction of the county court in such an action was sustained. 4. The law of 1840, incorporated into the charter under which this dam was constructed, after being repealed, was subsequently reenacted verbatim in ch. 62, Laws of 1857, by the express terms of which its provisions were extended to the case of any dam then maintained, for which compensation had not been made. Sec. 3, ch. 62, Laws of 1857; sec. 26, ch. 56, R. S. 1858; sec. 3402, R. S. 1878. The act of 1857, as amended, forms the present mill-dam law. That it governs this case was virtually decided in Zeidler v. Johnson, 38 Wis., 335; and this accords with the decisions of this court holding that the provisions of the general railroad law operate to modify or repeal prior special charters. Moore v. Railroad Co., 34 Wis., 173; Oleson v. Railway Co., 36 id., 388; Bohlman v. Railway Co., 40 id., 157. To claim that the proceeding must be in conformity to the act of 1840, involves the absurdity of requiring the action to be brought in the defunct territorial court, and under the forms of the common law, which are obsolete.
The above cases were submitted together upon one argument, and there will be but one opinion, and that filed in the first case. The positions assumed and so ably urged by the learned counsel of the appellants in support of the demurrer are first , that the jurisdiction to try and determine this case could not be constitutionally conferred...
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