Geise v. Lee

Decision Date02 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. 43266,43266
PartiesLulu Owens GEISE, Petitioner, v. Wallace LEE and Jane Doe Lee, doing business as Lazy Wheels Mobile Home Park, Respondents.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Owen J. Wales, Seattle, for petitioner.

Martin, Niemi, Burch & Mentele, Susan F. French, Seattle, for respondents.

HUNTER, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff (petitioner), Lulu Owens Geise, a tenant in a mobile home park, brought suit against the defendants (respondents), Wallace Lee and Jane Doe Lee, doing business as Lazy Wheels Mobile Home Park, for injuries incurred by slipping on snow and ice which had accumulated in a common area of the park. The Lazy Wheels Mobile Home Park, located in Bothell, Washington, is comprised of approximately 100 spaces for mobile homes. Between the rows of spaces provided for the homes are driveways intended for both vehicular and pedestrian use, neither of which is exclusive in any given spot. All tenants were free to share these driveways in common with each other for their own particular needs.

The plaintiff is 61 years old and has been a tenant of the park since 1965. During the period beginning on January 23, 1972, and continuing until January 26, 1972, a total of approximately 12 to 14 inches of snow fell and accumulated in the driveways. During the following week, melting and freezing conditions combined with passing cars, caused ridges of ice, 4 to 6 inches in height, to form throughout the common areas creating a hazardous condition for any tenant who ventured into these expanses. The defendants had actual knowledge of this condition, having been informed by both the plaintiff and other tenants. Several of the residents of the park had fallen, resulting in one being taken to the hospital.

In spite of these adverse conditions, no attempt was ever made to clear the common areas for the benefit of the tenants, a large percentage of whom were retired individuals. On February 1, 1972, the plaintiff, while carefully making her way to her sister's car, slipped and fell on the ice causing serious injury to her person. As a result of this accident, the plaintiff initiated this action alleging that the defendants were negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care to keep the common areas under their control in a reasonably safe condition. The defendants moved for summary judgment supported solely by the facts surrounding the accident and Mr. Lee's affidavit which stated:

I am the owner and proprietor of the trailer park where Mrs. Geise rented a space. In the January-February snow of 1972, I did not clean the street where she fell prior to her fall. I did not want to assume the responsibility of keeping the streets clear of snow and ice, and all the tenants knew it.

The trial court granted the defendants' motion on the grounds that they did not owe any duty to the plaintiff under these facts. This decision was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Geise v. Lee, 10 Wash.App. 728, 519 P.2d 1005 (1974). The case comes before us upon our granting the plaintiff's petition for review.

The sole issue before this court is whether a landlord or owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing safe common areas upon his rental premises, free from dangerous accumulations of smow and ice, absent a prior undertaking of such a service.

The general rule in the United States is that where an owner divides his premises and rents certain parts to various tenants, while reserving other parts such as entrances and walkways for the common use of all tenants, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care and maintain these common areas in a safe condition. See Landlord's liability to tenant or tenant's invitees for injury or death due to ice or snow in areas or passageways used in common by tenants Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 387, 393 (1973). The dispute in the instant case arises due to a distinct division between courts from various jurisdictions in regard to the removal of natural accumulations of snow and ice. The older view, referred to as the Massachusetts rule, stems from the case of Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357, 45 Am.R. 344 (1883). This decision articulated an exception to the general rule stated above by holding that a landlord was under no duty to the tenants to remove snow and ice from common passageways, unless he had undertaken this duty in the past. Their decision was premised on the belief that to hold otherwise would place too great a burden on the landlord. In 1910, this state adopted the Massachusetts rule in Oerter v. Ziegler, 59 Wash. 421, 109 P. 1058 (1910), and subsequently reaffirmed it in Schedler v. Wagner, 37 Wash.2d 612, 225 P.2d 213, 230 P.2d 600 (1950). The defendants, in the instant case, argue that these decisions are still controlling. The plaintiff contends that the better view is that enunciated in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 128 A. 705 (1925), commonly referred to as the Connecticut rule. We agree with the plaintiff. The court there said on page 706:

The duty of the landlord being to exercise reasonable care to prevent the occurrence of defective or dangerous conditions in the common approaches, the fact that a particular danger arose from the fall of snow or in the freezing of ice can afford no ground of distinction. Indeed, the causes which are at work to produce it are no more natural causes than are those which, more slowly, bring about the decay of wood or the rusting of iron. To set apart this particular source of danger is to create a distinction without a sound difference.

This approach has rapidly replaced the Massachusetts rule and is representative of the modern trend which has been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions. The primary reason for the wide acceptance of the Connecticut rule stems from judicial recognition of changing conditions within the ever expanding boundaries of the landlord-tenant relationship. These courts have concluded that the landlord is best situated to cope with the hazards presented by snow and ice. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island recently summarized the logic underlying...

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36 cases
  • Iwai v. State
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • May 9, 1996
    ...612, 225 P.2d 213, 230 P.2d 600, 26 A.L.R.2d 604 (1950). In 1975, this court flatly rejected the Massachusetts rule. Geise v. Lee, 84 Wash.2d 866, 529 P.2d 1054 (1975) (imposing the duty on mobile home park owners to keep the driveways between the homes safe for pedestrian traffic where sno......
  • Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • July 14, 1977
    ...who have relied in good faith on the rule. Geise v. Lee, 10 Wash. App. 728, 519 P.2d 1005 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 84 Wash.2d 866, 529 P.2d 1054 (1975). Appellate courts possess the power to give their decisions prospective effect, i. e., not to apply the decision to the parties in t......
  • Harrison v. Taylor, 17002
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • January 17, 1989
    ...is probably the growing view, known as the "Connecticut rule," which rejects the natural accumulation no-duty rule. See Geise v. Lee, 1975, 84 Wn.2d 866, 529 P.2d 1054; Hammond v. Allegretti, 1974, 262 Ind. 82, 311 N.E.2d 821; Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 1975, 395 Mich. 2......
  • Mucsi v. GRAOCH ASSOCIATES LTD. PARTNERSHIP
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • September 27, 2001
    ...use of all tenants, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care and maintain these common areas in a safe condition." Geise v. Lee, 84 Wash.2d 866, 868, 529 P.2d 1054 (1975). [A tenant] "`enters upon an implied representation or assurance that the land has been prepared and made ready and sa......
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