Geisking v. Sheimo

Decision Date18 October 1960
Docket NumberNo. 50066,50066
Parties, 2 A.L.R.3d 268 Estella GEISKING, Appellant, v. Erling Keith SHEIMO, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Brown, Dresser & Kinsey, Mason City, for appellant.

Boyle & Schuler, Clear Lake, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The matter before us arises solely upon the pleadings. Plaintiff's petition alleges that on March 10th, 1958, about 9 a. m., she was driving an automobile south on a farm to market road in Hancock County. The defendant was driving his automobile east on an intersecting farm to market road. As defendant approached the intersection he was faced by a traffic sign which read 'Yield Right of Way', which sign was intended to apply to vehicles approaching this intersection from the west. Defendant intended to make a left turn at the intersection, and as he approached he slowed his speed to a rate suitable for a left turn or 'suitable for preparing to stop and to yield the right of way.' There was no obstruction to the view and each vehicle was in plain sight of the driver of the other. Plaintiff reasonably believed that defendant observed her automobile and the 'Yield' sign and was yielding the right of way to her. Defendant did not stop or yield, however, but both vehicles proceeded into the intersection and a collision occurred. Allegations of specific negligence charged against the defendant and specifications of plaintiff's damages are not material to this appeal.

The defendant attacked the petition by a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Summarized, the motion is based upon the thought that the defendant had the directional right of way under Section 321.319, Code of 1958, I.C.A.; there was no obstruction to the view, and plaintiff admits she saw defendant as the vehicles approached the intersection; the 'Yield' sign was not an authorized traffic control device and so was of no legal significance, defendant was not bound to observe it and plaintiff had no right to rely upon it as giving her the right of way in opposition to the directional right of way statute, Section 321.319, supra. It is the apparent sense of the motion for judgment that plaintiff was on the face of her petition guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The trial court so held, and granted the motion. From the judgment so entered we have this appeal.

I. Defendant's contention is that Section 321.252 of the Code, I.C.A., requires the State Highway Commission to adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic control devices for highways, and that the Commission did adopt such a manual which was in effect on March 10, 1958, which contained no provision or authorization for 'Yield' signs. Code Section 321.236, I.C.A., in effect on March 10, 1958, authorized local authorities to designate stop intersections but there is no provision therein for 'Yield' signs. This statute was amended effective July 4, 1959, to authorize 'Yield' signs, but there was no such authority on the date of the accident. Section 321.255 provides that all local control traffic devices shall conform to the state manual and specifications required by Section 321.252, supra; and Section 321.259 provides that no unauthorized signs shall be placed on any highway, and such signs are declared to be public nuisances. So defendant and the trial court regard the 'Yield Right of Way' sign which faced the defendant at the intersection as unauthorized and so having no meaning whatever, and in no manner protecting the plaintiff from the charge of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to yield the directional right of way.

It seems to have been assumed that the questioned sign was erected by authority of the Board of Supervisors of Hancock County, and we shall make the same assumption. The trial court said it would take judicial notice of the adoption of a Manual by the State Highway Commission, and of its contents, at least to the extent that it contained no provision for 'Yield' signs on the date of the collision. While we might have some doubt that judicial notice goes so far, the question is not raised by the appellant and we have no occasion to decide it. We shall consider the manual as did the able trial court.

II. We start, therefore, with the assumption that the sign was unauthorized, although we do not so decide, since its legality is not determinative in our view of the case. But we are unable to agree that it had no legal significance whatever when the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is to be determined. Taking her petition at its face value, she knew of the sign, saw the defendant slow his speed as if to obey its mandate, and relied upon both the sign and the defendant's action. We have so often said that generally the question of contributory negligence is for the jury that repetition of authority is needless. It may be that if the sign had not been there, and if defendant had not given evidence of obeying it or of waiving his right of way, a holding that plaintiff was so plainly contributorily negligent that the court should so hold as a legal question would be appropriate. We do not decide that point. There is considerable authority on the amount of reliance which may be placed on an unauthorized traffic sign; and for the purposes of this discussion we shall consider the sign in question as being in that category. However, the driver of a motor vehicle has the right to assume that an apparently regular traffic sign was placed by legal authority and to act accordingly, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary. In Rogers v. Jefferson, 223 Iowa 718, 721, 272 N.W. 532, 534, 277 N.W. 570, we said: 'In any event, we think that appellee's son was warranted in assuming that the 'Slow' sign was placed there by proper authority, and that he was entitled to take it into consideration in determining his movement toward the intersection.' To the same effect are Rogers v. Jefferson, 224 Iowa 324, 333, 275 N.W. 874, 880, and King v. Gold, 224 Iowa 890, 895, 276 N.W. 774, 776.

But the great weight of authority is that even an unauthorized sign is not meaningless when questions of negligence are under consideration. We agree with the rule stated in 164 A.L.R., at page 216, under the heading 'Anno--Traffic Control at Street Intersection'. It is there said: 'Futhermore, many courts take the view that even if it is shown that the traffic signal involved was not properly authorized, it is still effective to control the question of the negligence or contributory negligence of a pedestrian or vehicle driver who disregards it, at least to the extent that such disregard may be taken into consideration by the trier of the facts as one of the circumstances to be passed upon in determining the question of a violator's negligence or contributory negligence.' Numerous authorities are cited in support. In Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 136 P.2d 777, the California Supreme Court upheld an instruction telling the jury it was negligence as a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Thornton v. Pender
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 20 Junio 1978
    ...Safety statutes have been applied in civil litigation when no criminal conviction would have been possible, as in Geisking v. Sheimo, (1960) 252 Iowa 37, 105 N.W.2d 599, (safety regulation was not validly enacted); Black v. Stith, (1940) 164 Or. 117, 100 P.2d 485, (no technical violation of......
  • Paulsen v. Mitchell
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 18 Octubre 1960
    ...is equally well settled that the issue of freedom from contributory negligence is generally one of fact for the jury. Geisking v. Sheimo, 251 Iowa ----, 105 N.W.2d 599. Only where plaintiff's contributory negligence is so palpable that reasonable minds may fairly reach no other conclusion i......
  • Turbert v. Mather Motors, Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 14 Noviembre 1973
    ...least to the extent that such disregard may be taken into consideration as one of the circumstances to be passed upon. Geisking v. Sheimo, 252 Iowa 37, 41, 105 N.W.2d 599; note, 164 A.L.R. 8, 216; Blashfield, Automobile Law & Practice (Perm.Ed.) §§ 686.5, 998, Regardless of whether the area......
  • Briggs v. Baker
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 6 Abril 1982
    ...(1930); Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943); Malcom v. Dempsey, 184 A.2d 474 (Del.Super.1962); Geisking v. Sheimo, 252 Iowa 37, 105 N.W.2d 599 (1960); Comfort v. Penner, 166 Wash. 177, 6 P.2d 604 (1932); Warner v. Ambrose, 53 Wash.2d 231, 332 P.2d 941 (1958); Berendt v.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT