Gen. Realty Improvement Co. v. City Of New Haven.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1946
• Citation: 133 Conn. 238,50 A.2d 59
• Parties: GENERAL REALTY IMPROVEMENT CO. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

133 Conn. 238

50 A.2d 59

GENERAL REALTY IMPROVEMENT CO.

v.CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 8, 1946.

Case Reserved from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Dwyer, Judge.

Application by the General Realty Improvement Company against the City of New Haven for a reduction in the amount of an assessment upon land and buildings, brought to the Court of Common Pleas, wherein the defendant filed a special defense on the ground that the plaintiff was not an aggrieved party within the appeal statute. The plaintiff demurred to the defense, and the case was reserved, for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.

Court of common pleas advised to sustain the demurrer.

Louis Feinmark, of New Haven (Lazarus Heyman, of Danbury, on the brief), for plaintiff.

Maurice C. Resnik and William L. Beers, both of New Haven (George G. DiCenzo, of New Haven, on the brief), for defendant.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

JENNINGS, Judge.

General Statutes, Sup.1941, § 165f, is entitled ‘Remedy when property wrongfully assessed’ and provides that: ‘When it shall be claimed that a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the town or city in whose tax list such property was set, or that a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof, prior to the payment of such tax, may, in addition to the other remedies provided by law, make application for relief to the court of common pleas * * *. Such application may be made within one year from the date as of which the property was last evaluated for purposes of taxation * * * and the pendency of such application shall not suspend action upon the tax against the applicant. In all such actions, the court of common pleas shall have power to grant such relief upon such terms and in such manner and form as shall to justice and equity appertain * * *.’ The question in the case is whether the plaintiff is the ‘owner’ of the property in question within the meaning of the statute. It is raised by the plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's special defense.

The complaint alleges that Yale University owned a certain piece of property in New Haven on June 1, 1944, that the assessment upon it was manifestly excessive under the statute cited and that the tax based thereon had not been paid. It further alleges that the property, by mesne conveyances dated November 30, 1944, November 30, 1944, and January 12, 1945, came to the plaintiff. Each grantee, including the plaintiff, assumed and agreed to pay the taxes on the list of 1944.

The defendant filed an answer admitting all of the allegations of the complaint except the excessive assessment and also filed a special defense. The alleges that the assessment date in New Haven is June 1 of each year, that Yale University's first grantee not only assumed the taxes on the list of 1944 but was allowed a deduction from the agreed purchase price based thereon, that Yale University is directly liable for the taxes on the list of 1944 and that the plaintiff is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of the statute. The word ‘aggrieved’ has been treated by both parties as the equivalent of ‘proper.’

The plaintiff demurred to the special defense substantially on the ground that the facts alleged therein, admitted by the demurrer, were insufficient to deprive it of its status as an aggrieved person, privileged to question the assessment. The trial court reserved the ruling on the demurrer for the advice of this court.

The history and construction of this statute, originating in Public Acts 1921, chapter 302, has been discussed in several Connecticut cases, most recently in Fenwick v. Old Saybrook, 133 Conn. 22, 47 A.2d 849. The point here involved, whether a grantee who has assumed the tax is the ‘owner’ within the meaning of the statute, was in issue in none of them. Cases from other states are not particularly helpful because of the different phraseology employed in the pertinent statutes. ‘The word ‘owner’ has no fixed meaning but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used.' Warren v. Borawski, 130 Conn. 676, 679, 37 A.2d 364, 365.

The statute provides that when property has been wrongfully assessed the owner thereof may apply for relief within the time limited. There is no ambiguity in this statement insofar as the plaintiff is concerned. It claims the property was wrongfully assessed, it is ‘the owner thereof’ and it has applied for relief within the time limited. The plaintiff is the ‘owner’ within the meaning of the statute unless its full context or other circumstances limit that meaning. Any limitation upon such a clear statement must be definitely expressed to be persuasive. ‘It clearly is incumbent upon any litigant desiring to limit the general and inclusive import of [a] word to show something in the context of the statute or some general course of interpretation in like matters sufficient logically to justify a restriction in the meaning of the term.’ Tolli v. Connecticut Quarries Co., 101 Conn. 109, 115, 124 A. 813, 815; see also Yale University v. Town of New Haven...