General Acc. Ins. Co. v. City of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 22 March 1988 |
| Citation | 539 A.2d 59,114 Pa.Cmwlth. 528 |
| Parties | GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO., Appellant, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Anthony Quinn, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Norman G. Prajzner, Barbara R. Axelrod, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before CRUMLISH, Jr., President Judge, and BARRY and COLINS, JJ.
General Accident Insurance Company (General Accident) appeals a Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court order sustaining preliminary objections filed by the City of Philadelphia and dismissing its complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
This action originates from an automobile accident in which a car driven by General Accident's policy-holder, Arthur Necci, was struck by an uninsured motorist at an intersection within the City of Philadelphia. General Accident paid Necci basic loss benefits and a collision claim, as well as uninsured motorist benefits. General Accident now seeks indemnification and/or contribution based on its allegation that the City is jointly or severally liable for negligently failing to replace a fallen stop sign at the intersection. In dismissing the complaint, the common pleas court determined that the City was protected from indemnification liability under Section 8553(d) of the Judicial Code 1 and was not liable for contribution because no City vehicle or employee was involved in the accident.
Our scope of review of a common pleas court order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing a complaint is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Rok v. Flaherty, 106 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 570, 527 A.2d 211 (1987).
General Accident asserts that the Judicial Code's immunity provision does not preclude contribution to an insurer obligated to indemnify its insured for losses caused jointly by a municipality and an uninsured motorist. Specifically, General Accident contends that it stands in the shoes of the uninsured motorist, on whose behalf it paid uninsured motorist benefits to its policyholder. Hence, it claims entitlement to contribution from the City, under both the Uninsured Motorist Act 2 and the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act. 3 We disagree.
Section 8553(d) of the Judicial Code provides:
(d) Insurance Benefits--If a claimant receives or is entitled to receive benefits under a policy of insurance other than a life insurance policy as a result of losses for which damages are recoverable under subsection (c), the amount of such benefits shall be deducted from the amount of damages which would otherwise be recoverable by such claimant.
This section limits recovery by a claimant-insured where a collateral source of benefits exists; it requires that the claimant's insurance benefits be deducted from the damages for which the municipality would otherwise be liable. Gubernick v. City of Philadelphia, 85 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 397, 481 A.2d 1255 (1984).
Despite its protestations to the contrary, General Accident is asserting its rights as a subrogee of its insured, Necci, and as such stands in his shoes with respect to his rights and injuries. See Michel v. City of Bethlehem, 84 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 43, 478 A.2d 164 (1984). Because Necci's claim was apparently satisfied by General Accident, he has no remaining claim against the City of Philadelphia and, consequently, there is no claim to which General Accident can be subrogated. General Accident's argument that it is entitled to contribution from the City as a joint tort-feasor is without merit for the same reason. As a subrogee, General Accident may only pursue the interests of its insured, not the interests of the uninsured motorist. 4 This is true despite the fact that it was the uninsured motorist's involvement in the accident that caused General Accident to be obligated to pay benefits. 5
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
The order of the Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court, No. 3623 dated April 21, 1987, is affirmed.
2 Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 909, as amended, 40 P.S. § 2000(d)-(f).
4 General Accident contends that under Section 1(d) of the Uninsured Motorist Act, 40 P.S. § 2000(d), it has the right to recover against any person liable for the injuries to its insured. That section provides, in pertinent part:
In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this section, the insurer making such payment shall, to the extent...
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