General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Allen
| Decision Date | 23 April 1997 |
| Citation | 692 A.2d 1089,547 Pa. 693 |
| Parties | GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Appellant, v. Eugene R. ALLEN, Elizabeth Ann Allen, Tammy Allen, Individually, Breanne Allen, Heath Allen, minors by their guardian, Merle S. Kramer, and Debbie Allen, Appellees. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.
This is an appeal by General Accident Insurance Company of America from the per curiam order of the Superior Court quashing its appeal from an order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand the matter to the Superior Court for disposition of the merits of the appeal. 1
General Accident (Appellant) issued homeowner's insurance policies covering three consecutive years beginning on December 3, 1985 to Eugene R. Allen and his wife, Elizabeth A. Allen. Each policy provided personal liability coverage in the amount of $15,000 per occurrence. The policies contained language specifically excluding claims for bodily injury which was expected or intended by the insured.
In August 1989, a civil action was filed in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas against the Allens by three grandchildren for injuries suffered as a result of sexual abuse inflicted upon them by Eugene Allen. The complaint alleged that Eugene Allen had engaged in sexual acts with the grandchildren between 1986 and July 24, 1988. As to Elizabeth Allen, the complaint alleged that she was aware or should have been aware of her husband's conduct and that she failed to protect the grandchildren. 2
General Accident undertook the legal defense of the civil action subject to a reservation of rights. In a letter dated July 26, 1990, the Allens were apprised by a claims manager for General Accident of its position that the homeowner's insurance policies might not provide coverage for the claims asserted in the civil action. The letter informed them that General Accident intended to file a declaratory judgment action for the purpose of determining the coverage under the policies with respect to the civil action.
General Accident filed this action for declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541 on August 15, 1990, seeking a determination of its duties under the policies. As required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 7540, General Accident named the Allens, the children, and the children's mother as their natural guardian as parties whose interests would be affected by the declaratory judgment action. 3 General Accident sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Allens with respect to the civil action filed by the children. General Accident requested alternatively that if a determination was made that the policies afforded coverage for the claims against the Allens, the obligation to indemnify was limited to the sum of $25,000 per claimant per policy regardless of the number of insureds or claims made.
The underlying civil action proceeded to trial before a jury prior to disposition of the declaratory judgment action. The civil action was tried in September 1992, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of the children against the Allens and the children's mother, who had been joined as an additional defendant. 4 Subsequently, General Accident and the children filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action.
In its summary judgment motion, General Accident requested the common pleas court to decide as a matter of law that the complaint in the underlying civil action did not give rise to a duty to defend under the homeowner's insurance policies. General Accident asserted that the policies contained an intentional act exclusion which precluded personal liability coverage for any bodily injury expected or intended by the insured, and that the exclusion applied to injuries caused by sexual abuse.
In the event that the common pleas court interpreted the policy as providing coverage for claims of sexual abuse, General Accident requested that the court enter an order declaring that the injuries resulted from a single occurrence. General Accident contended that a limitation of liability clause contained in the policies necessitated a determination that one occurrence per child existed under the policies regardless of the number of incidents of sexual abuse. 5 Finally, General Accident requested a determination that the punitive damage claim of the children was not within the coverage of the policies.
The summary judgment motion filed on behalf of the children asserted that special interrogatories presented to the jury in the civil action indicated that the jury had determined that Eugene Allen was liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress and that Elizabeth Allen was liable for negligent conduct found to be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm done to the children. The motion stated that as a result of the jury's determination, the insurance policies afforded coverage to the Allens. It was further asserted that the conduct of Eugene Allen amounted to multiple occurrences as it occurred over a three year period and constituted separate and distinct events.
On August 15, 1994, the common pleas court granted General Accident's motion for summary judgment in part with respect to the punitive damages claim in the children's civil action and the allegations of intentional acts performed by Eugene Allen, but denied summary judgment as to the allegations of negligent acts performed by the Allens. The court also granted the children's summary judgment motion, finding that General Accident had a duty to defend with respect to the negligence allegations made against the Allens. In addition, the court concluded that the incidents of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences thereby triggering coverage under all three policies.
The accompanying memorandum filed by the court addressed General Accident's argument that all claims against Eugene Allen necessarily arose from his intentional sexual molestation of the children. The court rejected this argument based upon the jury's finding in the civil action that Eugene Allen had engaged in negligent conduct that "[could] be said to have transcended the allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by [him]." As to Elizabeth Allen, the court emphasized the fact that the jury had found her negligent for failing to keep her property safe for the children and for failing to apprise them of the danger her husband posed to them. 6 General Accident filed a notice of appeal from the court's order. On March 29, 1995, a motion to quash the appeal was filed on behalf of the children. The motion asserted that the common pleas court's order disposing of the cross-motions for summary judgment was not a final order as defined by Pa.R.A.P. 341. 7 It was alleged that the order was interlocutory and that General Accident had not requested permission to appeal. General Accident answered the motion to quash asserting that the order was a final appealable order. Alternatively, General Accident contended that the order was an appealable collateral order as defined by Pa.R.A.P. 313, for which there is no requirement that permission to appeal be granted. 8
On June 6, 1995, the Superior Court entered a per curiam order granting the motion to quash the appeal. No opinion was issued by the court. General Accident then filed a petition for allowance of appeal. On November 8, 1995, we granted allocatur limited to the question of "whether a trial court's determination of an insurer's duty to defend is appealable, particularly where the trial court had not yet determined the insurer's duty of indemnification." 9 After consideration of the briefs and argument of the parties, we conclude that the Superior Court erred in quashing the appeal.
"The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is 'to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations....' " Fidelity Bank v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 498 Pa. 80, 88, 444 A.2d 1154, 1159 (1982), citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541. General Accident brought this declaratory judgment action for a determination of whether the homeowner's insurance policies issued to the Allens afforded coverage for the injuries claimed by the children arising from the sexual abuse to which Eugene Allen subjected them. General Accident's position was that the policies did not provide coverage for claims of sexual abuse because the language of the policies specifically excluded intentional acts that cause bodily injury to another. The focus of the dispute was whether sexual abuse committed by Eugene Allen was to be considered as intentional conduct for which no insurance coverage existed.
The task of interpreting a contract of insurance is generally performed by the court. "The goal of that task is, of course, to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument." Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., 503 Pa. 300, 305, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983).
General Accident asserted that the policies should be interpreted as excluding the children's claims against the Allens from coverage, while the children argued for an interpretation of the policies that would provide coverage for bodily injuries resulting from sexual abuse. The interpretation of the language of the policies as providing or excluding coverage for such claims would necessarily determine whether General Accident had a duty to defend the Allens in the civil action brought on behalf of the children.
The policies provided,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Winslow
...to defend its insured against all claims until there is no possibility of recovery for a covered claim. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (1997) ; Cadwallader, 152 A.2d at 488 ; see Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d C......
-
TIG Insurance Co. v. Nobel Learning Communities, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-4708 (E.D. Pa. 6/18/2002)
...party's complaint triggers coverage. Mutual Ben. Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743 (Pa. 1999) (citing General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997); Wilson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 105 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. 1954)). The averments contained in the underlying c......
-
Usx Corp. v. Adriatic Insurance Co.
...a duty to defend until the claim is confined to a recovery that the policy does not cover. See, e.g., General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (1997); The Frog, Switch and Manufacturing Co., 193 F.3d at 746. The duty to defend thus carries with it a co......
-
Northland Cas. Co. v. Hbe Corp.
...duty to defend. Western World Ins. Co., Inc. v. Cigna Corp., 718 F.Supp. 1518, 1520 (S.D.Fla. 1989); General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (1997); Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 90 N.C.App. 464, 369 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1988). The duty to defend, which ......
-
Chapter 9
...Insurance Co., 84 Ohio App.3d 302, 616 N.E.2d 988, 996 (1993). Pennsylvania: General Accident Insurance Company of America v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997); Erie Insurance Exchange v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 516 Pa. 574, 533 A.2d 1363, 1368 (Pa. 1987). [142] Iowa: F......
-
Chapter 5
...978, 979–980 (Ohio 1996). Oregon: Ledford v. Gutoski, 877 P.2d 80 (Or. 1994). Pennsylvania: General Accident Insurance Co. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997). Texas: Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Krolczyk, 408 S.W.3d 896 (Tex. App. 2013). Washington: Travelers Insurance Cos. v. North ......