General Cable Corp. v. INTERNATIONAL BRO. OF ELEC. WKRS., LOCAL UNION 1798

• Citation: 333 F. Supp. 331
• Decision Date: 18 October 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C-71-300.
• Parties: GENERAL CABLE CORPORATION, a New Jersey Corporation, Plaintiff, v. The INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 1798, AFL-CIO, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

333 F. Supp. 331

GENERAL CABLE CORPORATION, a New Jersey Corporation, Plaintiff, v. The INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 1798, AFL-CIO, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C-71-300.

United States District Court, W. D. Tennessee, W. D.

October 18, 1971.

Andrew M. Kramer, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., Samuel J. Weintraub, Weintraub, DeHart & Kalmans, Memphis, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Howard R. Paul, Memphis, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

WELLFORD, District Judge.

In this case the plaintiff employer, General Cable Corporation, has sought a temporary restraining order and also injunctive relief against the defendant, Local 1798, of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and its officers, restraining them, and all of those in participation with them, from participating in a work stoppage, and seeking mandatory arbitration of an alleged dispute or grievance, which the plaintiff asserts grows out of, and is covered by, the collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the defendant Local.

The relief sought by the plaintiff is, in effect, an order requiring the officers of this Memphis Local to direct their workers to continue at work without a stoppage, and requiring arbitration of the question pertaining to the "no strike —no lockout" provision in the collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the Local, and, furthermore, a determination of the applicability of that provision to the situation which is present in this instance where there has been informational picketing by agents of another local union.

Jurisdiction is claimed under Section 301 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S.C. § 185, and the Court feels that this is another of those cases that depend upon the proper interpretation of the case of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970). This case involves whether or not the local union did in fact sanction or authorize the stoppage of work, and whether the dispute in question is over a matter in which the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate.

There has been in effect, at all times during the matters with which we are involved, a collective bargaining agreement between the parties which became effective September 15, 1970, and expires, by its terms, December 31, 1972.

There is apparently a dispute between Locals 1164, 1256 and 1558 of the IBEW, and the plaintiff Company which involves disputes and differences in other sections of the country, including St. Louis, Missouri. These separate locals apparently were covered by separate agreements which are in dispute; and it is apparent that approximately a month before the dispute which arose in this case, these other local unions notified all of the General Cable local unions, including Local 1798, of the fact that negotiations were taking place in New York City, and reported on the status of the negotiations, and suggested that a handbill be distributed pertaining to that matter, the substance of which is that:

"It is possible that informational pickets from these striking plants may appear at other locations for the purpose of publicizing the dispute at those plants."

The pamphlet was to keep the members of other locals fully advised of that situation and these developments, and, prior to July 27, 1971, the president of Local 1798 did, in fact, distribute handbills containing this information to the local membership.

On or about seven or seven-thirty A. M., on July 27, after these handbills had been passed out and before the eight o'clock shift at the Memphis plant of General Cable, pickets appeared purporting to represent these other locals, including the 1164, 1256, and 1558 of the IBEW. These pickets carried signs purporting to show that they were informational pickets. None of the pickets were members of the Memphis Local, and none were Memphis General Cable Employees.

Almost immediately a meeting took place between the representatives of the Company and Local Union, including Messrs. Vandergriff, Huggins, and Edwards, being the president and certain other officers of the Local, regarding this situation. The Company advised the local union officials that there should be no work stoppage as that would constitute, in the Company's view, a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

Mr. Vandergriff advised those local members assembled who would report for the eight o'clock shift of the "no strike" or "stoppage" provision of the agreement, and perhaps somewhat equivocally advised them to report to work. It is significant to note, however, that Mr. Vandergriff, himself, and no other Local 1798 members, actually crossed the line to go to work. What constituted a work stoppage ensued after officials of the union had been warned of disciplinary consequences which might take place, and which, in fact, did take place, in that a number of employees, including certain union officials, and including particularly Mr. Vandergriff, were subsequently discharged.

This Court had a hearing and issued a temporary restraining order on July 29, 1971, which restrained the participation or encouragement of a work stoppage, restrained picketing about the plaintiff's Memphis plant, and called for a hearing in connection with this matter, which is the basis upon which the Court has rendered its findings and will render its conclusions.

After the temporary restraining order was issued, meetings apparently took place between the company and union officials, or official, with regard to the possible selection of an arbitrator, submission to the arbitrator of the issues growing out of the picket line situation and ensuing work stoppage, and, also the subsequent disciplinary action by the Company.

The Court finds from all of the evidence that the local union did, in effect, participate or act in concert with, and through, its local officers in the work stoppage at the Memphis plant of the plaintiff Company. It was something more than mere voluntary action of individual members and employees in bringing...