General Cas. Co. v. Tracer Industries, Inc.
Decision Date | 18 December 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 4-96-0416,4-96-0416 |
Citation | 285 Ill.App.3d 418,674 N.E.2d 473 |
Parties | , 220 Ill.Dec. 930, 63 A.L.R.5th 903 GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRACER INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Robert W. Cockerham, Brown & James, P.C., St. Louis, MO, Larry D. Kuster (argued), Rammelkamp, Bradney, Dahman, Kuster, Keaton, Fritsche, Jacksonville, for General Casualty Company.
James L. Perbix (argued), Perbix and Morgan, Havana, for Tracer Industries, Inc. Justice GREEN delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff General Casualty Company filed a petition against defendant Tracer Industries, Inc., to enforce an appraisal clause in a fire insurance policy issued to defendant. The policy provided for the parties to each appoint an appraiser, when necessary, to together appraise the loss suffered by an insured, and for the court to appoint an umpire if the appraisers could not agree. The petition alleged that an appraisal dispute arose here in regard to a fire resulting in total loss of a building in Havana. The court appointed Darrell Hilst umpire.
Hilst presented a report stating he was in agreement with the appraisal of James Johnston, appointed by defendant, which fixed the fire loss in the sum of $111,900, which was reduced by policy limits to $100,000. The sum of $33,527 had been paid, leaving $66,473 to be paid. Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the determination resulting from the agreement of Hilst with Johnston's appraisal. The circuit court denied that motion. Judgment was entered against plaintiff for $66,473. By amendment that sum was later increased to $68,973.
Plaintiff appeals maintaining the judgment was palpably erroneous because (1) Johnston's appraisal did not take into consideration the obsolescence of the insured building; (2) the award was so high that (a) it must have resulted from fraud, and (b) it was against public policy; and (3) a conflict of interest with Hilst rendered the judgment fraudulent. We affirm.
The evidence indicated that Robert Knake and William Knake, Jr., were the owners of the destroyed building. They were sons of William Knake, sole owner of the defendant corporation. The sons were named as additional insureds in the policy but, strangely, were never made parties to this suit. However, no issue has been raised in that regard.
The parties do not dispute that when a contract provides for a determination of amount by appraisers, substantial deference is given to that appraisal. Bailey v. Timpone, 75 Ill.2d 539, 545, 27 Ill.Dec. 785, 788, 389 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (1979) ( ); Board of Education v. Gorenstein, 179 Ill.App.3d 388, 394, 128 Ill.Dec. 397, 400-01, 534 N.E.2d 579, 582-83 (1989) (); Sebree v. Board of Education, 254 Ill. 438, 446, 98 N.E. 931, 935 (1912) () ; cf. Hetherington v. Continental Insurance Co., 311 Ill.App. 577, 583, 37 N.E.2d 366, 368 (1941) ( ).
The Bailey court stated that review of the rental agreement there "should be limited in a manner analogous to the statutorily constrained role the courts may play in reviewing arbitration awards under the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 10, pars. 101 [through] 123)," even though the act did not apply because the contract called for an "appraisement." Bailey, 75 Ill.2d at 545, 27 Ill.Dec. at 788, 389 N.E.2d at 1196. Since the parties had agreed the arbitrators had "binding authority to conclusively and finally establish the fair cash rental value of the premises," it was proper for the trial court to defer to the meaning the arbitrators ascribed to the terms they used. Bailey, 75 Ill.2d at 546, 27 Ill.Dec. at 788, 389 N.E.2d at 1196.
Recently, this court has noted:
Hayes v. Ennis, 278 Ill.App.3d 121, 127, 215 Ill.Dec. 9, 12, 662 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1996).
In Tim Huey Corp. v. Global Boiler & Mechanical, Inc., 272 Ill.App.3d 100, 208 Ill.Dec. 697, 649 N.E.2d 1358 (1995), this court held that Tim Huey, 272 Ill.App.3d at 106, 208 Ill.Dec. at 701, 649 N.E.2d at 1362. This court did note that "gross errors of judgment in law or gross mistakes of fact may be reviewable if they are apparent upon the face of the award" (Tim Huey, 272 Ill.App.3d at 106, 208 Ill.Dec. at 702, 649 N.E.2d at 1363).
We turn first to the question of whether the decision by Johnston, approved by Hilst, not to consider obsolescence was a gross error of law. The policy provided for limits of $100,000 each as to the building and its contents and further provided the insured would not be paid more than its "financial interest" in the property with any loss determined "[a]t actual cash value." The major problem in this case arises because the "actual cash value" of the building, as determined by the appraisers ($100,000), grossly exceeded any indication of market value.
The evidence was undisputed that one week before the fire, the Knake brothers purchased the property for $67,500. Shortly before that time, two appraisers appraised the premises at a market value of $69,900 and $71,000, and both valued the bare land at $52,500, in effect deeming the building to have a market value of only $17,400 or $18,500. Thus, the appraisers' award here would seem to place the "actual cash value" of the building at approximately five times its market value.
The parties agree that "actual cash value" and market price or value are different concepts, and the major distinguishing characteristic is that determination of "actual cash value" begins with a determination of the cost of replacement while market price is determined by what people would be willing to pay for a property. A very ornate and expensive house in an area where people would not want to live would have a high replacement cost but a low market value. The parties also agree that in arriving at "actual cash value" a deduction must be made from replacement cost to account for depreciation for age. See C.L. Maddox, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co., 208 Ill.App.3d 1042, 1055, 153 Ill.Dec. 791, 799, 567 N.E.2d 749, 757 (1991); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 511 F.2d 241, 244-45 (7th Cir.1975), both citing Smith v. Allemannia Fire Insurance Co., 219 Ill.App. 506, 513 (1920) ().
Plaintiff asserts that in determining "actual cash value" a deduction from replacement cost must be made for obsolescence either as an aspect of depreciation or as an additional item. Hilst's report explained there is:
(Emphasis added.) J. Purdon, Appraisal for Insurance Purposes, Encyclopedia of Real Estate Appraising 1133, 1135 (3d ed.1978) (hereinafter Encyclopedia).
The parties agree that the purpose of a policy of fire and extended-coverage insurance is to insure, as much as reasonably possible, that the insured will be in nearly as good a position after the event insured against as before that event. Chicago Title, 511 F.2d at 245. When a chattel is lost, it can often be replaced by the purchase of a similar chattel. This is not as easy with real estate. For that reason, the theory of not considering obsolescence stated by Hilst makes sense.
Here, the burned building was across the street from a building already owned by defendant. Location may well have been a matter of value to defendant and it may want to rebuild. The location value of the building to the insured would not be an element in determining actual cash value but it is a logical reason why the appropriate measure of loss to the insured is replacement value less depreciation rather than market value, in which obsolescence would be a factor. On the other hand, the market value appraisal pointed out that Havana properties had economic obsolescence due to unemployment and lack of industry in the area. The same report indicated that although the building had deterioration because of age and wear, it did...
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