General Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lacey

Decision Date18 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. 90993.,90993.
Citation769 N.E.2d 18,199 Ill.2d 281,263 Ill.Dec. 816
PartiesGENERAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. George W. LACEY, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

John A. Slevin, John R. Pusey, of Vonachen, Lawless, Trager & Slevin, Peoria, for appellant.

Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria (Karen L. Kendall, Craig L. Unrath, Rex K. Linder, of counsel), for appellee.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue presented is whether, under the facts of this case, the liability-limit exhaustion clause in General Casualty Insurance Company's underinsured-motorist policy is valid and enforceable. We hold that it is.

BACKGROUND

On June 22, 1991, George W. Lacey was operating a car that was involved in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Lacey was covered by an under insured-motorist policy issued by General Casualty. That policy provided coverage limits of $100,000 per accident and $300,000 per occurrence, and included the following liability-limit exhaustion clause:

"We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgment or settlements, unless we:
(1) Have been given written notice in advance of a settlement between an `insured' and the owner or operator of the `underinsured motor vehicle;' and
(2) decide to advance payment to the `insured' in an amount equal to the tentative settlement."

The other driver involved in the accident was insured by Allstate Insurance Company under a policy providing bodily injury liability limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.

In the summer of 1997, Lacey settled with Allstate for $42,500. Lacey then filed a claim with General Casualty for underinsured-motorist benefits. General Casualty denied the underinsured-motorist claim, insisting that underinsured-motorist coverage was not triggered because the $42,500 settlement did not exhaust the at-fault driver's bodily injury liability limits. In addition, General Casualty sought a declaration from the trial court that Lacey was not entitled to underinsured-motorist benefits. In response, Lacey conceded that the $42,500 settlement with Allstate failed to exhaust the at-fault driver's bodily injury liability limits. Nevertheless, Lacey argued that he was entitled to underinsured-motorist benefits because General Casualty's liability-limit exhaustion clause was void as against public policy. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court entered summary judgment in General Casualty's favor. With one justice dissenting, the appellate court affirmed. No. 3-99-0977 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted Lacey's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill.2d 342, 349, 233 Ill.Dec. 643, 701 N.E.2d 493 (1998). The standard of review for the entry of summary judgment is de novo. Ragan, 183 Ill.2d at 349,

233 Ill.Dec. 643,

701 N.E.2d 493.

Before this court, Lacey again argues that General Casualty's liability-limit exhaustion clause is void as against public policy. In support of this argument, Lacey points to the current enactment of section 143a-2(7) of the Illinois Insurance Code, which provides:

"A policy which provides underinsured motor vehicle coverage may include a clause which denies payment until the limits of liability or portion thereof under all bodily injury liability insurance policies applicable to the underinsured motor vehicle and its operators have been partially or fully exhausted by payment of judgment or settlement. A judgment or settlement of the bodily injury claim in an amount less than the limits of liability of the bodily injury coverages applicable to the claim shall not preclude the claimant from making an underinsured motorist claim against the underinsured motorist coverage." 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(7) (West 2000).

Conceding that this version of section 143a-2(7) did not become effective until January 1, 1997, Lacey nevertheless argues-without any citation to authority-that the validity of General Casualty's liability-limit exhaustion clause "should be governed by the law in effect at the time of settlement."

We must reject Lacey's argument. While we agree with Lacey that statutes represent an expression of public policy (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill.2d 369, 372, 259 Ill.Dec. 18, 757 N.E.2d 881 (2001)), it is equally well settled that "[s]tatutes in force at the time an insurance policy was issued are controlling." (Emphasis added.) State Farm, 197 Ill.2d at 372...

To continue reading

Request your trial
98 cases
  • U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Villasenor
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 5 Octubre 2012
    ...as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill.2d 281, 284 [263 Ill.Dec. 816, 769 N.E.2d 18] (2002) ; 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2004)." Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co., 368 Ill.App.3d 10, ......
  • WEST BEND MUT. INS. v. Mulligan Masonry Co.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 Marzo 2003
    ...at 579, 262 Ill.Dec. 697, 766 N.E.2d 317. We review de novo the trial court's ruling. General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill.2d 281, 284, 263 Ill.Dec. 816, 769 N.E.2d 18 (2002). Plaintiff's first contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly granted defendant affirmative......
  • Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sykes
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 20 Junio 2008
    ...to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill.2d 281, 284, 263 Ill.Dec. 816, 769 N.E.2d 18, 20 (2002), citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2006). A genuine issue of material fact exists where the fa......
  • Mercury Indem. Co. of Illinois v. Kim
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 23 Mayo 2005
    ...("statutes in force at the time an insurance policy was issued are controlling"); see also General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill.2d 281, 285, 263 Ill.Dec. 816, 769 N.E.2d 18 (2002) ("we look not to the law that was in effect at the time of settlement but at the law that was in ef......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT