General Elec. Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1958 |
| Docket Number | X-R |
| Parties | , 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2187, 34 Lab.Cas. P 71,330 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.,ay Dept., Appellant, v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.,ay Dept., Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Quarles, Herriott & Clemons, Milwaukee, John G. Kamps, L. C. Hammond, Jr., and James A. Urdan, Milwaukee, of counsel, for appellant.
Stewart G. Honeck, Atty. Gen., Beatrice Lampert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert E. Gratz, Milwaukee, for respondent.
General Electric Company, X-Ray Department, manufacturer of X-ray equipment at Milwaukee and District No. 10, of the International Association of Machinists, A.F.L., a voluntary and unincorporated labor organization (also referred to herein as the 'union') were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement executed October 27, 1952 which was effective at the time referred to herein. By complaint verified June 17, 1955 and filed with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board pursuant to provisions of sec. 111.07(2), Stats., the union charged the company with unfair labor practices involving violations of the collective-bargaining agreement under sec. 111.06(1)(f), Stats. The board determined that six of the union's charges had no merit, but that the company had violated the contract in four particulars. By separate judgments the trial court (a) dismissed the company's petition for review, and (b) directed conformation and enforcement of the board's order. The issue upon this appeal from the judgments relates to but one charge asserted in the complaint, neither party having sought review here of other items determined by the trial court.
Specifically the third paragraph of the complaint, in relation to which the controversy centers, is stated as follows:
'That the company violated the seniority and transfer provisions of the agreement by transferring two employees from Department F against their will and two employees from Department L. Said grievance D-5-2 further constitutes a violation of the layoff and recall provisions of the agreement and that the company was and now still is in violation of those particular provisions in the grievance aforementioned.'
By answer the company asserted:
'As to the third paragraph, denies the transfers complained of in grievance D-5-2 violated the seniority and transfer or the layoff and recall provisions of the agreement and states in any event such transfers lasted only one month and were necessary to supply (on pending work) skills needed at once and not otherwise available.'
It appears without dispute from the evidence adduced before the Board that on March 4, 1955 the company temporarily transferred two women employees, Audrey Czaplewski and LaVerne Ripinski, from Department F to Department XA, and that to replace them, the company transferred two men, Howard Komm and Leo Bocziewicz from Department L to Department F. The temporary transfers were necessitated by urgent need for production in Department XA. Each of the employees so affected had previous experience in the Department to which they were transferred. They were incentive workers, which under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement meant that they were to be paid a premium for the quantity of work produced by them over a fixed standard. When the union was notified of the transfers, its representative informed the company that the union would make no objection in event that the transfers were satisfactory to the employees involved. However, the employees potested, and the union submitted a 'grievance' pursuant to the grievance provisions of the contract. The said 'grievance' was denominated D-5-2. It was processed through steps specified in the contract. After such processing failed to resolve the dispute, the union filed the complaint in question with the board. However, before the filing of such complaint, the company had re-transferred the employees to their former departments. The re-transfer was made on April 4, 1955.
The collective-bargaining agreement provided in part:
'Incentive Plan, Principles and Objectives
'Section 1. Incentive bonus pay shall be defined as additional money offered as a reward for additional productivity. The incentive bonus will be paid solely for 1/2 productivity in excess of 80% of the established time standards.
'Section 2. Incentive bonus payments shall start when performance exceeds 80% of the established time standards and will increase at the uniform rate of 1 1/4% of each participant's basic hourly wage rate for every 1% increase in productivity above 80%, continuing to and above 100%, in accordance with the table below.
% Productivity % Bonus % Productivity % Bonus
80% or less None 92% 15%
81% 1 1/4% 93% 16 1/4%
82% 2 1/2% 94% 17 1/2%
83% 3 3/4% 95% 18 3/4%
84% 5% 96% 20%
85% 6 1/4% 97% 21 1/4%
86% 7 1/2% 98% 22 1/2%
87% 8 3/4% 99% 23 3/4%
88% 10% 100% 25%
89% 11 1/4% 101% 26 1/4%
90% 12 1/2% 102% 27 1/2%
91% 13 3/4% Etc. Etc
The 'Wage Supplement' of the collective-bargaining agreement in so far as material provides in part 'Article I
'Wages
'Basic Hourly Wage Rates
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Labor Grade Automatic Min. Progression 4 Wks. 13 Wks. Merit Steps
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1 1.165 1.215 1.265 1.315
2 1.215 1.265 1.315 1.365
3 1.265 1.315 1.365 1.42
9 Wks. 18 Wks
4 1.265 1.315 1.365 1.42 1.47
5 1.315 1.365 1.42 1.47 1.525
6 1.365 1.42 1.47 1.525 1.585
7 1.42 1.47 1.525 1.585 1.645
8 1.47 1.525 1.585 1.645 1.705
9 1.525 1.585 1.645 1.705 1.765 1.825
10 1.585 1.645 1.705 1.765 1.825 1.885
11 1.645 1.705 1.765 1.825 1.885 1.94
13 Wks. 26 Wks
12 1.705 1.765 1.825 1.885 1.94 2.00
13 1.765 1.825 1.885 1.94 2.00 2.06
14 1.825 1.885 1.94 2.00 2.06 2.12
'2. * * *
Germane to a consideration of the issues on this appeal are the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order of the board as affirmed by the trial court.
'Findings of Fact
'5. That on October 26th, 1953 LaVerne Ripinski commenced her employment with the employer as an 'Assembler C' in Department F; that on April 19th, 1954 Ripinski was promoted to an 'Assembler B' in the same department and continued in that classification and department until January 17th, 1955; that on November 2nd, 1953 Audrey Czaplewski commenced her employment with the employer as an 'Assembler C' in Department F; that on April 19th, 1954 Czaplewski was promoted to an 'Assembler B' in the same department and continued in that classification and department until January 17th, 1955; that Howard Komm commenced his employment with the employer on May 25th, 1948 as a 'Packing Room Helper' in Department 7; that Komm continued his employment in various departments in various classifications, and from April, 1951 to January 12th, 1955 he was employed in Department 7P as a 'Packer and Crater A;' that Leo Bocziewicz commenced his employment with the Employer on November 12th, 1951 as a 'Packer and Crater A' in Department 7P and continued in that department until January 12th, 1955, at which time he was classified as 'Merchandise Packer.'
'(a) That on January 12th, 1955, due to a lack of work in Department 7P, the employer transferred Komm and Bocziewicz to Department F, both of whom were then given the classification of 'Assembler B;' that on January 17th, 1955, because of the Komm and Bocziewicz transfers, the employer transferred Czaplewski to Department DPA, as an 'Assembler B (Temporary)' and Ripinski to Department XA as an 'X-Ray Tube Assembler C;' that on January 31st, 1955 Czaplewski was transferred to Department XA as an 'X-Ray Tube Assembler B' and on the same date Ripinski's classification was raised to 'X-Ray Tube Assembler B.'
'(b) That shortly after January 31st, 1955 the union filed grievances protesting the transfers of Ripinski and Czaplewski, wherein the union contended that employees, in other departments, having less seniority than Ripinski and Czaplewski should have been transferred or laid off to make room for Komm and Bocziewicz and...
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