General Elec. Co. v. United States
| Decision Date | 21 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. M-84-3834. |
| Citation | 603 F. Supp. 881 |
| Parties | GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY v. UNITED STATES of America, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Edward C. Mackie, Patrick G. Cullen, and Rollins, Smalkin, Richards & Mackie, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.
Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., John J. Farley, III, Director, Civ. Div., Torts Branch, John Lodge Euler, Asst. Director, Civ. Div., Torts Branch, Richard Tolles and Timothy P. Garren, Attys., Torts Branch, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., and J. Frederick Motz, U.S. Atty., D. Md., Baltimore, Md., for defendants.
General Electric Company filed the instant action against the United States, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and against five federal employees individually for negligence, alleging diversity jurisdiction (Paper No. 1). All defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety (Paper Nos. 5 & 8), and the plaintiff has responded (Paper Nos. 7 & 9). No hearing is necessary to decide the issues herein. Local Rule 6E.
On July 27, 1982, Mr. James Layman and Mr. Lloyd Thompson, employed by the National Institute of Health (NIH) as electricians, were sent to Building 29 at NIH to replace burned out resistors in a transformer designed and manufactured by General Electric (Paper No. 1, ¶¶ 10-11). While Layman and Thompson were working on the transformer, a short circuit occurred causing a surge of electric current accompanied by an arc which enveloped Thompson and Layman seriously injuring both of them (id. ¶¶ 12-14). Mr. Thompson died within one month of his injury. Mr. Layman remains alive but permanently injured and disfigured (id. ¶¶ 13-14).
A civil action against General Electric was filed in this court by Mr. Thompson's representative and by Mr. Layman and his wife to recover for the injuries sustained by both men. See Thompson, et al. v. General Electric Co., No. M-83-1293. General Electric settled the claims of the plaintiffs in that action (Paper No. 1, ¶ 23).
In the present action, General Electric seeks contribution and indemnity from the United States and the five individual defendants. As to the United States, General Electric alleges that the United States, as the employer of Layman and Thompson, breached its duty to provide a safe work place for them (id. ¶ 17). Against the five federal employees, General Electric alleges that while acting in the scope of their employment, they failed to carry out their duties to use reasonable care for the safety of their fellow employees, specifically Mr. Layman and Mr. Thompson (id. ¶¶ 19-20).
The alleged breaches of duty on the part of both the United States and the five individual defendants are detailed in the complaint as:
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., is a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity to suits in tort. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 1975, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction for claims for money damages for negligence of employees of the United States, acting within the scope of their employment, "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
Since the negligent acts or omissions alleged herein occurred in Maryland, Maryland law governs the United States' liability in this case. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 8-9, 82 S.Ct. 585, 590, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Garrett v. Jeffcoat, 483 F.2d 590, 592 (4th Cir.). The United States "... stands in the shoes of a private person in like circumstances ..." for the purposes of liability. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 585 (D.C.Cir.1980); see also United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1853, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963). If Maryland statutes immunize a private employer in like circumstances from suit, the United States is likewise shielded from liability in this action.
Under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act, "every employer subject to the provisions of this article shall pay or provide ... compensation according to the schedules of this article for disability or death of his employee arising out of ... his employment...." Md.Ann.Code, Art. 101 § 15. If the employer secures compensation to his employees as set forth in § 16 of the Article 101,1 his liability under the workmen's compensation laws "shall be exclusive. ..." Md.Code Ann., Art. 101 § 15. Thus, "the Workmen's Compensation Act is a substitute for the employer's common law liability for negligence." Flood v. Merchants Insurance Co., 230 Md. 373, 377, 187 A.2d 320 (1963); see also Knoche v. Cox, 282 Md. 447, 452-53, 385 A.2d 1179 (1978); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State to Use of Schriefer, 183 Md. 674, 677, 39 A.2d 858 (1944).
The exclusivity provision of Maryland law precludes liability of the employer for contribution, see Mason v. Callas Contractors, Inc., 494 F.Supp. 782, 784 (D.Md.1980) citing Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1944) or indemnity, see American Radiator Corp. v. Mark Co., 230 Md. 584, 588-90, 187 A.2d 864 (1963).
The plaintiff argues, however, that the Maryland statute excludes some employers from its provisions and that those employers cannot take advantage of the exclusivity provisions of the statute even if they provide workmen's compensation to their injured employees.
Under the statute, "the following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this Act: (1) Every person that has in the State one or more employees subject to this Act." Md.Code Ann., Art. 101 § 21(a)(1). Seven classes of employees are exempted from coverage under the Act. Md.Code Ann., Art. 101 § 21(c)(1-7). One of the groups exempted is "any person for whom a rule of liability for injury or death is provided by the laws of the United States." Md.Ann.Code, Art. 101 § 21(c)(3). Obviously, then the United States does not have employees subject to the Act. The plaintiff argues that, as a result, the United States is not an employer subject to the Act and is, therefore, not immune from suit herein.
The plaintiff relies on Keeney v. Beasman, 169 Md. 582, 182 A. 566 (1936), to support its assertion that if an employee is exempted from the Act, even the employer's unilateral purchase of Workmen's Compensation insurance will not subject the employer to the Act and its protection.2
Not cited by the plaintiff, but also relevant to the issue, is Congressional Country Club, Inc. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 194 Md. 533, 71 A.2d 696 (1950). In that case, two employees of the Congressional Country Club hereinafter the Club were injured and one was killed when a bus owned by the Club and transporting them to work, collided with a train. Id. at 539, 71 A.2d 696. The injured passenger and the personal representatives of the deceased passengers filed suits against the Railroad. The Railroad notified the Club of the pendency of the suits and requested its participation in settlement. The Club declined to participate. The Railroad settled the claims and thereafter sued the Club for indemnity and contribution.
The Club defended on the basis that it was a conforming employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act and that its liability under the Act was exclusive. Whether the Club was entitled to that defense depended on whether the employees were covered by the Act. Id. at 541, 71 A.2d 696.
Because the Act extended liability to an employer, in this case, on the basis of extra-hazardous employment, the Club would have been liable to the employees for workmen's compensation under the Act only if their employment was found to be extra-hazardous. Id. The court found that the employees were not engaged in extra-hazardous work, and, therefore, the Club was not liable to them for workmen's compensation under the Act. Id. at 542-43, 71 A.2d 696. The Club could have elected to insure employees in non-extra-hazardous work and thus become liable to them under the Act, but it chose not to do so. Id. at 544, 71 A.2d 696. Therefore, the Club was estopped from raising the defense of exclusivity in the suit brought...
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Matthews v. U.S., 86-2592
...court's interpretation of its own statute. See Horton v. United States, 622 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir.1980); General Electric v. United States, 603 F.Supp. 881, 884 (D.Md.1985). Accordingly, the decision of the district court is REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 As noted hereinafter, both Lathroum and Br......