General Elec. Credit Corp. v. McManus
| Decision Date | 05 August 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 102808,102808 |
| Citation | 34 Conn.Supp. 154,381 A.2d 1071 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Common Pleas |
| Parties | GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION v. Charles McMANUS et al. |
Sid M. Miller and Brian W. Poirier, Hamden, for plaintiff.
No appearance for defendants.
The plaintiff corporation is the assignee of a promissory note signed by the defendants for home improvements to premises located at 12 South Third Street in Meriden, Connecticut. The retail installment contract and the promissory note were both dated June 20, 1975, with the first payment due on the note in August of 1975. The contract price for the improvements was in the sum of $2834 and the finance charge thereon was $1586.08, for a total due on the note of $4420.08, to be repaid in eighty-four monthly installments over a period of seven years at a monthly payment of $52.62. According to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants made no payments on the note. The plaintiff's action was returnable on the third Tuesday of February, 1976, and the defendants, having been served, failed to appear and were defaulted. The plaintiff now comes before the court seeking a judgment in accordance with Practice Book § 876A.
The plaintiff's affidavit of debt claims the whole of the obligation, not only the contract price plus interest to date but also the interest due through the end of the contract some five years hence. It is the court's opinion that to permit the plaintiff to recover this unearned and yet-to-be-due interest would be unconscionable and would be a windfall to the creditor. A review of the applicable statutes relating to retail installment sales truth-in-lending, and sales finance companies seemingly indicates that the legislature does not agree with the plaintiff's position. The relevant statutes all require a separation and line of demarcation between the contract price for the goods and the finance or interest charge or the time price differential.
In chapter 657 of the General Statutes, the Truth-In-Lending Act, § 36-395 relating to the drafting of regulations by the banking commissioner indicates that the purpose of the legislative grant to prescribe substantive and procedural regulations is "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that a prospective debtor will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and to avoid the uninformed use of credit." Sections 36-405(a)(9) and 36-406(a)(7) of the act both require that disclosures to purchasers prior to or at the time of sale state "the default, delinquency or similar charges payable in the event of late payments." The court would interpret those two statutory sections to require the seller to disclose to the buyer the net results of a default and the consequences attendant thereto, and that the buyer, in the event of a default, is liable not only for the unpaid principal balance but also for the total amount of the finance charge or interest, not only to the date of judgment but over the...
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Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Trataros Constr., Inc., 2006 NY Slip Op 50829(U) (NY 5/9/2006)
...Inc. v. Indata Services, 541 A.2d 543 [Conn. App. Ct. 1988], cert denied, 548 A.2d 443 [Conn. 1988], and General Electric Credit Corp. v. McManus, 381 A.2d 1071 [Conn. Ct. Com. Pl. 1977], both of which deal with the public policy against liquidated damages and usurious interest rates and ha......
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