General Electric Credit Corp. v. Noblett

Decision Date29 May 1967
Docket NumberCiv. No. 66-375.
PartiesGENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORP., Plaintiff, v. Ernest V. NOBLETT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

Gary C. Rawlinson, of Fellers, Snider, Baggett & McLane, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff.

Val R. Miller, of Crowe, Boxley, Dunlevy, Thweatt, Swinford & Johnson, Oklahoma City, Okl., Paul D. Sullivan, of Leach & Sullivan, Duncan, Okl., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EUBANKS, District Judge.

Plaintiff commenced this diversity action on October 5, 1966, alleging generally in its complaint that defendant and Bowl-Mor Company, Inc., entered into a written contract on May 20, 1965 whereunder defendant leased from Bowl-Mor eight automatic ten pin setting machines. According to the terms of that rental lease contract defendant agreed to pay, in installments, certain specified sums of money for the use of the machines, the first installment becoming due on September 6, 1965. The rental lease agreement provided, among other things, that "The Lessor (Bowl-Mor) may assign all its right, title and interest under this lease, including the payments due hereunder, but the Assignee shall not be held responsible for any of the Lessor's obligations. The obligations of the Lessee (Noblett) shall, however, continue in full force and effect."

The complaint alleges further that Bowl-Mor assigned the rental lease agreement to plaintiff on May 24, 1965, and thereafter the defendant made two installment payments as was required of him but defaulted on the installment due September 20, 1965, and has made no payments since. Recovery is sought for the accelerated balance due under the lease after deducting the proceeds of the sale of the machines. (By agreement of both parties such sale has been accomplished since this suit was filed.)

By way of answer the defendant admits the execution of the rental lease agreement and does not deny his default but raises two defenses. (1) That he is not individually obligated because it was agreed between him and Bowl-Mor that the contract be signed by him as an individual only to expedite delivery of the machines, but that it was understood that as soon as he formed a corporation, Marlow Lanes, Inc., all of lessee's responsibility under the contract would be shifted to that corporate entity. In this part of his defense defendant says plaintiff had notice of such understanding between him and Bowl-Mor and subsequently recognized Marlow Lanes, Inc., (the corporation which was indeed formed) as the obligor thereunder. (2) That the machines were not as warranted and represented to him in that they were defective and would not operate efficiently. Also defendant claims a breach of further provisions of the agreement to allow him an advertising and sign allowance and a failure on lessor's part to provide an agreed "on-the-job training" for employees. Defendant contends that this second defense amounts to a failure of consideration for the contract.

The case is now before the Court on motion of plaintiff for summary judgment to which is attached the affidavit of R. N. Lamy, plaintiff's credit specialist, saying, in effect, that plaintiff took the assignment of the rental lease from Bowl-Mor for a valuable consideration, in good faith and without notice of any claim or defense which Noblett may have against Bowl-Mor. Responding to plaintiff's motion defendant substantially reiterates his two defenses in an affidavit but adds thereto by saying that there are writings that will corroborate his claim that he was not to be held individually obligated, which writings he is currently attempting to locate.

Both parties agree that Massachusetts substantive law governs this matter because of contract provisions. Able counsel for both parties are apparently also in accord that irrespective of whether it is a matter of procedural law and thus governed by the rules of the forum, parole evidence cannot be allowed to vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument. With reference to the specific issue of individual or corporate liability it was said in Norfolk County Trust Co. v. Green, 304 Mass. 406, 24 N.E.2d 12 (1939), "but the written agreement purports on its face to bind the defendant and appears to set out a complete contract of the parties. Parol evidence to contradict or vary its terms was not admissible." For other cases holding that where there is nothing in the instrument to indicate the signer thereof acted otherwise than as an individual, or that a corporation was to be bound, a signer will not be heard to say he acted in a representative capacity only, see Ricker v. B-W Corp., 349 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1965); Mid-America Corp. v. Miller, 372 P.2d 14 (Okl.1962; and 82 A.L.R.2d 424).

For the foregoing reason the the first defense herein must fail unless defendant is able to produce written evidence that only Marlow Lanes, Inc., was to be responsible under the lease and be further able to establish that plaintiff had notice of same. Since this is a possibility according to...

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5 cases
  • Chemical Bank v. Rinden Professional Ass'n
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1985
    ...upon Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 231 § 5, that "the subsequent act in effect repealed the ... earlier one." General Electric Credit Corp. v. Noblett, 268 F.Supp. 984, 987 (W.D.Okla.1967) (applying Massachusetts law), rev'd on other grounds, 400 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 93......
  • Noblett v. General Electric Credit Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • November 12, 1968
    ...terms of the rental agreement, and being of the view that Noblett thereby had waived the pleaded defenses, General Electric Credit Corp. v. Noblett, 268 F.Supp. 984 (W.D.Okl. 1967), the trial court granted summary judgment for the balance of the rentals in the sum of $64,389.91, together wi......
  • A. L. Jackson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Oxley
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • May 10, 1977
    ...by the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in a representative capacity.7 General Electric Credit Corp. v. Noblett, 268 F.Supp. 984 (W.D.Okl.1967); Custom Equipment Co. v. Young, 47 OBJ 3091 (Dec. 21, 1976), 564 P.2d 1020 (Okl.App.1976); See also Annot., 'Constru......
  • Minnesota Paints, Inc. v. Johns
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1970
    ...than a personal, obligation, were oral, or in parol, rather than in writing. In this connection, notice General Electric Credit Corp. v. Noblett, U.S.D.C.W.D.Okl., 268 F.Supp. 984, 986, in which the court overruled plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in view of the 'possibility' of defe......
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