General Electric Supply Corp. v. Merriam
| Decision Date | 30 March 1935 |
| Docket Number | File 41242 |
| Citation | 1 Conn.Supp. 123 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | GENERAL ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORP., ET AL. v. CHARLES C. MERRIAM, ET AL. |
Present Hon. JOHN RUFUS BOOTH, Judge.
Ralph H. Clark, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
George E. Beers, Attorney for the Defendants.
Where conditional sale does not apply with Section 4697 of the General Statutes, creditors of vendee may make attachment notwithstanding actual notice.
No basis for estoppel where defendants have done nothing inconsistent with their claims or in any way altering the position of the plaintiffs.
Action of replevin brought by conditional vendor against deputy sheriff and attaching creditors. Judgment for defendants.
BOOTH (JOHN RUFUS), J.
The action is in replevin, wherein the plaintiffs claim the right to possession of certain electrical equipment which they placed in the possession of the New Haven Baseball Club, Incorporated, under the terms of certain conditional sales contracts which are conceded not to have complied with Section 4697 of the General Statutes.
The defendants, with the exception of Merriam, a deputy sheriff who made an attachment on behalf of his co-defendants, are creditors of the New Haven Baseball Club, Incorporated, and their possession of the goods replevined was by virtue of this attachment.
The question, therefore, is whether the property was subject to the attachment at the time it was made.
It must be conceded that Section 4699 of the General Statutes makes the conditional sales agreements absolute insofar as the defendants other than Meriam are concerned, and further provides expressly that the property in question is liable to be taken by attachment and execution for the debts of the vendee.
There is no serious dispute that this is the effect of the statutory provisions. The plaintiffs contend, however, that they had repossessed themselves of the property in question and that thereafter it was no longer subject to attachment by the defendants. Had their acts actually amounted to a repossession of this property, its further availability to satisfy the defendants' claims would have presented a question of some difficulty which in the present controversy it is not necessary to decide. In the opinion of the Court the acts of the plaintiffs in this connection did not amount to a repossession of the property, their declarations to the contrary not-withstanding. The plaintiffs further...
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