General Finance Corp. of Jacksonville v. Sexton

• Decision Date: 16 July 1963
• Docket Number: No. E-8,E-8
• Citation: 155 So.2d 159
• Parties: GENERAL FINANCE CORPORATION OF JACKSONVILLE, INC., a corporation, and General Finance corporation of Florida, East, a corporation, Appellants, v. Frank W. SEXTON, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 159

155 So.2d 159

GENERAL FINANCE CORPORATION OF JACKSONVILLE, INC., a corporation, and General Finance corporation of Florida, East, a corporation, Appellants, v. Frank W. SEXTON, Appellee.

No. E-8.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 16, 1963.

Adam G. Adams, II, of McCarthy, Adams & Foote, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Carl G. Swanson and Evan T. Evans, jacksonville, for appellee.

RAWLS, Judge.

In an action for conversion of an automobile belonging to defendant Frank W. Sexton, General Finance Corporation appealed from a jury verdict and judgment in the sum of $1,000. By stipulation $450.00 of the judgment is compensatory damages with the balance being considered punitive damages.

The essence of the action as apparently found by the jury from the myriad of conflicting facts was that General Finance Corporation, assignee of a retail installment contract covering Sexton's automobile, kept its records on Sexton's account in such a state of confusion that it caused its collecting agents to make numerous calls upon the plaintiff, made conflicting statements about the status of the account, failed to acknowledge one payment for over two months after it was received, notifid plaintyiff that his car was repossessed (although arguing at the trial and on appeal that it was just a 'paper' repossession), and finally refused to accept one payment having already repossessed the automobile by causing title to be transferred to it by the Motor Vehicle Commissioner. Several months prior to the repossession, the vehicle had been delivered to City Motor & Transmission Exchange, Inc. for the purpose of installing a factory rebuilt motor. Because of a dispute between Sexton and City Motor as to the terms of their oral agreement, the automobile had remained in the possession of City Motor at all times since delivery to them. There is no evidence that City Motor took any action to enforce a claim of lien and pending litigation between it and Sexton is being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the instant case.

The three points submitted by the appellant to this court on appeal are:

1. Did the 'repossession' amount to a wrongful deprivation of property so as to satisfy that essential element of conversion?

2. Can there be conversion when the vehicle was in the possession of a third party?

3. Was there any legal basis for assessment of punitive damages?

That disseisin of chattels which is called conversion has been described as an 'act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's personal property inconsistent with his ownership therein', 'an act in derogation of plaintiff's possessory rights', 'interference with the dominion of the true owner', 'unauthorized assumption of powers of the true owner' and by many other well known and often quoted descriptive phrases. ¹ The gist of the action is interference with legal rights which are incident to ownership ² or the wrongful deprivation of the property of the owner and neither manucaption nor asportation is an essential element thereof. ³

The legal efficacy accorded the registered title holder of a motor vehicle by statute ⁴ is the strongest indication of ownership afforded any type of personal property and rights of ownership are dependent thereon. A wrongful transfer of title to a motor vehicle by the appellant corporation could hardly be less than a disseisin of the owner, and interference with legal rights which are incidents to ownership, and a deprivation of the owner's dominion of his property permanently or for an indefinite time.

Under the second point appellant's argument that there can be no conversion while the automobile was in the possession of a third party which had a claim of lien, is based upon two factors: First, there can be no conversion where the plaintiff was not entitled to possession, and secondly, there can be no conversion where plaintiff violated his agreement under the retail installment contract to keep the automobile free from liens. The right of an owner to possession of his chattel is one incident to ownership and the deprivation of same is one of the most common factors giving rise to actions for conversion. As noted above, the interference of any legal right incident to ownership may amount to a conversion, and the act of transferring title to a motor vehicle is sufficient to deprive the owner of his right of possession as between the parties in litigation irrespective of the unsettled dispute between the owner and a third party.

The trial court denied the finance company's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that Sexton had breached the terms of the contract which required him to keep the vehicle free of liens. The reasoning of the trial court was that neither party could possibly have intended that the contract provision prohibited delivery of possession of the car to a garage to have it repaired, so the contract provision was not breached until the garage...