General Fire-Extinguisher Co. v. Magee Carpet Works

• Decision Date: 04 June 1901
• Docket Number: 320
• Parties: The General Fire Extinguisher Company v. Magee Carpet Works, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

49 A. 366

199 Pa. 647

The General Fire Extinguisher Company v. Magee Carpet Works, Appellant

No. 320

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 4, 1901

Argued April 16, 1901

Appeal, No. 320, Jan. T., 1900, by defendants, from judgment of C.P. Columbia Co., May T., 1897, No. 143, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of the General Fire Extinguisher Company a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, v. The Magee Carpet Works, Owner and Reputed Owner and the Bloomsburg Carpet Works, Contractor. Affirmed.

Scire facias sur mechanic's lien. Before DUNHAM, P.J. specially presiding.

At the trial it appeared that in 1896, James Magee was treasurer and general manager of both the Bloomsburg Carpet Works and the Magee Carpet Works, two corporations organized for the purpose of the manufacture of carpet and other textile fabrics. On April 28, 1896, Magee signed a contract for the installation of a system of automatic sprinklers in certain buildings, some of which buildings were the property of the Magee Carpet Works. Magee signed the contract as treasurer and general manager of the Bloomsburg Carpet Works. The evidence showed that Magee did the purchasing for the Magee Carpet Works, and that his authority was never questioned. After the work was finished he wrote a letter signing it as treasurer and general manager of the Magee Carpet Works approving the work. After the work was finished an apportioned mechanic's lien was filed against the three new buildings of the Magee Carpet Works, and shortly thereafter three separate writs of scire facias were issued on the lien. On April 15, 1897, an affidavit of defense was filed, and on the same day, the defendant pleaded nil debet etc. In neither affidavit of defense nor plea, was the question of the sufficiency of the lien raised so far as lumping charges were concerned.

More than two years afterwards, on June 8, 1899, when the cases were called for trial, the defendant asked leave to withdraw the pleas, and moved to strike off the lien because the items of labor and material were not sufficiently itemized. A rule was granted returnable in two days, which after argument was discharged by the court.

Defendant presented amongst others these points:

1. That the Bloomsburg Carpet Works, the contractor, having been incorporated for "the purpose of the manufacture of carpets and other textile fabrics," could not contract "for and about the erection and construction of three several buildings adjoining each other," nor could it contract for "the installment of a system of Grinnell Glass-Disc Automatic Sprinklers, including the necessary piping, indicator gates and draw-off valves, and materials and labor necessary to the erection and construction of the said system for the purpose of extinguishing fires, "for the Magee Carpet Works, as the same was outside of its charter powers and ultra vires, and the plaintiff cannot recover in the action. Answer: That point as a whole we do not affirm, but we leave it to you under the evidence in the case whether the plaintiff cannot recover, or can. The fact that the Bloomsburg Carpet...