General III, LLC v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-2667 |
| Parties | GENERAL III, LLC d/b/a SOUTHSIDE RECYCLING and RMG INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO and DR. ALLISON ARWADY, in her Official Capacity as the Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Public Health, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Yesterday the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed that “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, a federal court should not consider the claim before the government has reached a ‘final' decision.” Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 594 U.S. ---, 2021 WL 2637819 at *1 (June 28, 2021). That principle requires dismissal of Count IV of Plaintiffs' complaint-the sole claim asserted to be within the Court's original jurisdiction-on ripeness grounds. The allegations of the complaint and the record compiled to date establish that Defendants have suspended their review of Plaintiffs' permit application to conduct further review at the request of federal regulators but have not issued a final determination one way or the other. Furthermore, applying the usual rule in the Seventh Circuit, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims (Counts I, II, and III), all of which arise under state law. Indeed, even if Plaintiffs' claim under the Takings Clause were ripe principles of federalism would convince the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I, II, and III as Plaintiffs' requests for immediate and mandatory injunctive relief under those counts rest on the application of state law to a municipality's construction of its own rules and guidelines.
In sum Count IV is dismissed without prejudice as premature and Counts I, II, and III are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to refile in state court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-217. The Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiffs' motion for a writ of mandamus and/or injunctive relief [7], which is terminated as moot in view of the Court's jurisdictional rulings. A final judgment consistent with this opinion will enter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. This civil case is terminated.
Plaintiffs General III, LLC d/b/a Southwest Recycling and RMG Investment Group, LLC have filed this lawsuit against Defendants City of Chicago and Dr. Allison Arwady in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Public Health. At stake is the issuance of an operating permit that would allow Plaintiffs to operate a large recycling facility known as Southside Recycling (“SR”). According to the complaint, Plaintiffs have made an $80 million investment in the facility and have completed a rigorous, two-year zoning, rulemaking, and permitting review process. Plaintiffs insist that they have complied with every City requirement necessary to be granted the permit they seek. Yet a final decision on the permit has not been made, in part due to Defendants' accession to a May 7, 2021 request from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”) asking the City to halt its review of SR's permit application so that additional environmental justice analysis can be conducted. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' refusal to issue the permit violates the Chicago Municipal Code and constitutes a breach of the City's contractual obligation to work “expeditiously and efficiently” with Plaintiffs on the permitting process. Plaintiffs claim that they are suffering irreparable harm and significant financial damage and ask the Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing Defendants to issue the operating permit pursuant to Section 11-4-2520 of the City's Municipal Code and the City's Rules for Large Recycling Facilities, or in the alternative to enjoin Defendants from interfering with SR's right to operate a large recycling facility on its property.[1]
In every case, the first task of a federal court is to ensure that it has jurisdiction. See, e.g., Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Haight, 697 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2012); Hay v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2002) (). Article III courts may only adjudicate matters where a live case or controversy exists. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (). In addition, to invoke the original jurisdiction of a federal court, the plaintiff's complaint must present either a federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331), or the parties must satisfy the prerequisites for diversity jurisdiction-namely, complete diversity of citizenship and a sufficient amount in controversy (28 U.S.C. § 1332). A party that successfully invokes a federal court's original jurisdiction may also bring claims that arise under state law in the same case under the court's supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367), but the exercise of that jurisdiction is discretionary. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997).
In their complaint, Plaintiffs bring four claims. The first three arise under state law. Count IV arises under federal law-the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States-as it seeks compensation under the Takings Clause. This claim is the sole hook for original federal jurisdiction, as Plaintiffs' counsel confirmed on the record that diversity jurisdiction is lacking. Defendants note [see 29, at 23] that “appealing to a federal court's supplemental jurisdiction to issue state-law mandamus against a municipality when the only federal claims in this case are not even included in the motion for preliminary relief raises complicated jurisdictional concerns, ” but do not elaborate on those “concerns” or offer their views on how the Court ought to address them. But that observation alone is enough to raise at least yellow flags (if not red ones), and (as noted above) the Court has an independent obligation to police its own jurisdiction in any event.
The first question is whether Plaintiff has asserted a claim that lies within the Court's original jurisdiction. There are several potential obstacles, and Plaintiffs manage to clear most of them cleanly. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that their decision to plead a claim for immediate mandamus and injunctive relief under state law and a claim for just compensation under federal law comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which do in fact allow pleading in the alternative. And Plaintiffs' decision to advance their “vested rights” theory through an immediate motion for mandamus and other injunctive relief [see 7] while holding the takings claim in reserve at this time complies with settled principles of law as well. See Image Media Advertising, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 6059921, at *5 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 7, 2017) (). Finally, the Court also concurs in Plaintiffs' assertion [36, at 8] that a takings claim for a denial of a permit to operate in the circumstances of this case would be “real and substantial” as those terms are defined in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946).
Nevertheless Plaintiffs must clear another hurdle to validly invoke the Court's original jurisdiction: their takings claim must be ripe. The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to “prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the Supreme Court has “articulated a special ripeness doctrine for constitutional property rights claims.” Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Wright & Miller, 13B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3532.1.1 (3d ed.) (“A special category of ripeness doctrine surrounds claims arising from government takings of property.”). Under this ripeness standard, a plaintiff may initiate an action when “the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2169 (U.S. 2019); see also id. (); Church of Our Lord & Savior Jesus Christ v. City of Markham, Ill., 913 F.3d 670, 678 (7th Cir. 2019) (); 2 Am. Law. Zoning § 16:12 (5th ed.) ( ...
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