General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 6143.
| Decision Date | 09 February 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 6143.,6143. |
| Citation | 63 F.2d 209 |
| Parties | GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Royden Dixon, of Memphis, Tenn. (Dixon & Williams, of Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for appellant.
H. C. Murchison, of Jackson, Tenn. (Dwayne D. Maddox and Bailey Walsh, both of Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for the United States.
Before MOORMAN, HICKENLOOPER, and SIMONS, Circuit Judges.
In a libel proceeding in rem brought by the government for the forfeiture of a Chevrolet automobile, appellant intervened and filed a reclamation petition praying that the car be delivered to it so that it might satisfy a lien claimed thereon under a title retaining contract. From an order denying the petition it appealed.
The car was seized by a narcotic agent while it was being used by one Luttrell in the transportation of two ounces of morphine. Luttrell was convicted, whereupon the government filed its libel under sections 3061 and 3062 of U. S. R. S., being sections 482 and 483, title 19, USCA, relating to the search and forfeiture of vehicles containing merchandise subject to duty or introduced into the United States contrary to law. The libel alleged that the automobile was being used to convey 775 grains of morphine which had been fraudulently and clandestinely imported and introduced into the United States without payment of customs duty due to be paid thereon, and not being in or from original stamped packages, and there being no internal revenue stamps affixed as provided by the statutes of the United States (see 26 US CA § 691 et seq.). The reclamation petition does not traverse any of the material allegations of the libel. In it there is no denial of the fact of transportation, nor the contraband character of the merchandise. The petition relies upon the superior title of the appellant by reason of its purchase of the conditional sales contract from the vendor of the car, the default of the purchaser, Luttrell, the good faith of the appellant in purchasing the contract, and its lack of knowledge that the car was being used or would be used for an unlawful purpose.
At the hearing the government produced the narcotic agent who made the seizure, who testified as to the circumstances under which the car was seized, the indictment, trial, and conviction of Luttrell, the identity of the cans of morphine seized, the absence of internal revenue stamps thereon, his own tests that showed them to contain morphine powder, and his knowledge of the report and testimony of the chemist who analyzed the powder and found it to be morphine hydrochloride. No other witness was sworn for the government, and the appellant introduced no evidence. The court below, to which the case was tried under a stipulation waiving trial by jury, found the issues in favor of the United States, and against the appellant.
It is contended that the court erred in permitting the narcotic agent to testify that the seized merchandise was morphine hydrochloride, and in finding that the morphine was unlawfully imported. The argument, in so far as we are able to follow it, seems to be this: There are two precipitates of morphine, morphine sulphide, and morphine hydrochloride. The former is made in the United States in some quantity. There is substantially none of the latter manufactured in this country. While the witness for the government had personal knowledge that the alleged contraband was morphine, he could not state of his own knowledge whether it was morphine sulphide or morphine hydrochloride. If the former, there could be no inference that it was unlawfully imported into the United States. The evidence that it was morphine hydrochloride was purely hearsay, and should have been excluded, and, though the District Judge, by virtue of having presided...
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...we do not lack support from other Courts. United States v. Gramling, 5 Cir., 180 F.2d 498, 500-501; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 6 Cir., 63 F.2d 209. See also United States v. One Gardner Roadster, D.C.W.D.Wash., 35 F.2d 777, We approach then the second phase of the pro......
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