General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. United States

• Decision Date: 02 May 1932
• Docket Number: No. 574,574
• Citation: 76 L.Ed. 971,286 U.S. 49,52 S.Ct. 468,82 A.L.R. 600
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES, and three other cases
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

286 U.S. 49

52 S.Ct. 468

76 L.Ed. 971

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

v UNITED STATES, and three other cases.

No. 574.

Argued and Submitted April 14, 15, 1932.

Decided May 2, 1932.

[Syllabus from pages 50-51 intentionally omitted] Messrs. John Thomas Smith, of New York City, and C. A. Lindeman, of Los Angeles, Cal., for General Motors Acceptance Corporation.

[Arguments of Counsel from pages 50-51 intentionally omitted] The Attorney General and Mr. G. A.Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.

[Arguments of Counsel from Pages 52-53 intentionally omitted] Mr. Joseph G. Myerson, of New York City, amicus curiae.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.

The facts stated in the certificate are these:

'The record presents four consolidated automobile forfeiture cases in which the same disputed legal questions are involved.

'On four different dates during July and August, 1930, the four automobiles whose forfeiture is in issue were seized at ports of entry on the Mexican border, each vehicle having liquor concealed therein. Three of the cars were seized at San Ysidro, California, and the fourth at Calexico, California. Each car was observed crossing the international boundary line from Mexico and traveling some distance thereafter in the United States, and in each instance the concealed liquor was discovered at an official stopping place of the United States Customs Service. The seizures were effected by Customs officers.

'All four drivers of the cars were arrested. Each was charged with violations of the Tariff Act of 1930; namely unlawfully importing liquor into the United States, and knowingly concealing and facilitating the transportation of such liquor. Each indictment alleged failure to obtain a permit, failure to pay duties, and failure to make entry at the custom house. The four defendants entered pleas of guilty to the first count, which charged importation, and were sentenced by the court. In each case, the remaining count was dismissed.

'A libel of information in rem was filed by the United States attorney against each automobile, claiming its forfeiture under the provisions of Sections 3061 and 3062 of the Revised Statutes (19 USCA 482 and 483). In three of the cases the General Motors Acceptance Corporation intervened as owner of the attached automobiles, and in the other case the vehicle was claimed by the Howard Automobile Company. All the interveners set up proof of ownership, averred that they were innocent of any illegal acts in which the vehicles may have been involved, and prayed the court to dismiss the libels, contending that the government's sold remedy was under Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA 40).

'In each case, it was stipulated that the liquor alleged to have been found in the automobile was intoxicating in fact and fit for beverage purposes. It was further stipulated, subject to the objection by the libelant that such a purported defense was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, that neither the seller nor the intervener had any notice of the illegal use, or intended illegal use, of the automobile.

'The government offered in evidence at the forfeiture proceedings the judgment roll, consisting of the indictment and sentence, in the criminal cases, at which, as stated above. pleas of guilty had been entered. The intervener in each case objected to the introduction of this judgment roll, on the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial; that no proper foundation had been laid; that the roll was not binding upon the intervener; and that it did not show that the intervener was a party to the criminal action or had notice of it. The objections were overruled and the records were admitted in evidence, to which the respective interveners duly excepted.

'Testimony of customs officers showed that the four automobiles were driven across the international boundary some distance into the United States before being searched and seized.

'The District Court entered decrees of forfeiture in all four cases, finding that each automobile was engaged in smuggling dutiable merchandise into the United States in violation of the customs laws thereof."

The four interveners having appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court certified for answer by this court the following questions (Judicial Code, § 239, 28 U. S. C. § 346 (28 USCA § 346)):

'1. Does Section 26 of Title II of the National Prohibition Act repeal by implication and render inoperative in liquor importation and transportation cases the forfeiture provisions of the Customs Laws, in so far as offending vehicles are concerned? Or, putting the question in another form:

'2. Do the mandatory provisions of Section 26 of the National Prohibition Act apply when the automobile has been seized while in the act of transporting intoxicating liquor across the border and some distance into the United States?

'3. May the government, in such a case, ignore such mandatory provisions, arrest the driver, and elect to forfeit the automobile under the customs laws?

'4. Is the record in the criminal case wherein the driver pleaded guilty of violating the customs laws (Tariff Act of 1930) admissible in the separate forfeiture proceedings wherein the intervener is the only party appearing, for the purpose of showing unlawful importation by the automobile, or for any other purpose?'

The importation of intoxicating liquors without permit and without payment of customs duties is a violation of the Tariff Act and a criminal offense thereunder. This was the law under the Tariff Act of 1922, enacted after the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. Tariff Act of 1922, c. 356, § 593(b), 42 Stat. 982, U. S. C. title 19, § 497 (19 USCA § 497). It is still the law under the present Tariff Act of 1930, § 593, U. S. C. title 19, § 1593 (19 USCA § 1593). True, the drivers of the cars who brought these liquors from Mexico into California were subject to prosecution under the National Prohibition Act, title 2, § 29, 27 U. S. Code, § 46 (27 USCA § 46). They were subject to prosecution under the Tariff Act also (Callahan v. United States, 285 U. S. 515, 52 S. Ct. 454, 76 L. Ed. —, April 11, 1932), and under that act they were indicted and convicted.

The appellants would have us hold that prosecution of the offender may be based at the election of the government either on the one act or on the other, but that forfeiture of the implements used in his offending may be based on only one of them. The consequence of such a holding would be to withdraw from the tariff acts remedies and sanctions existing for the better part of a century. Forfeiture of vehicles bearing smuggled goods is one of the time-honored methods adopted by the government for the repression of the crime of smuggling. The provisions of the Revised Statutes, sections 3061 and 3062, which carried forward the provisions of earlier acts (Act of July 18, 1866, c. 201, 14 Stat. 178, § 3), have in turn been carried forward into the United States Code. U. S. Code, title 19, §§ 482, 483 (19 USCA §§ 482, 483). By implication, if not in express terms, they were recognized as law in the Tariff Act of 1922, which declares it to be the duty of any customs agent who has made seizure of a vehicle for violation of the customs law to turn the vessel over to the collector of the district. Tariff Act of 1922, c. 356, § 602, U. S. Code, title 19, § 509 (19 USCA § 509). They are recognized by like provisions in the Tariff Act of 1930. Act of 1930, c. 497, § 602, U. S. Code, title 19, § 1602 (19 USCA § 1602). Indeed, the same implication persists in the Prohibition Law itself, or in Acts connected with it. By section 1 of the act of March 3, 1925, c. 438, 43 Stat. 1116, U. S. Code, title 27, § 41 (27 USCA § 41), 'any vessel or vehicle summarily forfeited to the United States for violation of the customs laws, may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, under such regulations as he may prescribe, be taken and used for the enforcement of the provisions of this title (i. e., the title, Intoxicating Liquors) in lieu of the sale thereof as provided by law' (cf. 27 U. S. Code, § 42 (27 USCA § 42)). Certain it is therefore that vehicles carrying smuggled merchandise other than intoxicating liquors may still be seized and forfeited under the provisions of the tariff acts and those of the Revised Statutes ancillary thereto. The forfeiture may be enforced even against innocent owners, though the Secretary of the Treasury may remit it, upon such terms as he deems reasonable, if satisfied that there was neither willful negligence nor intent to violate the law. Rev.St. § 3078; Tariff Acts of 1922 (19 USCA §§ 520, 532) and 1930, sections 613, 618 (19 USCA §§ 1613, 1618). The penalty is at times a hard one, but it is imposed by the statute in terms too clear to be misread. Beyond all room for question, the owner of a vehicle bearing smuggled merchandise runs the risk of forfeiture, subject to remission by the grace of an administrative officer, where the merchandise is medicine or wheat or dry goods or machinery, subjects of legitimate trade upon payment of the lawful duties. The argu- ment for the interveners is that the intention of Congress was to make the risk a lighter one where the trade is wholly illegitimate, i. e., where the merchandise smuggled consists of intoxicating liquors. They tell us that perhaps a forfeiture under the tariff acts will be permitted when what is laden in the vehicle is partly intoxicating liquor and partly something else. Cf. Commercial Credit Co. v. United States (C. C. A.) 53 F.(2d) 977, 978, 979. They insist, however, that the remedy under those acts must be held to be excluded when liquor and liquor only is the subject-matter of the carriage.

Section 26, title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 305, 315, U. S. C. title 27, § 40 (27 USCA § 40)), which is quoted in the...