General Motors Corp. v. Erves

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: LEVIN
• Citation: General Motors Corp. v. Erves, 209 N.W.2d 713, 47 Mich.App. 591 (Mich. App. 1973)
• Decision Date: 25 May 1973
• Docket Number: Docket No. 13094--13098,No. 1,1
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John ERVES et al., Defendants-Appellees

Page 713

209 N.W.2d 713

47 Mich.App. 591

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John ERVES et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 13094--13098.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

May 25, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 5, 1973.

Released for Publication Aug. 14, 1973.

Ross L. Malone, Gen. Counsel, by Edmond J. Dilworth, Jr., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jorden Rossen, Detroit, for John Erves.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Felix E. League, Detroit, for Mich. Employment Security Commission.

Before LEVIN, P.J., and V. J. BRENNAN and O'HARA, ^* JJ.

LEVIN, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff, General Motors Corporation, appeals a judgment of the circuit court ordering payment of 'back-to-work' benefits to the five individual defendants. We affirm as to defendants Lawson and Griffith and reverse as to defendants Bloomer, Kartsonas, and Erves.

All five individual defendants were employed by General Motors Corporation, Cadillac Car Division. All were laid off during the annual model changeover period in the summer of 1968.

(I) Bloomer and Kartsonas received their layoff notices at the end of their shift on Friday, August 2, 1968. They returned

to work 3 weeks and 2 days later, on Monday, August 26, 1968. Erves received his notice at the end of his shift on Friday, July 5, 1968 and, similarly, returned to work 3 weeks and 2 days later, on Monday, July 29, 1968.

(II) Lawson and Griffith received notices at the end of their shift on Wednesday, July 31, 1968, and returned to work 4 weeks later, on Wednesday, August 28, 1968.

At issue is the back-to-work benefit--a sum equal to one week's unemployment compensation--payable under the Employment Security Act to an employee who has 'a period of unemployment' which commenced with a 'layoff' that continues 'for more than 3 weeks' and who obtain employment with any employer within 13 weeks of the last week worked:

'(2) When an individual has had a period of unemployment: (i) For which he has been paid benefits for 1 or more weeks or has received credit for a waiting week, (ii) which commenced with a layoff by an employing unit that continued with such employing unit for more than 3 weeks, and (iii) which has been terminated by his accepting and engaging in full-time work with any employing unit within the 13 weeks immediately following his last week of employment with such employing unit, such individual shall be paid for the most recent week in such period for which benefits are payable or were paid to him or for which he was entitled to credit for a waiting week, an amount equal to his currently applicable weekly benefit rate in addition to any benefits otherwise payable or paid to him for such week.' ¹

I

General Motors contends that the layoff notices received by Bloomer, Kartsonas, and Erves on a Friday became effective as of the next scheduled day of work, the following Monday, and therefore the layoff lasted exactly three weeks, not longer. The three men contend that the layoff became effective on the last day worked and, therefore, they were laid off for 3 weeks and 2 days and are entitled to back-to-work benefits.

The men argue that decision here is controlled by Michigan Supreme Court decisions denying group life insurance benefits to beneficiaries of laid off employees. ² In the cited cases, however, there was no issue concerning the status of the employee between receipt of notice of layoff and the next day--but for the notice of layoff--he would have expected to work. Nor would the Court's conclusions concerning insurance coverage in those cases be determinative of legislative intent in enacting this peculiar proviso of the Employment Security Act.

The primary purpose of the act is to compensate workers for lost wages. While the individual defendants had worked occasionally on weekends during the first half of 1968, this was not the usual practice. Bloomer and Kartsonas had not worked any weekend during the two months preceding the layoff; the record is silent as to Erves. It appears that the impact of the layoff in terms of wage loss was not felt until the Monday after the last day the men worked.

The men suffered no wage loss on the Saturday or Sunday which immediately followed the last day of work. They lost 3 weeks' wages--not 'more'. How then could they have been laid off for more than 3 weeks? Only by ignoring customary usage and a common-sense construction of the legislative language and purpose would exactly '3 weeks' of lost work become--by counting a superfluous, ordinarily not worked Saturday and Sunday--'more than 3 weeks'. ³

Of controlling concern is the time when the impact of the layoff becomes felt by a worker and when it is lifted. We see that impact, for purposes of the back-to-work benefit, primarily in terms of lost wages, rather than any of the other possible incidents of a layoff which may affect a worker at an earlier or later point in time.

Erves, Bloomer, and Kartsonas were laid off, for purposes of the back-to-work benefit, as of the first day--but for the notice of layoff-they would have expected to work, that is, the Monday they were told not to report for work. They were reemployed exactly 3 weeks later when they reported for work. They are not entitled to back-to-work benefits.

We have considered the commission's interpretation in its manual providing that for purposes of determining eligibility for the back-to-work payment 'the controlling factor in determining the effective date of the layoff will be either the last day on which work was made available by the employing unit or the date of notification of layoff to the worker, whichever is later'. ⁴

While this guideline works well where the last day worked is in the middle of a regularly scheduled work week, we believe it to be unnecessarily inflexible and inconsistent with the spirit of the act in failing to differentiate that case from the kind of case now before us where the last day worked is the last day of a normal five-day work week and there is no expectation that work will be provided on Saturday and Sunday.

II

Lawson and Griffith were laid off for 4 weeks. They argue that, perforce, they have met the statutory qualification of 'a layoff * * * that continued * * * for more than 3 weeks'.

General Motors would read the statute as requiring a 'period of Unemployment' of 'more than 3 weeks'. Because Lawson and Griffith received 'short-week' benefits under their union's agreement with General Motors, ⁵ they were not 'unemployed' within the Employment Security Act's special meaning of that word during the week in which they were laid off or the week in which they resumed work. ⁶ General Motors argues that since Lawson and Griffith were not unemployed for 'more than 3 weeks', they could not have been laid off for more than 3 weeks.

But Lawson and Griffith were unemployed. They had 'a period of unemployment.' While the act requires a layoff of more than 3 weeks, it does not in terms require that the period of unemployment extend for any particular time; it requires simply 'a period of unemployment'--the length of that period is not explicitly stated. The only length explicitly stated is 'more than 3 weeks' of layoff. The back-to-work benefit is geared to the period of the layoff, not the period of unemployment. ⁷

Affirmed as to Lawson and Griffith; reversed as to Erves, Bloomer and Kartsonas. Remanded for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

O'HARA, Judge (concurring in part; dissenting in part).

Judicial candor compels me to say that I have extreme difficulty in understanding section 27(c)(2), ¹ when read, as it must be, in connection with the rest of the Employment Security Act.

If the three-week period of Layoff, as used in § 27(c)(2), must also be a period of unemployment as the term 'unemployed' is defined in section 48 ² the result reached in this case would of necessity be different from that reached by Judge Levin.

If the term 'week' as defined in section 50(a) ³ of the act is to be regarded as controlling in the computation of the three weeks of layoff required by section 2(c)(2) obviously the result reached by Judge Levin would also be changed.

As I grope for that elusive concept 'legislative intent' in 27(c)(2) it seems to me the Legislature was trying to provide a benefit 'in addition to any benefits otherwise payable'. If this be true, then to effect the legislative intention, the words 'irrespective of any other provision of this act' must be read into 27(c)(2). If this be not true then the terms 'unemployed' and 'week' as elsewhere used must somehow be reconciled with their use in 27(c)(2).

I think what is troubling me most deeply is the distinction made by Judge Levin between the categories designated as the 'Erves, Bloomer, and Kartsonas' group and the 'Lawson and Griffith' group.

It's all very well to speak about the 'impact of the layoff in terms of wage loss' as to Erves, Bloomer or Kartsonas; and their 'week' as the normally worked five days. As to them Judge Levin makes out a very pragmatic and common-sense result.

But what of Lawson and Griffith? They get not only the 'back-to-work' benefit, but additionally two weeks of 'short-week' benefits under the union contract. If we are to be 'impact-of-layoff' oriented as to one group we ought to be so oriented as to the other. In fact it seems to me Lawson and Griffith have less entitlement to the back-to-work payments than do Erves, Bloomer, and Kartsonas. I sense almost an equal protection issue as between the two groups. Both groups ought to be eligible or not eligible instead of being distinguished on the basis of whether their layoff started on Friday or midweek.

General Motors speaks strongly to the point of an undeserved and, legislatively, uncontemplated windfall under the commission's interpretation. The commission speaks to the point that windfall or no windfall, the section says what it says, and if the...