General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus
Decision Date | 16 December 1983 |
Docket Number | 80-2027,81-1029,Nos. 80-1868,s. 80-1868 |
Citation | 724 F.2d 979 |
Parties | , 233 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,110 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Petitioner, v. William D. RUCKELSHAUS, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Petitioner, v. William D. RUCKELSHAUS, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Petitioner, v. William D. RUCKELSHAUS, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
George F. Ball and Theodore Souris, Detroit, Mich., with whom William L. Weber, Jr., Michael B. Lewiston, James A. Smith, Terrence B. Larkin, and Frederick J. Dindoffer, Detroit, Mich., were on brief, for petitioner.
Samuel I. Gutter, Atty., E.P.A., Washington, D.C., with whom Angus MacBeth, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Gerald K. Gleason, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Robert A. Weissman, Atty., Environmental Protection Agency, Donald W. Stever, Jr., and Rosanne Mayer, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for respondent.
Before WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges, and BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge BAZELON.
Petitioner General Motors Corporation (GM) brings three consolidated petitions for review of final actions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act, as amended. 1 In these petitions we are asked to decide whether the recall provision of section 207(c)(1) of the Act 2 permits the EPA to require automobile manufacturers to recall and repair at their own expense all members of a class of vehicles--a substantial number of which have been found to be in nonconformity with applicable emissions standards during their useful lives--regardless of the age or mileage of any individual vehicle when presented for repair. We take jurisdiction under section 307(b)(1) of the Act. 3 For reasons detailed below, we reverse the actions of the Administrator.
Through the Clean Air Act, Congress sought "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population ...." 4 To this end, Title II of the Act 5 establishes a comprehensive program for the control of motor vehicle emissions. The Act authorizes the Administrator to prescribe standards for motor vehicle emissions within the broad guidelines set out by the statute. 6 Such standards are applicable to the vehicles throughout their "useful lives." 7 The useful life of light duty vehicles, such as automobiles, is defined by statute as "a period of use of five years or fifty thousand miles (or the equivalent), whichever first occurs ...." 8
The Act also provides an elaborate enforcement system designed to ensure that vehicles comply with emissions standards, not only when they leave the assembly line but also while in actual use. 9 Among the enforcement mechanisms at the disposal of the EPA is the authority to order manufacturers to recall and repair at their own expense an entire class or model of vehicles or engines should the Administrator determine that a substantial number of vehicles in that class, although properly used and maintained, have failed to meet applicable emissions standards during their useful lives. 10 The precise scope and application of this recall authority are at issue in this lawsuit.
ANALYSIS
In reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute, a court should first examine the language of that statute to determine whether the interpretation falls within the statute's plain meaning. 43 In the instant case, however, the statutory language is ambiguous at best. Section 207(c)(1) of the Act provides in relevant part:
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