General Motors Corp. v. Davis

• Decision Date: 14 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 2,Nos. 53344,53345,s. 53344,2
• Citation: 233 S.E.2d 825,141 Ga.App. 495
• Parties: , 5 A.L.R.4th 654 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Dorothy DAVIS et al. DAYS CHEVROLET, INC. v. Dorothy DAVIS et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 825

233 S.E.2d 825

141 Ga.App. 495, 5 A.L.R.4th 654

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Dorothy DAVIS et al.

DAYS CHEVROLET, INC. v. Dorothy DAVIS et al.

Nos. 53344, 53345.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Feb. 14, 1977.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1977.

King & Spalding, R. Byron Attridge, Lanny B. Bridgers, Atlanta, for General Motors Corp.

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Warner S. Currie, Samuel P. Pierce, Jr., Atlanta, for Days Chevrolet, Inc.

Powell, Goldstein, Frazier & Murphy, Robert W. Patrick, Jerry B. Blackstock, James M. Griffin, Atlanta, for appellees.

STOLZ, Judge.

The appellee, Mrs. Dorothy Davis brought a wrongful-death action against the appellants, claiming that their negligence caused the death of her husband. The appellants' motions for summary judgment were denied. The denials of their motions are challenged on interlocutory appeals to this court.

On February 3, 1973, a large Chevrolet truck was purchased from Days Chevrolet by W. L. Brown. The new truck was given a routine safety inspection by Days Chevrolet. The truck had been manufactured by General Motors.

On March 1, 1973, the truck was being operated by an employee of its owner when it ceased to function in rush-hour traffic on Interstate Highway 75 in the Atlanta suburbs. The inability to operate was caused by a defect within the alternator, which caused a complete failure of the truck's electrical system. The defect was allegedly caused by General Motors' negligence in manufacturing the vehicle. It was also alleged that Days Chevrolet negligently failed to correct the defect or warn the owner of its existence. When the alternator failed to operate, the truck came to rest in the right-hand lane of two northbound lanes of freeway traffic.

A substantial period of time later, when freeway traffic had returned to normal speed, the large Chevrolet truck was still resting motionless on the freeway. Because of the electrical failure, no blinking lights were used to warn traffic of the danger, but the driver stood behind the truck to motion traffic around the vehicle. At approximately 6:00 p.m., a panel truck approached the stalled truck in the right-hand lane of traffic at freeway speed. Immediately behind the panel truck, Mrs. Davis' husband was driving a Volkswagen fastback. Construing the evidence most favorably to the nonmoving party on summary judgment, the facts indicate that the driver of the Volkswagen was unable to see the obstacle blocking his lane of traffic until, at a distance of two to three hundred feet from the motionless vehicle, the panel truck swerved into another lane. There was no visible reaction on the part of Mrs. Davis' husband; he drove his Volkswagen into the Chevrolet truck, thus causing his death.

Both appellants have made motions for summary judgment, which motions the trial judge denied. We affirm the denial of General Motors' motion and reverse the denial of Days Chevrolet's motion.

General Motors argues that, as a matter of law, its alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of the fatal collision. It is the contention of General Motors: (1) that there was no causation in fact linking its alleged negligence to the death of the decedent, (2) that it owed no duty to the decedent in its construction of the faulty alternator, and (3) that the collision was such a remote consequence of its alleged negligence as to break the chain of proximate cause. None of these contentions has any merit when applied to the facts as outlined above.

1. We find first that there was causation in fact linking General Motors' alleged negligence to the freeway death. In other words, the "but for" test mentioned by General Motors in oral argument has been met.

According to Prosser, the "but for" rule may be stated as follows: "The defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it." W. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th Ed. 1971), 239. In the instant case, if General Motors had not negligently manufactured the alternator, the truck would not have stalled, and there would not have been a stationary vehicle on the freeway for the decedent to hit. Therefore, causation in fact does exist.

2. General Motors also claims that, under the rule expressed by Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), it owed no duty to the decedent because he was outside of their "ambit of risk" in construction of the alternator. This contention, too, is without merit.

In the construction of vehicles intended for use on our highways, the entire motoring public is arguably within the ambit of risk. A jury could reasonably find that the malfunction of a piece of automotive equipment would place any person using a highway in danger of property damage or bodily injury. See Griffith v. Chevrolet Motor Div., GMC, 105 Ga.App. 588(1), 125 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga.App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197 (1948); cf. Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga.App. 461(5), 206 S.E.2d 121, affd., 232 Ga. 787, 209 S.E.2d 61 (1974) (duty of insurance company which safety inspects a building to persons who later may be injured by disaster in building); Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga.App. 420(3), 43 S.E.2d 553 (1947) (duty of furniture manufacturer to family member of ultimate purchaser). " 'It was not necessary that the defendant should have had notice of the particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye.' Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150, 156, 34 S.Ct. 44, 45, 58 L.Ed. 162 . . ." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., supra, 162 N.E. p. 100; see Stern v. Wyatt, 140 Ga.App. 704(1), 231 S.E.2d 519 (1976).

3. General Motors next alleges, citing Whitehead v. Republic Gear Co., 102 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1939), that the principle of remoteness releases it from liability. The principle of remoteness is applicable to situations where an intervening agency, such as the negligence of another, preponderates in causing the plaintiff's injury. Higdon v. Ga. Winn-Dixie, Inc., 112 Ga.App. 500(1, a), 145 S.E.2d 808 (1965). In Whitehead, supra, a truck became disabled on a highway due to the manufacturer's negligence, and a motorist later collided with the stationary vehicle. The accident was found to have been caused by either the negligence of the plaintiff himself or the driver of the disabled truck, such intervening negligence making the collision a remote consequence of the manufacturer's negligence.

In the case sub judice, a jury could find that there was no intervening agency tending to break the chain of causation linking the collision to the manufacturer's alleged negligence. A jury could reasonably conclude that the occurrences subsequent to General Motors' alleged negligence were natural and foreseeable results of its negligence that did not so preponderate as to insulate the manufacturer from liability. See Stern v. Wyatt, supra, (1).

4. General Motors cites several cases which stand for the proposition that if a driver can avoid a collision by swerving or stopping its vehicle when the danger becomes apparent, then the driver's contributory...