General Motors Corp. v. Smith

CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
Citation602 S.E.2d 521,216 W.Va. 78
Docket NumberNo. 31425.,31425.
PartiesGENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant Below, Appellee, v. Hubert J. SMITH, Appellee, and Complainant Below, Appellant, and The West Virginia Human Rights Commission, Appellee Below, Appellant.
Decision Date25 June 2004

Ronald S. Rossi, Esq., Susan R. Snowden, Esq., Martin & Seibert, L.C., Martinsburg, for General Motors Corporation.

Robert J. Schiavoni, Esq., David M. Hammer, Esq., Hammer, Ferretti & Schiavoni, Martinsburg, for Hubert J. Smith and the West Virginia Human Rights Commission.

PER CURIAM.

Hubert J. Smith, Appellant, contests the final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruling that his disability discrimination claim under the State Human Rights Act against General Motors Corporation (hereafter "GM"), Appellee, is preempted by both the federal Labor Management Relations Act and the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and fails to meet the statutory definition of "unlawful discrimination." After careful consideration of the issues raised herein, we reverse.

I. FACTS

While this case involves a dispute over a disability retirement, it is not a case of a plaintiff seeking to prove a disability or win any sort of benefits. This case concerns the efforts of Hubert J. Smith, Appellant, who despite receiving a permanent and total disability retirement from his job for GM, sought to give up his retirement benefits and go back to work.

Early in 1971, Mr. Smith began working for GM at its parts storage warehouse in Martinsburg, West Virginia, where he served as chairman of the workplace Civil Rights Committee. For much of his time at GM, Mr. Smith was a "Power Sweeper Operator," which essentially means that he drove a machine up and down the warehouse aisles cleaning the floor.1

During his time working for GM, Mr. Smith took an additional job working for the local Veterans' Administration office to help support his large family, usually working 7 to 3 for the VA, and then working another full shift at the GM plant. He first injured his back during his service in the Unites States Marine Corps, and re-injured it several times during the course of his employment. In 1985, he fell down a flight of stairs and suffered a lower back injury that ultimately resulted in three back surgeries. As a result of his condition, Mr. Smith either took, or was strongly encouraged by GM to take, a total and permanent disability retirement.2

As established in the union contract, or collective bargaining agreement, between the United Auto Workers Union, of which Smith was a member, and GM, a retired employee may return to work under certain conditions:

(f) Retirement as follows:
(1) An employee who retires, or who is retired under the terms of the Pension Plan, shall cease to be an employee and shall have seniority canceled.
(2) An employee who has been retired on a permanent and total disability pension and who hereby has broken seniority in accordance with subsection (1) above, but, who recovers and has pension payments discontinued, shall have seniority reinstated as though the employee had been on a sick leave of absence during the period of disability retirement, provided however, if the period of disability retirement was for a period longer than the seniority the employee had at the date of retirement, the employee shall, upon the discontinuance of the disability pension, be given seniority equal to the amount of seniority the employee had at the date of such retirement.

When a retiree meets the two criteria to return to work set forth in paragraph 64(f)(2) above, the parties should proceed as though the retirement had not occurred and the employee may return to the job held before retirement.

Given permission by his doctor to return to work, and feeling that his back had improved, Mr. Smith decided that he wanted to return to gainful employment at GM. He began the attempt to get his old job back on May 26, 1995, by submitting an authorization to return to work supplied by his treating physician. Over the next two years, his efforts to give up his retirement and return to work were impeded by a variety of bureaucratic hurdles erected by GM. GM did not even schedule a physical examination of Mr. Smith until June 11, 1997, some two years after he contacted the company about returning to work. Finally on July 22, a GM manager informed Mr. Smith that, according to the GM doctor, he was still too disabled to perform his old job, and would not be rehired by GM.

Responding to GM's refusal to re-employ him, Mr. Smith filed a complaint on July 24, 1998 with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission; his complaint alleged that he was able, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential function of a Power Sweeper Operator, but that GM failed to reinstate him because of his disability.

Over the course of a two day hearing, Mr. Smith presented evidence that several employees of GM had lied to Mr. Smith about his rights, had misstated his job duties, had overstated his disability, and had committed other impermissible acts to ensure that he would not return to work. Eventually, on May 1, 2001, the Human Rights Commission's administrative law judge ruled in Smith's favor, and the Commission later affirmed this ruling. GM appealed this decision, and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversed, finding that Mr. Smith's claim does not meet the statutory definition of "unlawful discrimination," and the state law claim is preempted by both the federal Labor Management Relations Act (sometimes referred to as the "LMRA") and the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (sometimes referred to as "ERISA"). Mr. Smith now appeals this order.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Circuit court decisions reversing an administrative agency receive a two-part review by this Court. "In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo." Syl. pt. 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). The question before us, which is whether Smith's state disability discrimination claim is preempted by federal law, is a question of law that we review de novo. We are also mindful that: "West Virginia Human Rights Commission's findings of fact should be sustained by reviewing courts if they are supported by substantial evidence or are unchallenged by the parties." Syl. pt. 1, West Virginia Human Rights Com'n v. United Transp. Union, Local No. 655, 167 W.Va. 282, 280 S.E.2d 653 (1981); accord syl. pt. 1, Fairmont Specialty Services v. West Virginia Human Rights Com'n, 206 W.Va. 86, 522 S.E.2d 180 (1999); syl. pt. 2, Tom's Convenient Food Mart, Inc. v. West Virginia Human Rights Com'n, 206 W.Va. 611, 527 S.E.2d 155 (1999) (per curiam).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Preemption

Knowing that Federal preemption is the greatest hurdle he must overcome, Mr. Smith first argues that neither federal pension law,3 nor federal labor contract law,4 preempts his claim. The essence of his argument is that, although Mr. Smith's initial right to seek re-employment with GM is a creature of his union contract, GM violated several aspects of our State employment law in the way it handled his request to come back to work.

Several decisions of this Court explain that federal preemption5 of state law is generally disfavored, and is more often the exception than the rule. The Court has also noted that state courts have jurisdiction to determine whether or not federal law should preempt a claim filed in a state court. We have explained that "[i]t is clear that state courts, including our own, have the authority to decide whether a state provision is indeed preempted by federal law." In re: West Virginia Asbestos Litigation, 215 W.Va. 39, 42, 592 S.E.2d 818, 821 (2003). Or, more succinctly: "West Virginia state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over federal preemption defenses." Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Orlofske v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 538, 575 S.E.2d 148 (2002).6

Our law has a general bias against preemption: "Moreover, both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have explained that federal preemption of state court authority is generally the exception, and not the rule." In re: West Virginia Asbestos Litigation, 215 W.Va. at 42, 592 S.E.2d at 821. And preemption should not be considered lightly: "Despite the existence of this doctrine, however, preemption is disfavored in the absence of convincing evidence warranting its application [.]" Hartley Marine Corp. v. Mierke, 196 W.Va. 669, 673, 474 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1996), cert denied sub nom. Hartley Marine Corp. v. Paige, 519 U.S. 1108, 117 S.Ct. 942, 136 L.Ed.2d 832 (1997). Finally we have noted, "[a]s a result, there is a strong presumption that Congress does not intend to preempt areas of traditional state regulation." Chevy Chase Bank v. McCamant, 204 W.Va. 295, 300, 512 S.E.2d 217, 222 (1998) (citing, FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990)).7

Bearing in mind these general principles, we turn to the lower court's finding that ERISA preempts Mr. Smith's claim. This Court has noted:

A party seeking preemption under the jurisdictional provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994), must first overcome the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law. State law actions that are clearly subject to preemption include those where West Virginia law attempts to affect the manner in which pension benefits are calculated under federal law, where the pension plan's existence is a critical element of the state law cause of action, or one in which the West Virginia statute expressly
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