General Motors Corp. v. Dist. Ct.
| Decision Date | 11 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 44506.,44506. |
| Citation | 134 P.3d 111 |
| Parties | GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, and Chapman Mesa Auto Center, Petitioners, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF the STATE OF NEVADA, in and for the COUNTY OF CLARK, and the Honorable Michelle Leavitt, District Judge, Respondents, and Heather Simmons, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Law Offices of Greg W. Marsh, Chtd., and Greg W. Marsh, Las Vegas; Bowman and Brooke LLP and Curtis J. Busby, Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner General Motors Corporation.
Lincoln, Gustafson & Cercos and Thomas J. Lincoln and Loren S. Young, Las Vegas, for Petitioner Chapman Mesa Auto Center.
Mainor Eglet Cottle, LLP, and Robert W. Cottle and Jennifer V. Willis, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest.
Before the Court En Banc.
In this original writ petition, we clarify Nevada's choice-of-law jurisprudence in tort actions. We conclude that the most significant relationship test, as provided in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 145, should govern the choice-of-law analysis in tort actions unless a more specific section of the Second Restatement applies to the particular tort claim. Consequently, we no longer adhere to the choice-of-law analysis previously set forth in Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc.1
In April 2002, real party in interest Heather Simmons was driving her 1996 Chevrolet Metro on Interstate 15 in southern Nevada. Jerry Freeland was driving his truck a short distance ahead of Simmons. Freeland's truck struck an object on the road that punctured his fuel tank and caused the tank to spill diesel fuel. When Simmons' vehicle came into contact with the diesel fuel, she lost control and her vehicle overturned. As a result of the accident, Simmons was rendered a quadriplegic.
Simmons is an Arizona resident. Except for the accident and spending several weeks in Nevada for medical treatment, Simmons has no contact with Nevada. After the accident, Simmons brought suit against several defendants, including petitioners General Motors Corporation (GM) and Chapman Mesa Auto Center (Chapman Auto). The complaint alleges that Simmons' injuries were caused by, among other things, the failure of her vehicle's roof assembly. Simmons asserts causes of action against GM and Chapman Auto for negligence, breach of implied warranty, strict liability, negligent failure to warn, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
GM is a Delaware corporation with its principal office located in Michigan. GM manufactured the 1996 Chevrolet Metro that Simmons was driving when the accident occurred. Chapman Auto is the independent auto dealer located in Arizona that sold the Chevrolet Metro to Simmons. Chapman Auto is not a GM dealer, nor is it affiliated with GM in any way.
GM and Chapman Auto sought dismissal of the case for forum non conveniens or, in the alternative, to have the district court apply Arizona law. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and determined that Nevada law should apply. As a result, GM filed this petition for a writ of mandamus, challenging the district court's order and seeking to compel the district court to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens or, in the alternative, to apply Arizona law. Chapman Auto joins in this petition.
The decision to entertain a petition for a writ of mandamus lies within this court's discretion.2 "A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, see NRS 34.160, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion."3
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.4 Consequently, we will only exercise our discretion to entertain a mandamus petition when there is no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"5 or "there are either urgent circumstances or important legal issues that need clarification in order to promote judicial economy and administration."6 Because this case presents important choice-of-law issues that need clarification in order to promote judicial economy and administration, we exercise our discretion to entertain that part of the writ petition challenging the denial of GM's and Chapman Auto's motion to apply Arizona law.7
Since this court's 1996 decision in Motenko, Nevada has followed the "overwhelming interest" test for resolving choice-of-law issues in tort actions. The "overwhelming interest" test can best be described as a hybrid of principles contained in the First and Second Restatements of Conflict of Laws. While this "overwhelming interest" test was intended to create a seemingly bright-line approach to resolving choice-of-law issues, it did not deviate from prior tests in a way that furthered the elusive goals of uniformity and predictability in complex, multiparty tort actions, and it fails to take advantage of the ongoing legal scrutiny by other courts and commentators given to the Second Restatement. Therefore, we conclude that our choice-of-law jurisprudence in tort actions warrants review.
Before Motenko, Nevada followed the vested rights approach
Historically, Nevada followed the First Restatement's vested rights approach when confronted with choice-of-law issues in tort actions.8 This approach required the court to apply the "substantive law of the forum in which the injury occurred."9 Although the application of the vested rights approach proved predictable, this court later expressed concern with the test in Motenko.10 In that case, this court abandoned the vested rights approach because that test blindly applied the substantive law of the forum where the injury occurred and produced "unjustifiably harsh results."11
The current state of the law under Motenko
In Motenko, the plaintiff and his mother were Massachusetts residents.12 While visiting Las Vegas, the mother fell and injured herself in a hotel.13 The plaintiff then filed a claim for loss of parental consortium in a Nevada district court.14 The district court applied the vested rights approach and determined that Nevada law applied because the injury occurred in Nevada.15 This court agreed with the district court's determination that Nevada law applied but did so after creating and applying the "overwhelming interest" test.16
Although a majority opinion was not reached, the Motenko court created the new "overwhelming interest" test, which retained a key feature of the vested rights approach and borrowed principles from the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test.17 The Motenko test requires the trial court to apply the substantive law of the forum in tort cases unless "another state has an overwhelming interest."18 Another state has an overwhelming interest if two or more of the Motenko factors are met.19 This approach reduces the conflict-of-law analysis in tort actions to a quantitative comparison of contacts, without any regard to a qualitative comparison of true conflicts-of-law between states.
The Motenko test is a hybrid of the vested rights approach and the most significant relationship test
Both the vested rights approach and the Motenko test start from the premise that the law of the forum governs the choice-of-law analysis in tort cases.20 Thus, both approaches emphasize a predictable and identifiable starting point that helps to further uniformity and predictability.
The Motenko test also borrowed and then modified some, but not all, of the Second Restatement's most significant relationship test for torts.21 The Second Restatement's most significant relationship test for torts is comprised of two sections. First, section 145(1) states that the rights and liabilities of the parties in tort actions are determined by the local law of the state that "has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Second, section 145(2) lists four contacts to be considered when applying the section 6 principles.22
Despite the clearly stated framework in section 145(1), the Motenko test ignores the qualitative principles in section 6, but utilizes the four quantitative contacts in section 145(2).23 The Second Restatement's four quantitative contacts in section 145(2) were designed to play a supporting role to the primary qualitative principles of section 6.24 Thus, the Motenko test effectively reversed the clearly stated order of priority between section 6 and section 145(2) by making the section 145(2) contacts the primary inquiry. The test also ignored the application of other Restatement sections in choice-of-law determinations designed specifically for a particular tort claim. Thus, Motenko created a new, independent test that lacks the historical evaluation, and cannot benefit from ongoing legal scrutiny, to be realized from the First and Second Restatements.
The Motenko test fails to further certainty, predictability, and uniformity
The stated purpose of the Motenko test was to meet "the goal of a higher degree of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result."25 However, as this court's decision in Northwest Pipe Co. v. District Court26 demonstrates, the application of the Motenko test to multiparty tort actions hinders, rather than promotes, these goals.
In Northwest Pipe, the defendant, an Oregon corporation, was sued for wrongful death in Nevada by family members of individuals who were killed in a California car accident. Two of the decedents were Nevada residents and four of the decedents were California residents. Nine of the eleven plaintiffs were Nevada residents with the remaining two residing in California.27
The plurality and concurrence applied the Motenko overwhelming interest test and produced an outcome in which the Nevada plaintiffs' claims proceeded under Nevada law and the California plaintiffs' claims against the same defendant proceeded under California law.28 Instead of qualitatively analyzing the contacts...
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