General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, s. B100758

• Decision Date: 15 August 1996
• Docket Number: B101933,Nos. B100758,s. B100758
• Citation: 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 871,48 Cal.App.4th 580
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6128, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9985 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Ron JEFFREY et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 871

55 Cal.Rptr.2d 871

48 Cal.App.4th 580, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6128,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9985

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

Ron JEFFREY et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Nos. B100758, B101933.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 15, 1996.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 5, 1996.

Review Denied Nov. 13, 1996.

Grace, Skocypec, Cosgrove & Schirm, Philip R. Cosgrove, David K. Schultz and Carl E. Lovell, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rowell & Tessier and John D. Rowell, Glendale, for Real Parties in Interest.

MIRIAM A. VOGEL, Associate Justice.

A driver wearing her seat belt is stopped in traffic. Her car is rear-ended. Although her seat belt remains fastened and does not break, her head strikes the steering wheel and she later mentions to a doctor that "the seat belt didn't hold [her]." Within one year, she sues the driver of the other car and 20 Doe defendants. More than two years after the accident, she substitutes the manufacturer of her car for a Doe defendant and adds allegations that the seat belt was defective. The manufacturer cries foul, claiming the driver knew there was a problem with the seat belt and knew the identity of the manufacturer of her car, and thus was not "ignorant" of its identity within the meaning of section 474 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ¹ The driver disagrees, claiming the mere fact that the seat belt did not secure her tightly to the seat did not make her suspect that the belt's "comfort feature" (which permits it to spool out when the driver leans forward) was defective in that it allowed "the inadvertent introduction of slack." The trial court agreed with the driver and so do we.

FACTS

On November 5, 1992, Susanna Jeffrey's 1986 Chevrolet Blazer was rear-ended by a car driven by David Katsuro Akazawa. Jeffrey's face hit the steering wheel and she suffered facial injuries, including "traumatic brain injury," a broken nose and broken teeth. Jeffrey hired a lawyer (Philip Dunn) and he sent Jeffrey to Charles Furst, Ph.D. (a clinical neuropsychologist), for an evaluation. On April 27, 1993, Dr. Furst interviewed and examined Jeffrey, who told him that she had struck her nose and abdomen on the steering wheel because "the seat belt didn't hold [her]" or because the "seat belt failed." ² On July 6, Dr. Furst forwarded a report to Dunn, reciting Jeffrey's history and expressing his opinion of her condition. Included in Dr. Furst's description of the accident is this statement: "She was stopped on the freeway in traffic when she was rear-ended. She experienced whiplash and she struck her nose on the steering wheel, after her seat belt failed, and additionally she struck her abdomen on the wheel also." On October 7, Jeffrey sued Akazawa and Does 1 through 20, claiming damages for personal injuries and property damage caused by Akazawa's negligent driving. ³

In March 1995, following a non-binding arbitration award against Akazawa for more than $500,000, Dunn associated "more experienced" counsel, John D. Rowell and his firm, Rowell & Tessier. In April, Jeffrey filed a standard-form "Amendment to Complaint" adding General Motors Corporation as Doe 1. On May 19 (two and one-half years after the accident), Jeffrey filed a first amended complaint adding a products liability claim against GM, alleging that the Blazer's seat belt restraint system was defectively designed, and that GM knew it was defective but did nothing about it. A claim for punitive damages was also added. ⁴

In August, GM (then unaware of Dr. Furst's notes) moved to quash service of Jeffrey's opposition was also supported by a declaration from Dunn explaining that he had examined the Blazer when he was first consulted by Jeffrey and that, to him, "there did not appear to be anything wrong with the passenger restraint system. Up until the time [he] discussed this matter with Mr. Rowell[, Dunn] was unaware of GM's 'comfort feature' and was completely unaware that this particular design could cause injuries such as occurred to Mrs. Jeffrey." A declaration by Rowell explained that he was involved in an unrelated matter involving "a claim that the identical 'comfort feature' " on a GM vehicle caused "head injuries in a similar manner to the allegations in this case." He had conducted substantial discovery in the other case and had learned of eight additional "comfort feature" cases pending against GM, all of which were subject to protective orders prohibiting disclosure of information about the alleged defects in GM's seat belt system. As a result, it "would be quite unusual for someone such as Mr. Dunn, who does not specialize in the products liability area, to have become aware of the problems associated with the use of the 'comfort feature' design" in Jeffrey's vehicle. Implicit in Rowell's declaration is the conclusion that the average driver would be totally unaware of this problem. ⁵

                Jeffrey's first amended complaint on the ground that Jeffrey must have known she had a potential claim against GM when the original complaint was filed because "a seat belt either restrains a person or it does not and this fact is known immediately after" an automobile accident.  Jeffrey opposed the motion, explaining in her declaration that although she obviously knew the name of the manufacturer of her car at the time she filed her original complaint, she "had no knowledge of any defect in the vehicle or the seat belt system of the vehicle."   Since that time, however, she "learned that the injury [she] suffered was an injury which was most likely suffered as a result of a defect in the design of the seat belt."   She learned of this defect when Rowell (her new attorney) explained it to her and identified a "so-called 'comfort feature' in the seat belt" which allows "the belt to remain in a spooled out position whenever a driver leans forward, for example, to adjust the radio or to turn on the ignition.  Once the driver leans forward the belt will not retract into a snug position when the driver leans back."   She had "never noticed this condition prior to discussing this matter" with Rowell but, since that time, had become aware of it when she drove the Blazer
                

GM's motion to quash was denied, the court finding that Jeffrey was "not aware of any defect, design or otherwise, in the ... occupant restraint system." GM then answered and conducted discovery, at which time it learned of Dr. Furst's examination of Jeffrey and the note in Dr. Furst's file about the seat belt "failure." GM asked Rowell to dismiss Jeffrey's case against GM in exchange for a waiver of costs and a release of GM's malicious prosecution claims. When Rowell refused, GM moved for summary judgment, contending Jeffrey's claims were barred because, at the time she filed her GM then filed a petition for a writ of mandate, asking us to compel the trial court to grant summary judgment and framing the issues as (1) whether a plaintiff may rely upon the subsequent association of more experienced counsel to bring in a new defendant under section 474 notwithstanding that "there has been no discovery of new facts" as required by section 474; (2) whether "the inexperience and malpractice" of Jeffrey's first lawyer, "who effectively violate[d][his] ethical obligation to not take cases [he was] unqualified to handle," is a legally justifiable excuse to avoid the requirements of section 474; ⁸ and (3) whether a Doe amendment can relate back to the date of the original complaint when it is "admittedly based upon the same basic facts (i.e. seat belt failure) which were admittedly known when the original complaint was filed." We issued an order to show cause, received opposition from Jeffrey, and heard argument (at which time we invited and later received further briefing). We now deny the petition.

                original complaint, Jeffrey and Dunn knew there was a problem with the seat belt and knew the identity of the car's manufacturer, and thus Jeffrey was not ignorant of GM's identity within the meaning of section 474.  GM supported its motion with Dr. Furst's deposition testimony, his handwritten notes, and his report to Dunn.  Jeffrey opposed the motion, relying on the declarations she had filed in opposition to GM's motion to quash and contending, again, that she was ignorant within the meaning of section 474 because she did not know the seat belt system was defective. 6  As Jeffrey explained to the trial court, her claims against GM are not based on an [48 Cal.App.4th 587] allegation of a mechanical failure but rather on the allegedly defective design of the restraint system.  The trial court denied GM's motion. 7
                

DISCUSSION

When a lawsuit is first initiated after the applicable period of limitations has expired and the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of a delayed discovery rule (that is But where, as here, a lawsuit is initiated within the applicable period of limitations against someone (that is, almost anyone at all) and the plaintiff has complied with section 474 by alleging the existence of unknown additional defendants, the relevant inquiry when the plaintiff seeks to substitute a real defendant for one sued fictitiously is what facts the plaintiff actually knew at the time the original complaint was filed. (See part II, post.)

when for one reason or another the plaintiff is granted an extended period within which to file suit), the relevant inquiry is what the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of due diligence, reasonably could have discovered at an earlier date. (See part I, post.)

In the trial court and here, GM talks in terms of what Jeffrey should have known at the time she filed her original complaint. As we will explain, that question is immaterial in this context and the only relevant inquiry is whether Jeffrey had actual knowledge of the basic facts giving rise to her claim against GM.

I. The...