General Motors Corp. v. Lupica

• Decision Date: 21 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 860897,860897
• Citation: General Motors Corp. v. Lupica, 237 Va. 516, 379 S.E.2d 311 (1989)
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,111 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Peter J. LUPICA, et al. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 311

379 S.E.2d 311

237 Va. 516, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,111

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Peter J. LUPICA, et al.

Record No. 860897.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

April 21, 1989.

James E. Farnham (Robert C. Rice, Jeffrey A. Standen, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, on briefs), for appellant.

Montgomery Knight, Jr., Norfolk, William R. O'Brien, Virginia Beach, (William L. Dudley, Jr., W. Robert Turner, III, Michael F. Bergan, Fay F. Spence, Knight, Dudley, Pincus, Dezern & Clarke, Norfolk on brief), for appellees.

Present: All the Justices.

STEPHENSON, Justice.

Peter J. Lupica and Luann K. Roane filed separate actions against General Motors Corporation (General Motors) to recover compensatory and punitive damages for injuries they sustained when Lupica's 1978 Chevrolet Monte Carlo automobile left Interstate Highway 64 and struck a tree. Both plaintiffs alleged that General Motors negligently designed the power steering system of the automobile, that the steering system was, therefore, defective, and that the defect was a proximate cause of their injuries.

The two actions were consolidated for trial, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of both plaintiffs. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $1,000,000 to Lupica and compensatory damages of $75,000 to Roane. ¹ The trial court entered judgment in accord with the verdict, and General Motors appeals.

We have limited this appeal to one of General Motors' assignments of error, i.e., whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain exhibits. The plaintiffs offered the exhibits to prove that General Motors had notice that other persons claimed to have experienced difficulty with General Motors' power steering systems because of the presence of particulate in the system--the defect that plaintiffs alleged existed in Lupica's automobile.

I

On July 3, 1979, Lupica and Roane left Norfolk en route to Richmond on Interstate 64. Lupica was operating the Monte Carlo automobile, and Roane was occupying the front passenger seat. The road surface was dry, and traffic was light in the area of the accident.

Approximately 500 feet east of the Ocean View exit, the automobile suddenly veered to its left, proceeded across the median, crossed the two eastbound lanes of the highway, and travelled an additional 167 feet before it struck a tree. The total distance traversed by the automobile from the westbound lanes of the highway to the tree was 467 feet.

At the time of the accident, the automobile's odometer showed approximately 27,000 miles. Lupica had never experienced any difficulty with the vehicle's steering system.

The steering system in Lupica's automobile did not contain a filter or screen to prevent particles from entering the system's hydraulic fluid. Consequently, particles in the fluid became wedged between cylinders within the power system, causing it to malfunction. This, in turn, caused the automobile to "self-steer" and to go out of control. The design of Lupica's steering system was identical to the power steering systems in all automobiles manufactured by General Motors since 1964.

II

A

General Motors contends that "[n]otice was not an element of the plaintiffs' case." This is so, General Motors asserts, because it did not "plead affirmatively that ... it did not know, and could not have known, of the defective design prior to the accident giving rise to the litigation." ² (Emphasis added.)

Suffice it to say, that in the motion for judgment, the plaintiffs alleged that General Motors knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, that the steering mechanism was dangerous and defective, and General Motors denied the allegation. Thus, notice was an issue in the case.

B

General Motors also contends that notice was not an issue because it admitted that, prior to the subject accident, it was aware that other persons had experienced steering problems caused by the presence of particulate in their power steering systems. At trial, out of the jury's presence, General Motors' counsel made the following statement:

We stipulate that, and we are prepared to either work with counsel or work with the court to say that prior to the date of this accident, General Motors knew that particulate matter was found in the power steering system of this type.

Now, we then go to the question of notice with respect to alleged failures of the system due to particulate. And the reason that we believe that this--one reason we believe that the stipulation is the only appropriate way to go is we will stipulate that prior to this accident, General Motors had--was aware of claims by drivers of cars, that their cars had been caused to malfunction because of particulate in the steering gear. Now, I think the bone of contention that we have to resolve is to what extent are the plaintiffs entitled to not only show notice but to show that one of those claims, for example, that you read involved a man who was apparently paralyzed as a result of this. Are they entitled to show not only the fact of notice but the detail of the notice? Now, I simply wanted to lay that framework out because I think those are the issues that really the court has got to--we're all going to have to come to grips with as part of this analysis. ... [T]his is the reason we would propose that resolution.

General Motors contends that this statement constitutes a judicial admission that prior to the accident in question, General Motors had knowledge of claims by other owners and operators of automobiles manufactured by General Motors that particulate in the steering gear had caused their automobiles to malfunction. We do not agree.

The essence of a judicial admission is its conclusiveness. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must conclusively establish a fact in issue. The admission may not be thereafter qualified, explained, or rebutted by other evidence. Consequently, once a fact has been established by a judicial admission, evidence tending to prove the fact admitted becomes irrelevant. See TransiLift Equipment, Ltd. v. Cunningham, 234 Va. 84, 90, 360 S.E.2d 183, 186-87 (1987).

Clearly, the statement made by General Motors' counsel does not rise to the level of a judicial admission. At most, it was a proffer to stipulate the fact of notice--a proffer the plaintiffs never accepted. Indeed, General Motors' counsel's understanding of the inconclusive nature and effect of his statement is demonstrated by his remark to the court that "[a]pparently, our proffer to stipulate has been rejected, and now [the plaintiffs] are going to go through specifics of complaints."

III

General Motors further contends that, even if notice is an issue in the case, the trial court erred in admitting the documents in question. ³ General Motors asserts that "the requisite factual predicate for the admission of the exhibits ... was totally absent."

"Evidence of other similar accidents or occurrences, when relevant, is admissible to show that the defendant had notice and actual knowledge of a defective condition," provided the prior accidents or occurrences happened "under substantially the same circumstances, and had been caused by the same or similar defects and dangers as those in issue." Spurlin, Administratrix v. Richardson, 203 Va. 984, 989, 128 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1962). Accord Roll 'R' Way Rinks v. Smith, 218 Va. 321, 325, 237 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1977). Thus, "the test of admissibility is ... substantial similarity." Id. (emphasis in original).

Such evidence is admissible in a products liability case to establish foreseeability and a defendant's duty to a plaintiff. When a defendant has notice and actual knowledge of a defect, it owes a duty to a plaintiff "to take the steps reasonably necessary to remedy the defect." Id. at 329, 237 S.E.2d at 162.

We have examined the admitted notice exhibits and conclude that most meet the "substantial similarity" test. Each exhibit meeting the test contains statements of occurrences where the power steering on a...