General Motors Corporation v. Washington

Decision Date08 June 1964
Docket NumberNo. 115,115
Citation377 U.S. 436,12 L.Ed.2d 430,84 S.Ct. 1564
PartiesGENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

See 85 S.Ct. 14.

Donald K. Barnes, Detroit, Mich., for appellant.

John W. Riley and Timothy R. Malone, Olympia, Wash., for appellees.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal tests the constitutional validity, under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses, of Washington's tax imposed upon the privilege of engaging in business activities within the State.1 The tax is measured by the appellant's gross wholesale sales of motor vehicles, parts and accessories delivered in the State. Appellant claims that the tax is levied on unapportioned gross receipts from such sales and is, therefore, a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce; is inherently discriminatory; results in the imposition of a multiple tax burden; and is a deprivation of property without due process of law. The Washington Superior Court held that the presence of a branch office in Seattle rendered some of the Chevrolet transactions subject to tax, but, as to the remainder, held that the application of the statute would be repugnant to the Commerce and the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the latter finding, holding that all of the appellant's transactions were sub- ject to the tax on the ground that the tax bore a reasonable relation to the appellant's activities within the State. 60 Wash.2d 862, 376 P.2d 843. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 374 U.S. 824, 83 S.Ct. 1871, 10 L.Ed.2d 1049. We have concluded that the tax is levied on the incidents of a substantial local business in Washington and is constitutionally valid and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

I.

We start with the proposition that '(i)t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business.' Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254, 58 S.Ct. 546, 548, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1938). 'Even interstate business must pay its way,' Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259, 39 S.Ct. 265, 266, 63 L.Ed. 590 (1919), as is evidenced by numerous opinions of this Court. For example, the Court has approved property taxes on the instruments employed in commerce, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General, 125 U.S. 530, 8 S.Ct. 961, 31 L Ed. 790 (1888); on property devoted to interstate transportation fairly apportioned to its use within the State, Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 11 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed. 613 (1891); on profits derived from foreign or interstate commerce by way of a net income tax, William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 38 S.Ct. 432, 62 L.Ed. 1049 (1918), and United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 38 S.Ct. 499, 62 L.Ed. 1135 (1918); by franchise taxes, measured by the net income of a commercially domiciled corporation from interstate commerce attributable to business done in the State and fairly apportioned, Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 41 S.Ct. 45, 65 L.Ed. 165 (1920); by a franchise tax measured on a proportional formula on profits of a unitary business manufacturing and selling ale, 'the process of manufacturing resulting in no profits until it ends in sales,' Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd., v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 282, 45 S.Ct. 82, 84, 69 L.Ed. 282 (1924); by a personal prop- erty tax by a domiciliary State on a fleet of airplanes whose home port was in the taxing State, despite the fact that personal property taxes were paid on part of the fleet in other States, Northwest Airlines, Inc., v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 64 S.Ct. 950, 88 L.Ed. 1283 (1944); by a net income tax on revenues derived from interstate commerce where fairly apportioned to business activities within the State, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S.Ct. 357, 3 L.Ed.2d 421 (1959); and by a franchise tax levied on an express company, in lieu of taxes upon intangibles or rolling stock, measured by gross receipts, fairly apportioned, and derived from transportation within the State, Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 79 S.Ct. 411, 3 L.Ed.2d 450 (1959).

However, local taxes measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce have not always fared as well. Because every State has equal rights when taxing the commerce it touches, there exists the danger that such taxes can impose cumulative burdens upon interstate transactions which are not presented to local commerce. Cf. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 170, 74 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed. 583 (1954); Philadelphia & Southern S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 346, 7 S.Ct. 1118, 30 L.Ed. 1200 (1887). Such burdens would destroy interstate commerce and encourage the re-erection of those trade barriers which made the Commerce Clause necessary. Cf. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521—522, 55 S.Ct. 120, 79 L.Ed. 632 (1935). And in this connection, we have specifically held that interstate commerce cannot be subjected to the burden of 'multiple taxation.' Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, supra, at 170. Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is well established that taxation measured by gross receipts is constitutionally proper if it is fairly apportioned.

A careful analysis of the cases in this field teaches that the validity of the tax rests upon whether the State is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation. For our purposes the decisive issue turns on the operating incidence of the tax. In other words, the question is whether the State has exerted its power in proper proportion to appellant's activities within the State and to appellant's consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the State has afforded. Where, as in the instant case, the taxing State is not the domiciliary State, we look to the taxpayer's business activities within the State, i.e., the local incidents, to determine if the gross receipts from sales therein may be fairly related to those activities. As was said in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444, 61 S.Ct. 246, 250, 85 L.Ed. 267 (1940), '(t)he simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.'

Here it is admitted that General Motors has entered the State and engaged in activities therein. In fact, General Motors voluntarily pays considerable taxes on its Washington operations but contests the validity of the tax levy on four of its Divisions, Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile and General Motors Parts. Under these circumstances appellant has the burden of showing that the operations of these divisions in the State are 'dissociated from the local business and interstate in nature. The general rule, applicable here, is that a taxpayer claiming immunity from a tax has the burden of establishing his exemption.' Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537, 71 S.Ct. 377, 380, 95 L.Ed. 517 (1951). And, as we also said in that case, this burden is not met

'by showing a fair difference of opinion which as an original matter might be decided differently. This corporation, by submitting itself to the taxing power * * * (of the State), likewise submitted itself to its judicial power to construe and apply its taxing statute insofar as it keeps within constitutional bounds. Of course, in constitutional cases, we have power to examine the whole record to arrive at an independent judgment as to whether constitutional rights have been invaded, but that does not mean that we will re-examine, as a court of first instance, findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.' At 537—538 of 340 U.S., at 380 of 71 S.Ct.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts.

II.
1. GENERAL MOTORS' CORPORATE ORGANIZATION AND SALES OPERATION.

General Motors in a Delaware corporation which was engaged in business in Washington during the period of time involved in this case, January 1, 1949, through June 30, 1953. Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile and General Motors Parts are divisions of General Motors, but they operate substantially independently of each other. The corporation manufactures automobiles, trucks and other merchandise which are sold to dealers in Washington. However, all of these articles are manufactured in other States. In order to carry on the sale, in Washington, of the products of Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile and General Motors Parts, the corporation maintains an organization of employees in each of these divisions on a national, regional and district level. During the taxing period in question, the State of Washington was located in the western region of the corporation's national organization and each division, except General Motors Parts, maintained a zone office at Portland, Oregon. These zone offices serviced General Motors' operations in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, portions of Montana and Wyoming and all of the then Territory of Alaska. Chevrolet Division also maintained a branch office at Seattle which was under the jurisdiction of the Portland zone office and which rendered special service to all except the nine southern counties of Washington, which were still serviced by the Portland office. The zone offices of each divi- sion were broken down into geographical district offices and it is in these districts that the dealers, to whom the corporation sold its products for re-sale, were selected and located.2 The orders for these products were sent by the dealers to the zone office located at Portland. They were accepted or rejected there or at the factory and the sales were completed by shipments f.o.b. the factories.

2. PERSONNEL RESIDING WITHIN THE ...

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